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The Maghreb’s political development continues to confound expectations. 
Few specialists anticipated the start of the Arab Spring. Fewer still thought 
it would begin in Tunisia, long regarded as one of the region’s most stable 
and prosperous countries.1 Then, when the demonstrations did break out, 
most assumed Ben Ali would easily deal with them. Not only had he 
overcome similar challenges in the past, but he had the support of a large, 
well-funded and experienced security apparatus. Their shock at his down-
fall less than a month later was compounded by the simultaneous outbreak 
of copycat protests elsewhere and Libya’s descent into civil war. Many 
now issued millennial predictions about what would happen next. Unrest 
would sweep the region. None of its leaders would be spared. Algeria was 
especially vulnerable.
Yet many of these forecasts have proved to be just as inaccurate as 
the conservative assumptions that preceded them. While the Arab Spring 
has undoubtedly wrought many significant changes to the Maghreb, its 
impact has not been as great as was predicted. In large parts of the region, 
political life has continued very much as before. Morocco’s monarchy has 
not surrendered any of its core powers let alone become fully constitu-
tional. Mauritania is still governed by the general and coup d’état leader, 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. And Algeria’s 2014 presidential election was 
won comfortably by the long-serving, aging and seriously ill incumbent, 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika.2
A critical mistake made by many commentators was to overemphasise 
Tunisia’s similarity to its near neighbours. They deduced that, if compara-
ble circumstances to those which had led to Ben Ali’s fall could be found 
throughout the rest of the region, then its other leaders were likely to suffer 
the same fate. Their suppositions and hypotheses were given additional 
weight and credibility by the outbreak of equally decisive protests in other 
parts of the Middle East. Hosni Mubarak’s demise was widely seen as 
both a sign and a prelude, as evidence of the region’s hunger and readi-
ness for change, and the continued power of this transnational impulse 
and movement to enact it. Soon, the whole region would succumb to its 
transformational energy.
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These assumptions were not without foundation. The countries of the 
Maghreb do share a great deal in common. And their likenesses are accen-
tuated by the region’s exceptionalism. Indeed, the Maghreb is defined by 
separation and similarity. It is distinct and distinguished from the regions 
that surround it, from the Middle East, from Europe and from sub-Saharan 
Africa. Yet its ties to them each are as numerous as they are varied, ancient 
as they are self-renewing, strong as they are subtle. Moreover, it is these 
connections that make it different. For the Maghreb is the sum of its 
parts. It is hybrid, it is distinct from each because of the influence of all. 
Similarity has created singularity.
Yet there are also differences within, between the Maghreb’s assorted 
parts, peoples and cultures. Indeed, it is these variations that hold the key 
to explaining the region’s competing political trajectories, why Morocco 
has not gone the way of Tunisia, why Abdelaziz Bouteflika remains in 
office, why the Mauritanian regime endures. The aim of this book is 
better to capture and contextualise these disparities while paying all due 
and  necessary attention to the similarities. It does so by charting, exam-
ining and comparing the political development of four of the region’s 
countries – Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania – over the past ten 
years. And, to structure and guide its analysis, it draws on Steven Levitsky 
and Lucan Way’s concept of competitive authoritarianism and associated 
model for explaining regime transition.3
The purpose of this model is to explain the uneven spread of democ-
racy among competitive authoritarian regimes. Levitsky and Way argue 
that such regimes are a product of the end of the Cold War. The conflict’s 
conclusion not only triggered a sharp decline in international tolerance of 
authoritarian practices and the governments that employed them but also 
sparked the rapid diffusion of the ‘formal architecture of democracy’ and 
‘particularly multiparty elections’ around the world.4 These developments 
led to the emergence of ‘civilian regimes in which formal democratic 
institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining 
power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a sig-
nificant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents’.5 The model seeks to explain, 
therefore, why some of these regimes ‘democratized during the post-Cold 
War period, while others remained stable and authoritarian and still others 
experienced turnover without democratization’.6
To do so, the model focuses on both international and domestic factors, 
regimes’ ‘ties to the West and the strength of [their] governing-party and 
state organizations’.7 These factors are covered by the core dimensions 
of linkage, leverage and organisational power which, in turn, consist of 
various subdimensions. Levitsky and Way define linkage as ‘the density 
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of ties’ between a regime and European and North American coun-
tries.8 These bonds can take a range of forms but the most significant 
are economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, social, information and 
civil-society.9
In contrast, leverage is defined less by the amount of pressure European 
and North American countries can bring to bear on a regime, and more 
by the regime’s ability to withstand outside influence.10 Levitsky and 
Way argue that the amount of leverage the West has over a regime is 
determined by the size and strength of the regime’s economy and state 
structures; the consistency with which European and North American 
governments pursue their foreign policies and co-ordinate them with one 
another; and whether a regime has a powerful patron or Black Knight who 
is willing and able to defend it against Western governments and offset 
some of the pressure placed on it by them.11
Finally, organisational power concerns a regime’s ability to sustain 
itself. Levitsky and Way observe that ‘modern authoritarianism is a 
complex and costly endeavour’.12 To survive, a regime has to dissuade 
‘diverse social and political actors from challenging’ it ‘as well as main-
tain the loyalty and cooperation of powerful’ individuals and groups 
within it.13 Crucial to its ability to perform these functions, are its state 
and party structures. For, as Levitsky and Way argue, ‘effective state and 
party organizations enhance incumbents’ capacity to prevent elite defec-
tion, co-opt or oppress opponents, defuse or crack down on protest, and 
win (or steal) elections’.14 A regime’s organisational power is determined, 
therefore, by the cohesion, reach and mobilisation capacity of the ruling 
party and the size, effectiveness and experience of the security forces (the 
military, police, gendarmerie, and intelligence and security services).
Levitsky and Way’s model provides an ideal framework for this 
enquiry for three main reasons. First, it is specifically designed system-
atically to capture and explain similarities and differences in experience. 
Second, the symmetry of circumstance encourages its renewed use. That 
is, the model was initially devised to explain the experiences of a range of 
regimes during the last, great wave of democratisation that was triggered 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. It is only 
fitting, therefore, that the model be applied to at least some of the coun-
tries affected during this most recent wave of democratisation. And third, 
the model has never been applied to this particular region which, owing 
to its geocultural singularity, is only imperfectly covered by Levitsky and 
Way’s original study.15
The book’s choice of case studies (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and 
Mauritania) is informed by two key considerations. First, by selecting 
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these countries, the book seeks to uncover and chart region-wide issues 
and themes. Doing so not only allows it to determine the ways and extent 
to which each country was affected by what was taking place in its nearest 
neighbours but also to compile a carefully structured overview of the 
region’s development over this critical period (before, during and after 
the Arab Spring). Second, Libya (the last remaining Maghreb country) is 
excluded as a case study because it is currently in the grip of civil war.16
The book argues that Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania were 
all competitive authoritarian a decade ago, that only Tunisia is now demo-
cratic and that, while Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania have remained 
competitive authoritarian, they have done so for different reasons. More 
specifically, the book argues that Morocco and Algeria have remained 
competitive authoritarian because of their high organisational powers, 
and Europe’s and North America’s inconsistent and half-hearted applica-
tion of pressure on them to democratise; that Mauritania has remained 
competitive authoritarian, despite the regime’s medium organisational 
power, because Europe and North America lack both the means and the 
will consistently to pressurise Nouakchott to democratise; and that Tunisia 
has democratised because the Ben Ali regime was unable to sustain itself 
owing to a catastrophic breakdown in its organisational power.
Inevitably, the Arab Spring casts a long shadow across the pages of 
this book. The passions, protests, calculations and countermeasures which 
comprised and defined it, have left an indelible mark on the Maghreb. And 
some countries have been especially affected. Tunisia is now much altered 
as a result. Not only did the protests start there but, such was their impact, 
they have entered into national folklore, become an important and pow-
erful political memory, and added an extra facet to Tunisians’ collective 
sense of self. Yet this book is not about the Arab Spring. The volume’s 
purpose and goal are neither to trace the local and transnational origins of 
these demonstrations, nor offer any great new insight into why they began 
and unfolded as they did. Rather, the book is interested in the political 
development of four Maghreb countries over a period during which the 
Arab Spring took place.
This examination and this analysis lead the book to make three valu-
able and original contributions. To begin with, it is the first to use Levitsky 
and Way’s model to structure its interrogation of Morocco’s, Tunisia’s 
and Mauritania’s recent experiences, and organise its comparison of 
their and Algeria’s development over the past decade.17 By adopting this 
unprecedented approach, the book is able systematically to chart and 
compare the development of these four regimes over this vital period. It is 
able to contextualise the start, progression and end of the Arab Spring in 
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the Maghreb, highlight and consider the roles played by key global actors, 
and examine the interplay between international and domestic factors. The 
book makes no claims about the originality of the information on these 
countries it includes, only about the ways in which this material is organ-
ised and presented. This approach is entirely consistent with that taken 
by Levitsky and Way in their 2010 book as they also relied on existing 
analyses and works for each of their cases studies.
Second, the book is the first to focus on these four countries alone. A 
number of existing studies of the Arab Spring examine events in some 
of them (usually Tunisia and Libya). Yet they invariably do so along-
side other places in the Middle East.18 By restricting its focus to Tunisia, 
Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, the book privileges the Maghreb’s 
experiences. Moreover, it is better able to address the shortfall in atten-
tion paid to some of the region’s countries. Little has been written about 
Algeria, and even less about Mauritania.
And third, the book extends the application and broadens the applica-
bility of Levitsky and Way’s model. As the first study to apply it to the 
Maghreb, the book extends their model to a group of countries that resist 
easy categorisation as either African, Middle Eastern or European and 
which are, as a result, only partially covered by both their introductions 
to their case studies from these regions and the studies themselves. And 
the book also confirms that their model can be applied to these countries. 
That is, it demonstrates that at least some of the limits Levitsky and Way 
imposed on their choice of case studies are needlessly stringent.
In explaining their selection, Levitsky and Way confirmed that they 
excluded ‘other types of hybrid (or “partly free”) regime[s], including a 
variety of regimes in which political competition exists but nonelected 
officials retain considerable power, such as (1) those in which the most 
important executive office is not elected (e.g., . . . Morocco); (2) regimes 
in which top executive positions are filled via elections but the authority 
of elected governments is seriously constrained by the military or other 
nonelected bodies . . . ; and (3) competitive regimes under foreign occu-
pation’.19 Their justification of these parameters was that ‘in all of these 
regimes, the power of actors outside of the electoral process generates 
a distinct set of dynamics and challenges not found under competitive 
authoritarianism’.20
The book challenges these restrictions on the grounds that they are 
unhelpful and unnecessary. First, Levitsky and Way’s explanation of why 
these conditions are needed is both brief and vague. They argue that pow-
erful monarchs and militaries do not fit within competitive authoritarian 
regimes but do not explain why this is so. Second, by insisting on these 
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limits, they expose themselves to accusations of cherry-picking, of setting 
the criteria for consideration in ways that favour their model. And third, 
by excluding certain types of regime, they compromise their model’s 
claim to universality. For there are numerous countries in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America that have politically influential kings or, more often, 
armed forces. If such regimes are to be ignored, then large parts of the 
world are placed beyond the model’s explanatory reach. The book, then, 
uses Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania to substantiate these challenges 
and demonstrate the fallaciousness of the restrictions Levitsky and Way 
impose.
To sustain this analysis and comparison, the book is divided into five 
chapters. The first outlines and explains Levitsky and Way’s model. It 
examines each of the core dimensions (linkage, leverage and organisa-
tional power) and their subdimensions. It explains how Levitsky and Way 
use these dimensions to assess a regime’s strength. It explains how they 
measure strength. And it examines the interplay between dimensions, how 
particular scores in one (high, medium or low) shape and affect the sig-
nificance of what is happening in the other two (for example, high linkage 
makes democratisation more likely even if leverage is low, while low 
linkage means that organisational power is key).21
The following four chapters each then applies this model to Tunisia, 
Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania respectively. To ensure better the con-
sistency of their analysis and facilitate each country’s comparison with its 
neighbours, these chapters are all structured in the same way as each other 
and along the same lines as Levitsky and Way’s original case studies. Each 
chapter begins, therefore, by assessing the strength of Tunisia’s, Algeria’s, 
Morocco’s and Mauritania’s links to Europe and North America. The 
chapters systematically proceed through the various subdimensions, iden-
tifying and evaluating the significance of any ties that fall within these 
categories. The chapters then move on to gauge the amount of leverage 
Western governments have over their Maghreb counterparts. Again, the 
chapters do so by progressing through each of the subdimensions before 
determining whether the country in question has the backing of a Black 
Knight patron. The chapters then examine the organisational strength of 
each regime, looking at the robustness of their party and state structures. 
Finally, and again in keeping with Levitsky and Way’s original case 
studies, the chapters trace the origins and development of the regime in 
question.
This analysis leads the book to arrive at a series of intriguing and 
noteworthy conclusions: that domestic factors have often proved to be 
more decisive than international ones; that the organisational strengths 
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of the Moroccan and Algerian regimes have exceeded the determination 
and ability of European and North American governments to make them 
change; that Western states have struggled to formulate and prosecute 
consistent, pro-democracy foreign policies and co-ordinate their efforts 
with one another; that these states have continued to struggle to promote 
democratisation in the region and better synchronise their policies despite 
promising to do so; that the Algerian, Moroccan and Mauritanian regimes 
look set to remain competitive authoritarian for the foreseeable future; that 
Levitsky and Way’s model can be applied to these regimes; and that their 
model has broader applicability than they claim.
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Levitsky and Way and 
Competitive Authoritarianism: 
Leverage, Linkage and Organisational Power
Levitsky and Way developed their model in response to the momentous 
events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Glasnost and perestroika, the 
withdrawal of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of the USSR itself set in train the powerful forces 
which not only led to the crucial changes in international attitude which so 
interest Levitsky and Way but also helped create several of the states they 
have since examined.1 In the space of just a few years, authoritarian prac-
tices were dismissed as inappropriate and the regimes which employed 
them worthy of censure. Liberal democracy was confirmed as the preferred 
and only truly legitimate political system.2 The amount of material support 
provided to dictatorships was either reduced or ended entirely, while that 
offered to governments which were willing and trying to democratise was 
increased. Indeed, just as colonialism had been quickly ruled unacceptable 
following World War II, so authoritarianism was deemed undesirable in 
the wake of the Cold War.3
Yet the triumph of democratic ideals these changes heralded was by 
no means total. While the number of democracies in the world certainly 
increased, especially in Eastern Europe, authoritarianism lingered on.4 As 
well as surviving in some of the places where it had long been practised, it 
was adopted by many of the governments of the new states that emerged 
out of the Soviet Union.5 Moreover, some of the regimes which claimed 
to have embraced democracy – claims that they often tried to substanti-
ate by pointing to new practices they had adopted or alterations to their 
political processes and systems they had made – had done so reluctantly, 
half-heartedly and imperfectly. Levitsky and Way describe such semi- or 
pseudo-democracies as competitive authoritarian.
Of course, the Third Wave of democratisation and the Arab Spring 
remain inextricably interlinked. First, there is the term ‘Arab Spring’ itself 
which is derived from that of the ‘Prague Spring’ that was applied to the 
Czechoslovakian government’s ill-fated efforts in 1968 to challenge Soviet 
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hegemony by extending its citizens’ civil and political rights.6 Memories 
of the Prague Spring later fed into the popular protests that helped launch 
and sustain the Third Wave and have also been invoked elsewhere in the 
world including North Africa. Indeed, in March, April and May 1980, 
Algeria’s Kabyle minority launched a series of protests against the gov-
ernment which were quickly dubbed the Berber Spring.7 The Arab Spring, 
therefore, is named after a vital moment in Eastern European history 
which has provided succour and inspiration to  pro-democracy activists 
everywhere for over fifty years.
Then there are the activities themselves. Very broadly, both the Third 
Wave and Arab Spring were phases of democratisation of international 
scale and import. Numerous countries in multiple regions were affected by 
them. Their transnational dimensions helped give them much of their early 
energy as populations followed and understood the significance of what 
was happening elsewhere, and drew courage and inspiration for what they, 
in turn, might achieve. In both instances, the world (or substantial parts 
of it, at least) appeared to be in flux with profound and, for the most part, 
popular changes being demanded and made. New political vistas seemed 
to be opening up while the momentum of events placed them tantalisingly 
within reach. And, more specifically, the Arab Spring was made possible 
and necessary only by the Third Wave’s failure to bring fundamental and 
lasting change to the region. Certainly the countries of the Maghreb were 
affected by the powerful forces it unleashed and encapsulated. In March 
1992, Mauritania held its first ever multiparty parliamentary election.8 
Then, in October 1999, Tunisia staged its first competitive presidential 
election.9 And, between June 1990 and December 1991, Algeria organ-
ised its first multiparty local, regional and national assembly elections.10 
Indeed, of all the region’s countries, Algeria experienced the most far-
reaching changes, coming close to undergoing democratic transfers of 
power at three of its four levels of government.11
And, after they had each begun, the Third Wave and Arab Spring fol-
lowed similar trajectories. Both caught the international community by 
surprise and opened with an outpouring of energy, dynamism and opti-
mism. Some governments fell quickly. Others sought to save themselves 
with platitudes and reforms, to bargain their ways out of their crises. 
Others still were more robust and turned to their militaries, police forces, 
intelligence and security services to save them. Some of these efforts were 
in vain as more regimes collapsed and others stood on the brink. Yet, in 
the end, by the time all the early energy, dynamism and optimism had dis-
sipated, the full extent of democracy’s gains were not quite as great as had 
initially been hoped for or seemed possible.
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Indeed, just as the Third Wave did not trigger the lasting collapse of 
any of North Africa’s established orders, so the Arab Spring has failed 
fully to deliver on its early promise. Perhaps inevitably, its piecemeal 
and partial achievements have breathed new life into the interests and 
questions that originally motivated Levitsky and Way. Indeed, why has 
this phase of democratisation stalled? Why have not more of the region’s 
countries liberalised? Why, despite their seeming similarities, have they 
experienced such different political outcomes? Why has Tunisia democra-
tised? Why have Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania remained competitive 
authoritarian? 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to chart and explain Levitsky and 
Way’s model in preparation for its application to the book’s four case 
studies. In pursuit of this goal, the chapter is divided into four sections. 
The first provides an overview of the dimensions of leverage, linkage and 
organisational power, focusing, in particular, on the interplay between 
them; how the strength of one renders the others more or less important. 
The following three sections are each organised along the same lines. The 
second section examines the dimension of leverage: the principal ways in 
which it is exercised and how it is quantified. This section also defines a 
Black Knight patron: what a state or regime must do to qualify as one. The 
third section examines the dimension of linkage: the main forms it takes 
and how its strength is measured and categorised. And the fourth section 
examines organisational power: the state and other structures on which it 
is based.
Leverage, Linkage and Organisational Power: an Overview
In 2010, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way published their highly acclaimed 
book, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. 
In it, they set out their model for explaining regime transition: why some 
regimes become democratic while others remain or become authoritarian, 
and others, still, become partial democracies or competitive authoritar-
ian. Their reasons for devising their model can be divided into two broad 
categories – to explain the broad and profound international and domestic 
political developments which had taken place in the world over the past 
two decades, and their dissatisfaction with existing attempts to do so.
The main real-world development which motivated Levitsky and Way 
was the end of the Cold War and resultant spread of democracy and 
competitive authoritarianism. As Levitsky and Way note, competitive 
authoritarianism was not born out of the ashes, or smashed-up fragments, 
of the Berlin Wall. On the contrary, it had been exhibited, on and off, by 
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regimes the world over since the 1920s. Yet, for all that, it had remained 
a limited phenomenon, never widespread, restricted to just a handful of 
countries. From the late 1980s onwards, however, it proliferated. The 
end of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe and collapse of the USSR 
created propitious political, economic, social and cultural conditions for 
its spread.12
More specifically, the demise of the Soviet Union had three crucial 
consequences. First, it led to a sharp decline in the amount of military 
and economic assistance provided to those authoritarian regimes that 
were supported by one or other of the superpowers. Clearly, the USSR 
no longer existed to provide the help and support that it once had. And 
the countries that replaced it, including the new Russian Federation, 
had neither the means nor inclination to assume its responsibilities. 
Meanwhile, with the Soviet Union gone, the United States could afford to 
reconsider which regimes to back, and in what ways and to what extent. 
The fiscal and security challenges the ending of this support presented its 
various client regimes, exacerbated the economic problems that many of 
them were experiencing. So much so that a raft of dictators were left ‘with 
little choice but to liberalize or abandon power’.13
Second, the USSR’s implosion encouraged the diffusion of democracy 
around the world in two distinct ways. To begin with, it caused the global 
balance of power to shift decisively westwards. Not only was there now 
no ‘military, economic, and ideological alternative to the liberal West’,14 
but its victory greatly enhanced the appeal of its political structures and 
practices. To those regimes eager to achieve similar levels of wealth 
and prosperity as the United States, Britain and France, the lesson was 
clear: embrace democracy. And they were given additional incentive to 
do so by the concentration of much of the world’s remaining develop-
ment resources in Western hands. To qualify to receive further outside 
economic assistance, these regimes had little choice but to acquiesce to 
Western demands and adopt ‘formal democratic institutions’.15
Indeed, the end of the Cold War enabled European and North American 
governments to refocus their foreign policies as never before. With the 
Soviet Union gone, they were free to promote and protect democracy 
around the world with far greater vigour. As well as putting military and 
diplomatic pressure on regimes to liberalise, they also devised a new form 
of leverage: political conditionality.16 From the early 1990s onwards, 
the United States, Britain and France declared that all future economic 
assistance they provided would be tied to democratic and human rights. 
Regimes would be given support only if they held regular multiparty elec-
tions and respected the personal liberties of all their citizens.17
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The imposition of these conditions formed part of a broader, more 
ambitious project to construct an international legal framework to facilitate 
the defence of democracy around the world.18 The third key development, 
therefore, was the creation of the means by which citizenries could be 
better informed of their rights and their governments more closely moni-
tored and held to account. During the 1990s, a ‘transnational infrastruc-
ture’, made up of ‘international party foundations, election-monitoring 
agencies, and . . . international . . . and non-governmental organizations’, 
was established which exploited the ‘new information technologies’ to 
draw ‘international attention to human-rights abuses, lobb[y] Western 
governments to take action against abusive . . . [regimes], and help protect 
and empower domestic opposition groups’.19 By the end of the decade, 
therefore, Western governments were aided and abetted in their efforts to 
protect democracy by a rapidly growing, and increasingly well-funded and 
sophisticated global apparatus.
These changes not only provided dictators with powerful incentives 
to democratise but also raised and made clear the costs they would incur 
if they failed to do so.20 Indeed, they were presented with a zero-sum 
choice. Hold multiparty elections and the West would look kindly upon 
them. Their requests for support would receive favourable hearings. And 
international human rights groups would review their efforts with sympa-
thy and offer encouragement. Refuse, however, and the opposite would 
happen. European and North American governments would condemn 
their rule and work to destabilise it. Their applications for assistance 
would be rejected. And human rights organisations would expose their 
foibles, provide damning assessments, and encourage their political rivals 
and publics to protest.
Yet, crucially, these changes neither marked nor brought about democ-
racy’s total victory. For the pressure to democratise exerted by the West 
was compromised in at least two critical ways. To begin with, it was not 
rigorously applied. Some regimes, including many in sub-Saharan Africa, 
were consistently and strictly held to account. Others, however, were not. 
Economically important and militarily powerful countries, such as China, 
were treated with reverence and caution. While close and strategic allies, 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, were similarly indulged. And 
even when pressure was applied, Western governments were often satis-
fied with the sometimes superficial reforms it brought about. They became 
overly fixated on the holding of multiparty elections at the expense of the 
quality of these votes (the extent to which they were free and fair) and the 
amount of respect governments paid to their citizens’ broader civil and 
human rights.21
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As a result, many dictators around the world found ways to alleviate or 
avoid this pressure (if any was placed on them at all). And they often did so 
by meeting some of the international demands made of them. They quickly 
recognised and cynically exploited the West’s preoccupation with elections 
to ensure that they held regular ballots which were at least partially free 
and fair. Indeed, while these votes were seldom hailed by election monitors 
as completely open and transparent, they were usually sufficiently com-
petitive to elicit only mild rebukes and tepid warnings. Regimes learned to 
practise just enough democracy to avoid the levels of international criticism 
which might have imperilled their holds on power and existence.22
So, while the changes in the international environment brought about 
by the end of the Cold War forced many regimes to moderate their behav-
iour and at least be seen to pay greater respect to their citizens’ civil liber-
ties and human rights, they did not establish democracy as the minimum 
acceptable standard of political organisation and conduct.23 What was 
instituted instead was multiparty electoralism. Certainly, democracy was 
confirmed as the preferred political system that most governments had to 
at least claim to aspire to implement if they did not practise it already. And 
the West did encourage and pressurise authoritarian regimes to embrace 
it. But often, Washington, London, Paris and Brussels were prepared to 
accept something less. As long as these regimes held ‘passable elections’ 
then the West was usually satisfied.24
It was in this twilight world of rhetoric and appearance, encouragement 
and pressure, negotiation and compromise that competitive authoritarian-
ism thrived. Between 1985 and 1995, the number of such regimes grew 
exponentially from ‘a handful . . . to nearly three dozen’.25 Yet their rapid 
proliferation did not augur well for democracy. For, as Levitsky and Way 
argue, competitive authoritarianism is not necessarily a stepping stone 
towards full liberalisation or a temporary state. Regimes can remain like 
this for as long as they are willing and able to. Indeed, by 2010, there were 
more than a dozen regimes around the world that had been competitive 
authoritarian for at least fifteen years.26 Moreover, not all those which 
ceased being so went on to become democratic. In fact, only a minority 
did, with the rest growing more authoritarian.27
The first explanatory dissatisfaction which helped drive Levitsky 
and Way to devise their model, therefore, was the ‘assumption that . . . 
 [competitive authoritarian] regimes are (or should be) moving in a demo-
cratic direction’.28 Just because they look more like democracies than 
dictatorships do, does not automatically mean that they will become dem-
ocratic. On the contrary, competitive authoritarian must be understood as a 
distinct regime type that will not inevitably turn into something else.
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And the second main dissatisfaction which motivated Levitsky and 
Way was the underexamination of ‘the relationship between the inter-
national environment and regime change’.29 This neglect was somewhat 
anomalous given the dramatic increase in the number of studies in the 
post-Cold War period into the ways in which the international sphere and 
global developments affect democracy’s spread. And it manifested itself 
in two noteworthy ways. To begin with, insufficient effort was made ‘to 
either adjudicate among the various mechanisms of international influence 
. . . [diffusion, direct democracy promotion, multilateral conditionality, 
democracy assistance and transnational advocacy networks] or integrate 
them into a coherent theoretical framework’.30 That is, either too little was 
said about the different ways in which these means worked and the relative 
significance of their respective contributions, or just one or two of them 
were examined while the rest were completely ignored.31
Second and related to this, too many studies pay insufficient attention 
to country-by-country and region-by-region variations in the effective-
ness of these mechanisms and the West’s democracy-promotion efforts 
more broadly. In particular, they fail to note or adequately chart: how 
diffusion was more effectual in Eastern Europe than in the former Soviet 
Union;32 how Western governments were more concerned about the fate 
of democracy in Latin America than in either Asia (where ‘power politics’ 
took precedence) or Africa (where its pursuit was mostly ‘rhetorical’);33 or 
how human rights organisations were better able to establish themselves 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America than in either the Middle East or 
sub-Saharan Africa.34 Indeed, for Levitsky and Way, too many studies fail 
to register the unevenness of the international environment’s influence on 
regime development (how it affected some countries more than others) or 
the disparate ways in which it achieved effect (whether by diffusion, as in 
Poland, or transnational advocacy networks, as in Nicaragua).
Levitsky and Way’s reasons for developing their model, therefore, were 
threefold. First, they wanted to address the explanatory shortcomings they 
identified in existing studies into democratisation in the post-Cold War 
period. They sought more carefully to chart and theorise the international 
environment’s influence on regime development. Second, they wanted 
better to explain the origins and spread of competitive authoritarianism. 
Though such regimes were not new, their rapid increase in number from 
1990 onwards gave them an international significance they had never had 
before. And third, they wanted to chart more accurately the full range of 
development trajectories of these regimes in order to counter the errone-
ous assumption that competitive authoritarianism was a temporary prelude 
to democracy.
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While competitive authoritarian is a distinct type of regime, it is also 
a hybrid because it combines both democracy and authoritarianism. 
Levitsky and Way define authoritarianism as the absence of any
viable channels . . . for opposition to contest legally for executive power.35 
This category includes closed regimes in which national-level democratic 
institutions do not exist . . . and hegemonic regimes in which formal democratic 
institutions exist on paper but are . . . [a] façade [sic] . . . In hegemonic regimes, 
elections are so marred by repression, candidate restrictions, and/ or fraud that 
there is no uncertainty about their outcome. Much of the opposition is forced 
underground and leading critics are often imprisoned or exiled.36
Competitive authoritarian regimes, in contrast, include constitutional 
safeguards that allow opposition groups to compete for control of the 
government. Elections are held regularly and are open to rival parties and 
candidates. And, between and during ballots, these groups are largely free 
to campaign, recruit and operate openly. Their leaders are not imprisoned 
or forced into exile and hiding.37
Levitsky and Way adopt a largely procedural definition of democracy 
built around a series of essential attributes. To be democratic, a regime 
must hold ‘free, fair, and competitive elections’; have ‘full adult suf-
frage’; protect ‘civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and 
association’; and be free from ‘nonelected “tutelary” authorities (e.g. 
militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that limit elected officials’ 
power to govern’.38 To these, they add a further, non-procedural attrib-
ute: the establishment and maintenance of ‘a reasonably level playing 
field between incumbents and opposition’.39 By reasonable, they mean 
that the advantages enjoyed by incumbents (all incumbents), such as 
having patronage to bestow, vote-winning money to spend, the ability 
to launch ‘clientelist social policies’ and ‘privileged access to media and 
finance’ are not so great as seriously to impair the opposition’s ability to 
compete for power.40 In competitive authoritarian regimes, on the other 
hand, ‘incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining 
 attributes . . . : (1) free elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and 
(3) a reasonably level playing field’.41
Elections can be considered free when ‘there is virtually no fraud or 
intimidation of voters’.42 And they can be considered fair when opposition 
parties are able to ‘campaign on [a] relatively even footing’ with incum-
bents and are not repressed, harassed or ‘systematically denied access 
to the media or other critical resources’.43 In competitive authoritarian 
regimes, elections are held but do not meet these standards. Ballots are 
usually competitive, as opposition parties and candidates are permitted to 
17
Levitsky and Way and Competitive Authoritarianism
participate in them and there is only a small amount of fraud, but not free 
and fair.44 Voter lists are manipulated, ballot boxes are stuffed and stolen, 
polling-booth results are changed and fabricated, opposition supporters 
are threatened, election monitors are intimidated, voters are prevented 
from casting their ballots, and opposition parties are excluded from parts 
of the country.45 By such means, incumbents ensure that they and those 
they back triumph. Yet, in these regimes, such abuses are never so serious, 
are never so great as to render the outcome of the election unbelievable 
and meaningless. Incumbents are willing to cheat but they want the result 
to stand and be (broadly) accepted. Their cheating cannot be so egregious, 
therefore, as to make this impossible.
Civil liberties are not only vital to the practice of democracy but their 
protection and exercise provide confirmation of its health. By having the 
freedom to speak, meet, say and read what they want, a country’s citizens 
are engaging in democracy. Moreover, in doing so, they provide proof 
that theirs is a democratic country. In competitive authoritarian regimes, 
these freedoms are imperfectly enshrined and only partially respected. 
Independent newspapers, radio stations and television networks exist but 
they and their staff are routinely threatened, fined and silenced. Opposition 
parties and other civil society groups are able to operate openly but their 
members and supporters are frequently attacked, intimidated, arrested and 
imprisoned. On some occasions, such is the ferocity of this repression 
that it resembles that practised in full dictatorships. More often, though, 
it is subtle and legalistic with regimes making ‘discretionary use of legal 
instruments – such as tax, libel, or defamation laws – to punish oppo-
nents’.46 While such prosecutions may be technically correct, they are 
pursued selectively against regime opponents.47 And, though such repres-
sion is not heavy enough to drive them into hiding or exile, it is greater 
than that allowed in democracies. By these means, competitive authoritar-
ian regimes intimidate all but the most courageous parties, individuals, 
civil groups, and media outlets into remaining silent.48
In such circumstances the political playing field is tilted decisively and 
unfairly in favour of the incumbent. Of course, those who hold power in 
democracies also enjoy a number of advantages. Yet not so many, nor to 
such an extent, that their rivals have little chance of winning. To distin-
guish between what is reasonable and what is not, therefore, Levitsky and 
Way set three criteria for assessing a playing field’s evenness. They argue 
that it is unfairly unbalanced if ‘state institutions are widely abused for 
partisan ends . . . incumbents are systematically favored at the expense of 
the opposition, and . . . the opposition’s ability to organize and compete in 
elections is seriously handicapped’. 49
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They also identify three factors which are particularly important in 
determining whether a playing field is level. The first is access to state 
resources, whether those in power abuse their positions ‘to create or 
maintain . . . disparities that seriously hinder the opposition’s ability to 
compete’.50 Sometimes, such manipulation is open and even legal, with 
incumbents overtly channelling public funds to themselves, their parties 
and their clients. More often, though, it is clandestine or surreptitious, 
with those in power unlawfully siphoning off state monies, ‘system-
atically deploy[ing] . . . state buildings, vehicles . . . communications 
 infrastructure . . . and . . . employees . . . on behalf of the governing party’, 
and ‘monopoliz[ing] access to private-sector finance’, using their ‘discre-
tionary control over credit, licenses, state contracts, and other resources 
to enrich themselves via party-owned enterprises, . . . benefit crony- or 
proxy-owned firms that then contribute money back to party coffers, 
. . . or corner the market in private-sector donations’.51 By these means, 
office-holders in competitive authoritarian regimes are able to gain huge, 
material advantages over their competitors, far in excess of those that their 
counterparts in democracies are able to achieve.
The second key factor is access to the country’s media. In many com-
petitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties and candidates are not 
only given less coverage but also less favourable coverage than those 
they are seeking to oust. State-owned television channels, radio stations 
and newspapers invariably do not give them as much airtime or as many 
column inches as the incumbents. Independent media outlets are often 
more favourably disposed towards them but are usually fewer in number 
and have more limited geographic and demographic reach. Finally, what 
privately owned stations and titles there are tend to be ‘linked to the gov-
erning party – via proxy ownership, patronage, and other illicit means’.52 
As a result, opposition groups are rarely afforded the same media platform 
as those in power, while their candidates, policies, initiatives and actions 
are presented far less favourably.
The third critical factor is access to the law. In many competitive 
authoritarian regimes, the autonomy of the country’s courts and other sup-
posedly independent bodies with the power to make legally binding deci-
sions, has been seriously impaired by those in office. Through a variety 
of means, such as interfering with appointment processes, packing judi-
ciaries and electoral commissions with supporters, bribery, blackmail and 
coercion, incumbents have extended their influence over many of the insti-
tutions charged with holding them to account.53 As a result, they are often 
able to break the law with impunity and are routinely awarded favourable 
rulings and judgments in the cases they bring and in those brought against 
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them.54 Opposition groups, candidates and activists, in contrast, invariably 
struggle to win positive legal outcomes, and frequently find themselves in 
trouble for misdemeanours for which the governing party is rarely held to 
account and on trumped-up charges.
In addition to establishing a vital benchmark, Levitsky and Way’s 
definition of democracy is noteworthy for the emphasis it places on the 
creation and maintenance of a level playing field, and the insights it offers 
into how they chose their case studies and the countries they selected. 
Certainly, most other definitions acknowledge the playing field’s impor-
tance. Yet, often, they do so but implicitly through the ‘dimensions of 
“free and fair elections” and “civil liberties” ’.55 As a result, they tend to 
neglect not only what goes on between ballots, ‘such as skewed access 
to media and finance’ which can greatly affect the outcomes of elections, 
but also those instances of incumbent interference which are not classi-
fied as civil liberty abuses.56 By drawing attention to the quality of the 
playing field directly, therefore, Levitsky and Way seek to provide fuller 
 definitional coverage.
How they defined democracy also informed the criteria they used for 
choosing their case studies. One of their definition’s five essential attrib-
utes specified that democracies must not be subject to ‘nonelected “tute-
lary” authorities (e.g., militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that 
limit elected officials’ power to govern’.57 Levitsky and Way embraced 
this requirement as a guiding principle when deciding which countries 
to examine in their 2010 book. As a result, they excluded ‘other types of 
hybrid (or “party free”) regime, including . . . [those] in which political 
competition exists but nonelected officials retain considerable power’.58 
More specifically, they rejected all regimes ‘(1) . . . in which the most 
important executive office is not elected . . . ; (2) . . . top executive posi-
tions are filled via elections but the authority of elected governments is 
seriously constrained by the military or other nonelected bodies . . . ; and 
(3) competitive regimes under foreign occupation’.59
Levitsky and Way’s embrace of these criteria also explains their case-
study selection, including their decision to exclude all Maghreb countries. 
Indeed, in the course of their book, they make only one, very brief, refer-
ence to the region; to identify Morocco as an example of the first type of 
inappropriate regime (one ‘in which the most important executive office 
[the monarchy] is not elected’).60 Nevertheless, and even though they are 
not named, Algeria and Mauritania can be considered examples of the 
second type of unsuitable regime (those ‘in which . . . the authority of 
elected governments is seriously constrained by the military’).61 For, not 
only have they both experienced army-led coups d’état and periods of 
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martial rule but their political processes and elected, civilian governments 
continue to be subjected to significant military interference. And Libya is 
ruled ineligible on the grounds that, under Gaddafi, it was too authoritar-
ian and, since his demise, it has been too unstable.62 Only Tunisia, in fact, 
satisfies Levitsky and Way’s stipulations since President Ben Ali regularly 
held elections which, by various unfair means, he dominated.63 Of the 
Maghreb’s five countries, therefore, four contravene Levitsky and Way’s 
criteria for inclusion.
Yet these requirements remain open to at least two significant chal-
lenges. The first is that they are underelaborated. For, while Levitsky 
and Way identify specific countries and the types of regime they will not 
consider, as well as briefly set out their reasons for excluding them, they 
do not explain why these conditions matter. What is it about the amount 
of power wielded by the king of Morocco, for example, that makes the 
country unsuitable for analysis? Second, the stringency of their restrictions 
not only limits their model’s claim to universality but also exposes them to 
accusations of cherry-picking. Many militaries in Africa, the Middle East, 
Latin America and elsewhere have played tutelary roles. So many and 
for such long periods, in fact, that there are few countries in any of these 
regions in which their political influence is not felt. Does this mean that 
Levitsky and Way’s model simply should not be extended to them? If so, 
then great swathes of the world are potentially placed off limits with all the 
implications this has for their model’s explanatory prowess. And finally, if 
so many regimes and regions are excluded, then are they not deliberately 
setting their criteria in order to discount those places which their model 
might struggle to explain? Are they trying to load the elucidatory dice in 
their favour? 
At least some of these conditions, therefore, are unnecessary and 
unhelpful, and place needlessly severe limits on Levitsky and Way’s 
model. This much can be confirmed by extending their analysis to Algeria, 
Morocco and Mauritania. Certainly the current influence of the monarchy 
and military in these countries cannot be questioned or denied. But, rather 
than view them as either extraordinary or immutable political forces, they 
should be considered parts of their respective country’s authoritarian fur-
niture. Making the Moroccan monarchy genuinely constitutional is one of 
the hurdles that pro-democracy reformers there need to clear if they are 
to liberalise the country’s political structures and practices. Just as their 
Algerian and Mauritanian counterparts need to depoliticise their militar-
ies. Rather than view these conditions as reasons to withhold Levitsky and 
Way’s model from these regimes, they should be factored into the analysis 
it enables.
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Competitive authoritarian regimes have split personalities. Indeed, they 
are defined by their dualism, by their embrace of the democratic and the 
authoritarian. As a result, they are marked by tension and ambiguity. Their 
democratic institutions and practices give opposition parties and candidates 
opportunities to challenge those in office for power. As long as incumbents 
are able successfully to exploit these processes, to command the support 
of a significant portion, if not outright majority, of the population and win 
elections without so compromising the vote as to render its result com-
pletely unbelievable and illegitimate, then this tension is contained. For, 
on such occasions, election outcomes and the popular will are broadly 
in harmony with the incumbents’ desire to remain in power. Yet should 
this alignment not be achieved, should those in power struggle to win the 
backing of a large number of their citizens or feel compelled to intervene 
in an electoral process to the extent that the ballot loses all credibility, then 
this tension becomes profound and, for the incumbents, dangerous.
Indeed, in such instances, those in power are confronted with a wicked 
dilemma. If they respect democracy they will be lauded for doing so but 
increase the risk of their being ejected from office. Alternatively, if they 
openly and aggressively intercede in the democratic process, they will 
better ensure their short-term survival but at the likely expense of their 
domestic standing and international reputation.64 To date, this tension and 
dilemma have elicited a range of responses from those in power in com-
petitive authoritarian regimes. Their various reactions help explain the 
divergent political trajectories of the countries they govern.
Despite the inescapable tension at its core, which forces those who 
hold power to exist in a state of almost constant imbalance, competitive 
authoritarianism has proved remarkably durable. Of the thirty-five case 
studies they investigated, Levitsky and Way found that nineteen had sur-
vived for fifteen years or more.65 This led them to identify three different 
development paths taken by competitive authoritarian regimes. The first 
was towards democratisation. In these cases, those in power held ‘free and 
fair elections’, recognised and protected civil liberties, and established ‘a 
level playing field’.66 The second was towards unstable authoritarianism. 
In these instances, ‘authoritarian incumbents were removed at least once 
but new governments were not democratic’. Moreover they ‘inherited a 
skewed playing field and politicized state institutions, which they used to 
weaken and/ or disadvantage their opponents’.67 And the third was towards 
stable authoritarianism. On these occasions, ‘authoritarian incumbents 
or their chosen successors remained in power for at least three presi-
dential/ parliamentary terms following the establishment of competitive 
 authoritarian rule’.68
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It was to explain competitive authoritarianism better and why indi-
vidual regimes followed different development paths that Levitsky and 
Way devised their model. At its heart are the dimensions of linkage, lev-
erage and organisational power which, together, cover both international 
(linkage and leverage) and domestic (organisational power) factors. With 
them, Levitsky and Way have constructed a three-part, incremental argu-
ment which begins by observing that extensive linkage to the West has 
made competitive authoritarian regimes far more likely to democratise.69 
For high linkage not only raises the international costs of any autocratic 
abuses committed, make a Western response to such misdemeanours more 
probable, expand the number of local groups and figures with an interest 
in avoiding any such sanctions, and increase the amounts of material help 
and acclamation heaped on opposition movements but also makes main-
taining an authoritarian regime far more expensive. Indeed, high linkage 
provides dictators and their successors with strong incentives to relinquish 
power quietly and govern democratically.70
In contrast, low linkage reduces the effectiveness of Western pressure 
to democratise. Step 2 of Levitsky and Way’s argument, therefore, is 
that, in these circumstances, ‘regime outcomes were driven primarily by 
domestic factors, particularly the organizational power of incumbents’.71 
In those regimes where the state apparatus and ruling party were well 
organised and cohesive, those in power were usually able to prevent 
elite defections and defeat any opposition challenges. But, in those 
countries where the state organs and governing party were poorly co-
ordinated and fragmented, incumbents often lacked the ‘organizational 
and coercive tools to prevent elite defection, steal elections, or crack 
down on protest’ so were ‘vulnerable to even relatively weak opposition 
challenges’.72
On these occasions, and step 3 of Levitsky and Way’s argument, ‘states’ 
vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure ( . . . leverage) . . . was 
often decisive’.73 Crucially, this pressure achieved the greatest effect on 
those regimes which were susceptible to European and North American 
influence but were of little strategic value to them and which were not 
supported by a Black Knight power. Countries which were important to 
the West habitually had less pressure put upon them. Moreover, that which 
was applied was often done so with little consistency or co-ordination as 
Washington, London, Paris and Brussels allowed their collective or indi-
vidual interests to take precedence over democracy promotion. And those 
regimes which had the backing of a Black Knight (usually, but not always, 
Russia or China) were better equipped to resist Western efforts to make 
them democratise even if they had low organisational power. Finally, in 
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those countries which had few ties to the West and only weak domestic 
pro-democracy movements, authoritarianism frequently endured.74
Taken together, therefore, leverage and linkage help to explain the 
variation in the types and levels of democratising pressure applied by 
the West.75 Different combinations of high, medium and low leverage 
and linkage generate a range of external environments, some of which 
are more conducive of democracy than others. The democratising effects 
of leverage and linkage, therefore, depend not only on their individual 
strengths but also on those of the other. When both are high then ‘external 
democratizing pressure is consistent and intense’.76 In such circumstances, 
the West is focused on what is taking place in a regime and willing to 
intervene if abuses are perpetrated, and provides encouragement and 
support to internal opposition groups. Indeed, so great is their interest and 
involvement that ‘democratization is likely even . . . [if] domestic condi-
tions are unfavourable’.77
When linkage is high and leverage low, however, this pressure is less 
well directed even though it remains strong. Its effects, therefore, are 
more indirect as it leads regimes to engage in greater self-censorship. 
For, while the West might not push these governments quite as hard 
to democratise as it does some others, they remain subject to ‘intense 
scrutiny from international media, transnational human-rights networks, 
and internationally orientated domestic constituencies’ which they are 
anxious to appease.78 And in their efforts to do so, and thereby avoid the 
reputational and material penalties they know they will incur from failing 
to, they enact many of the pro-democracy measures and reforms advo-
cated by the West.79
Conversely, when linkage is low and leverage high, external pressure 
is inconsistently applied. Those regimes which fail ‘to meet international 
electoral or human-rights standards’ may be severely sanctioned but often 
the penalty imposed on them amounts to no more than holding a ballot 
which broadly satisfies Western electoral expectations.80 Not only does 
this give dictators considerable room for manoeuvre but, even if they are 
ousted from power, there is no guarantee that democracy will follow or 
that the pressure being applied will be sustained thereafter. While a low-
linkage–high-leverage environment may raise the cost of authoritarian-
ism, it does not guarantee, or even greatly encourage, democratisation.81 
And finally, when linkage and leverage are both low, external pressure is 
infrequently and ineffectively applied. In such an environment, Western 
governments do not always respond to serious civil and human rights 
abuses let alone take any countermeasures. And, even when they do, 
their reprisals often have little impact. In such a lax and unconducive 
Democratisation in the Maghreb
24
environment, democratisation is demanded by domestic groups and 
organisations alone.82
In using these dimensions in this way, Levitsky and Way argue 
that their model successfully predicted what would happen in twenty-
eight of the thirty-five regime transitions they examined. Furthermore, 
they contend that six of the seven results they got wrong were ‘near 
misses’ as their model accurately explained ‘key aspects’ of the regimes’ 
evolution and forecast outcomes for them which were close to what 
eventually transpired.83 Indeed, Levitsky and Way maintain that only 
one case fell ‘entirely outside . . . [of their] theoretical framework’. In 
adopting this model, therefore, the book is embracing an analytical frame-
work and thesis which have been thoroughly developed and proven to 
work.84
Leverage
Levitsky and Way’s understanding of leverage ‘encompasses both . . . 
regimes’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the West, or their ability to avoid 
Western action aimed at punishing abuse or encouraging political liberali-
zation; and . . . the potential impact (in terms of economic health or secu-
rity) of Western punitive action toward target states’.85 The exercise of 
leverage, therefore, has two key features that cover the determination and 
capabilities of both those seeking (the West) and resisting (target states) 
democratic change. The first refers to the amount of pressure European 
and North American governments can bring to bear on a given country as 
measured by the likely political and economic consequences of individual 
and successive disciplinary actions. And the second relates to the ability of 
that country to withstand those actions and cope with their consequences. 
Both features must be considered, for it is possible for Western govern-
ments to put more pressure on a regime than they do others but still have 
less influence over it because of its greater capacity to cope with their 
punitive measures.86
The amount of leverage European and North American governments 
have over a regime is mainly determined by three factors. The first of 
these is the size and strength of the target state’s economy. Unsurprisingly, 
countries with ‘small, aid-dependent economies are more vulnerable to 
external pressure’ than those with large ones. Indeed, states with big econ-
omies are not only better able to cope with ‘the various types of pressure 
employed by Western powers . . . such as aid withdrawal, trade sanctions, 
and the threat of military force’ but are also better placed to prevent any 
penalties from being imposed in the first place.87
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The second factor is the consistency with which European and 
North American governments pursue their pro-democracy foreign poli-
cies towards a regime, and co-ordinate their efforts with one another. Any 
significant variation in either their individual or collective aims helps the 
target state evade and offset any pressure placed upon it. In such circum-
stances, dictators are better able to play Western governments off against 
one another. And they usually do so by presenting both themselves and the 
stability of their regimes as vital to the realisation of a particular govern-
ment’s goals, and greater democracy as a threat to this mutually beneficial 
arrangement. If another Western state attempts to discipline the regime, 
therefore, it soon discovers the limits of at least some of its allies’ support. 
And without their compliance, the punitive measures it has introduced are 
inevitably rendered less effective.88
Finally, the third factor is whether a regime has the backing of a Black 
Knight or ‘counter-hegemonic’ power.89 Black Knights are powerful 
states with a vested interest in ensuring a particular regime’s survival. 
Usually the role is played by either Russia or China but is occasionally 
performed by France and Japan. To help safeguard the existence of their 
client regime, a Black Knight will provide it with ‘economic, diplomatic, 
and other assistance’.90 And they will do so in part to enhance its ability 
to withstand any democratising pressure placed upon it by (any other) 
European and North American countries.
One of the main ways in which high leverage encourages democrati-
sation is by making dictatorships more expensive to establish and main-
tain. The sanctions imposed on many of them by European and North 
American governments often ‘trigger fiscal crises, which – by eroding 
incumbents’ capacity to distribute patronage and . . . pay [the] salaries of 
civil servants and security personnel – seriously’ endanger their survival.91 
So grave can the consequences be that, sometimes, just the threat of such 
measures is sufficient to make autocrats change their behaviour. By this 
method, therefore, Western states have been able to curb authoritarianism 
and undermine dictatorial regimes in a variety of ways, from deterring 
election theft, to toppling governments, to persuading autocrats to democ-
ratise, to convincing leaders who acquired power by nefarious means to 
relinquish it.92
Nevertheless, even high Western leverage is rarely sufficient by itself 
to bring about democratisation. Its limitations are mainly the result of 
the West’s preoccupation with elections and comparative neglect of 
other issues crucial to democracy, such as human rights. While European 
and North American governments often respond vigorously to serious 
and flagrant abuses, they tend either to miss or ignore ‘less spectacular’ 
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violations even when they occur before their eyes.93 Indeed, in many elec-
tions monitored by their observers, incumbents have been able to harass 
opponents, abuse state resources, exercise almost complete control over 
the country’s media and manipulate the vote and escape censure and 
punishment. Moreover, Western governments tend to relax whatever 
pressure they have been applying once a multiparty election has been held 
 regardless of whether it leads to greater democracy.94
The West’s fixation on elections is itself a consequence of the dif-
ficulties inherent in monitoring other elements of democratic behaviour. 
Ballots are easy to observe. Moreover, the European Union, United 
States and other national governments and international bodies, have 
well- established mechanisms for monitoring them. Western countries are 
then able to configure their policies and actions towards target states on 
the basis of what their observers’ witness. Ensuring that regimes respect 
civil liberties, and construct and preserve level electoral playing fields, 
however, is a much harder task to accomplish. Not least, because Western 
governments and international bodies are poorly equipped to undertake 
such assignments.95 On its own, therefore, leverage generates ‘blunt and 
often ineffective forms of external pressure’.96 Even when conditions 
are imposed on dictators, they are still often left with extensive room 
for manoeuvre. Too often, European and North American governments 
have been concerned only with the staging of multiparty elections at 
the expense of the quality of the votes themselves and the introduction 
of other, important democratic reforms. As a result, leverage has been 
sufficient ‘to force transitions from closed to competitive authoritarian 
regimes,’ but insufficient ‘to induce democratization’.97
Levitsky and Way use the same grading system (high, medium and 
low) to determine the strength of the West’s leverage over, and links 
to, a country, and a regime’s organisational power. According to them, 
Europe’s and North America’s leverage is low if the target state satisfies 
any one of three criteria, has a large economy (with a total GDP of more 
the $100 billion), is a major oil producer (pumping more than a million 
barrels of oil a day during the course of an average year), or possesses or 
has access to nuclear weapons.98 If a state does not meet any of these cri-
teria but has either a medium-size economy (with a total GDP of between 
$50 and $100 billion) or ‘a major security-related foreign-policy issue’ 
of importance to either the European Union or United States, or a Black 
Knight patron (which is either a high-income country with a per capita 
GDP of at least $10,000 or a major military power with an annual defence 
budget of more than $10 billion) providing it with extensive bilateral 
aid (amounting to at least 1 per cent of GDP), then Western leverage is 
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medium.99 Finally, if a state does not meet any of these seven criteria, then 
the West has high leverage over it.100
Linkage
Crucial to determining the effectiveness of Western pressure on a regime 
is Levitsky and Way’s second dimension, linkage. They define linkage 
as ‘the density of ties (the economic, political, diplomatic, social, and 
organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, 
people and information) among particular countries and the United States, 
. . . EU . . . , and Western-dominated multilateral institutions’.101 In addi-
tion to these many different types of interaction, the concept also covers 
an equally wide range of actors, including politicians and bureaucrats, 
political activists and aid, development and charity workers, journalists 
and intellectuals, business owners, industrialists and merchants, internet-
users, expatriates and migrants, and ordinary citizens. To help capture and 
organise better this plethora of links and participants, and thus render them 
more accessible to study and analysis, Levitsky and Way divide them into 
six categories of connection – economic (‘flow of trade, investment, and 
credit’), intergovernmental (‘including bilateral diplomatic and military 
ties as well as participation in Western-led alliances, treaties, and interna-
tional organizations’), technocratic (‘the share of a country’s elite that is 
educated in the West and/ or has professional ties to Western universities or 
Western-led multilateral institutions’), social (‘the flows of people across 
borders, including tourism, immigration and refugees flows, and diaspora 
networks’), information (the ‘flows of information across borders via 
telecommunications, Internet connections, and Western media penetra-
tion’), and civil-society (‘local ties to Western-based NGOs, international 
religious and party organizations, and other transnational networks’).102
The forms and extent of a regime’s links to the West are largely deter-
mined by history, economics and geography. Colonial pasts often sustain 
lingering attachments between former metropoles and those they once 
ruled. Periods of protracted military occupation and traditional alliances 
similarly generate and perpetuate long-standing affiliations, if not sympa-
thies, between countries and peoples.103 Colonisation also led to capital-
ism’s spread around the world, exposing territories to global markets and 
trade as never before, and encouraging the circulation of people and ideas 
around empires. Most important, though, is geographic proximity. The 
closer a country is to either the United States or to the European Union, 
the stronger its economic, political, civil-society and human relations with 
them are.104
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Linkage, therefore, channels influence from place to place around the 
world. Of course, so-called international effects are rarely that. Ideas, 
values, programmes and ambitions always originate from somewhere and 
are almost always more strongly associated with, believed in and adhered 
to by, some countries over others. As a result, their spread, to the extent 
that they disseminate at all, is also uneven as they tend to follow the better-
established and developed linkage paths. Indeed, linkage is ‘rooted in 
concrete ties – networks; organizations; and flows of people, information, 
and resources – among states’.105 And the pressure it helps exert is most 
effective in those regimes where NGOs have a strong and active presence 
and which have ‘extensive interaction’ with Western countries.106
Linkage has encouraged democratisation in three ‘material rather than 
normative or ideational’ ways.107 That is, while it ‘may facilitate the diffu-
sion of ideas and norms’, its main effect is on dictators’ ‘interests, incen-
tives, and capabilities’.108 The first way in which it changes autocrats’ 
behaviour is by generating greater international interest in any abuses 
they commit.109 The widespread media activity, frequent intergovernmen-
tal interactions, and transnational movement of people and ideas which 
characterise high linkage all reduce the likelihood of such misdemeanours 
escaping the West’s notice. And the heavy NGO presence and constant 
communication between expatriate communities and their friends and 
relations elsewhere mean that even relatively minor transgressions can 
attract considerable international attention. Moreover, Western govern-
ments often feel compelled to respond to such abuses because of the 
pressure put upon them by the media, human and civil rights groups, and 
members of the affected diaspora community.110
These governments are also more likely to take action if they feel that 
their interests are under threat. Inevitably, the chances of this happening 
are higher when the abuses occur in countries with which they have strong 
links. Conversely, they are less likely to respond if the transgressions take 
place in regimes with which they have weaker ties. For, in the absence of 
an extensive and sustained media campaign to expose wrongdoings, the 
determined activism of civil-society groups to hold those responsible to 
account, and the concerted efforts of sizeable expatriate communities to 
make Western political leaders take action, Washington, London, Paris 
and Brussels are under little pressure to respond and have few reasons to 
do so.111
The second way in which high linkage helps to change autocrats’ 
behaviour is by ‘increasing the number of domestic actors with a stake 
in adhering to regional or international democratic norms’.112 A defining 
feature of high linkage is the presence of large numbers of individuals and 
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organisations with strong ‘personal, financial, or professional ties to the 
West’.113 Moreover, the longer such good relations are maintained, the 
larger this group of interconnected actors grows. Inevitably, the transna-
tional bonds they share give them a powerful interest in their country’s 
relationship with the West. To the extent that, should it deteriorate signifi-
cantly because of the actions of their political leaders, they will press them 
to do whatever is necessary to win back the West’s favour.
These concerns are very keenly felt by technocrats with ties to Western 
universities and international bodies. For these links not only make them 
more aware of what is happening overseas but encourage them to aspire 
to secure funding from, and positions in, European and North American 
institutions.114 Technocrats tend, therefore, to oppose any actions that 
might damage or sever these bonds, and call for and support measures 
intended to improve their country’s global standing.115 Both for and 
through these actors linkage ‘blurs international and domestic politics’ 
by turning Western norms into local demands.116 And the more members 
of the ruling elite with vested interests in avoiding international isolation 
there are, the harder dictators find it to gain and maintain their support for 
authoritarian rule.117
The third way in which linkage helps alter dictators’ behaviour is by 
‘reshaping the domestic distribution of power and resources’ to the benefit 
of pro-democracy forces and detriment of autocrats.118 The connections 
that opposition groups and figures forge with like-minded politicians and 
organisations in the West help protect them from persecution at home. 
For, by their willingness to take action on their allies’ behalf, these influ-
ential friends make regimes think twice before arresting or attacking those 
who oppose them. This leads to the opening up of critical spaces within 
regimes which dictators cannot easily dismiss or silence, and with which, 
therefore, they have to engage.119
‘Western governments, transnational party networks [and] interna-
tional agencies’ may also provide opposition groups with much-needed 
material support and media access, thereby enabling them to compete 
better with the autocrats they are trying to oust.120 While these groups 
may be given only little or negative coverage by local newspapers, 
radio stations and television channels, and be unable to draw upon the 
human, financial and other resources of the state, this outside help allows 
them to ‘mount [more] effective national electoral campaigns’ than they 
would otherwise be able to.121 Moreover, if such assistance forms part 
of a programme of ‘intense Western engagement’, then it may well help 
rival opposition outfits to collaborate more to the benefit of their broader, 
shared objectives.122
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Opposition links to Europe and North America can also lead to a surge 
in popular support for their cause. Through the Western media, ordinary 
people are able to learn more about their government’s questionable inter-
national reputation and the hardships that will befall them should it refuse 
to respect their civil liberties and human rights, and the high esteem in 
which Washington, London, Paris and Brussels hold its pro-democracy 
opponents.123 These messages can also deter members of the local elite 
from either remaining in or entering into ruling coalitions with those in 
power, and have a destabilising effect on the ruling party by ‘helping to 
strengthen reformist tendencies’ within it.124
On many occasions, however, linkage’s impact is hard to identify 
and measure because it ‘influences a variety of state and nonstate actors’ 
and generates ‘multiple often decentralized forms of pressure that may 
operate below the radar . . . of outside observers’.125 Moreover, it can 
be difficult to distinguish from leverage, especially when both are high. 
Indeed, there are instances when linkage can be viewed as a form of 
leverage, such as when it ‘raises the cost of international norm-violating 
behaviour for individual actors (e.g., lost business, professional, or 
funding opportunities)’ although Levitsky and Way are clear that the two 
must retain their analytical distinction.126 Linkage also has a ‘cluster’ 
effect as its influence on political outcomes is the result of the ‘cumula-
tive impact of a diversity of ties’.127 That is, its impact is greatest when 
a regime is connected to the West by numerous ties covering a range of 
sectors and sections of society rather than perhaps an equal number of 
links concentrated in just a handful of sectors. And, finally, not all linkage 
is Western and, where ties to other states are strong, ‘they can be expected 
to shape how governments respond’ to European and North American 
pressure.128
When assessing the strength of each regime’s links to Europe and North 
America, Levitsky and Way focus on four types of connection: economic, 
social, communication and intergovernmental. Economic ties are meas-
ured by the amount of trade a regime has with the United States and the 
European Union’s member states for as long as it has been undemocratic. 
Social ties are measured by the average number of citizens of a regime 
travelling to, and residing in, the United States and European Union in 
a year as a percentage of that regime’s total population for as long as it 
has been undemocratic. Communication ties are measured by a regime’s 
annual average per capita transnational voice traffic and Internet access for 
as long as it has been undemocratic. And, finally, intergovernmental ties 
are measured by a regime’s membership of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) or potential membership of the European Union.129
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Each tie for every regime is then given a score of between 1 and 5 
‘based on its ranking relative to all non-Western countries in the world’, 
with 5 representing the highest quintile and 1 the lowest.130 These four 
scores are then converted into an overall mark of between 0 and 1 which 
determines whether a regime’s links to the West are classified as high, 
medium or low.131 Though the book adopts Levitsky and Way’s three 
grades and their broad approach to determining them (by assessing the 
strength of a regime’s ties to Europe and North America), it does so by 
qualitative, rather than quantitative, means. That is, instead of assigning 
each connection a score and then working out an overall mark, it makes 
a judgement as to the strength of that particular relation. Furthermore, it 
makes assessments on each of the six types of connection that Levitsky 
and Way initially identify (economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, 
social, information and civil-society) rather than just the four they eventu-
ally focus on.132 Indeed, their decision to ignore technocratic and civil-
society ties when calculating the strength of a regime’s links to the West 
is intriguing because it is unexplained. With its qualitative approach to 
determining linkage and fewer case studies, therefore, the book is perhaps 
better placed to look at all six ties.
Organisational Power
When leverage and linkage are lower, political outcomes are more heavily 
influenced by local factors. Two considerations in particular hold the 
key to whether regimes democratise. The first is the ‘balance of power’ 
between dictators and opposition forces.133 And the second, which greatly 
determines who gains the upper hand in this relationship, is the willing-
ness and capacity of regimes to defend themselves and resist liberalisa-
tion. Indeed, ‘authoritarian governments vary considerably in their ability’ 
to do what is necessary to overcome such threats, ‘to control civil society, 
co-opt or divide oppositions, repress protests, and/ or steal elections’.134 In 
some instances, they are so impoverished and poorly organised, so funda-
mentally weak, that they are at risk from even small, brief protests. Others, 
though, are sufficiently well resourced and structured to withstand large 
and sustained challenges.135
When assessing regime strength, Levitsky and Way focus on organi-
sational prowess. They do so in recognition of the manifold difficulties 
and great costs which authoritarian regimes have to overcome and defray 
in order to survive. To stay in power, dictators have to dissuade an amor-
phous and ever-shifting assortment of individuals, groups and communi-
ties from challenging their rule. At the same time, they have to persuade 
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a range of figures, organisations and constituencies, on whose support 
they depend, to remain loyal and committed to their cause.136 And these 
challenges are even greater in competitive authoritarian regimes where 
those in power have to deal with a host of ‘actors (parties, media, judges, 
NGOs) and arenas of contestation (elections, legislatures, and courts) that 
do not exist . . . or are merely a façade [sic]’ in full autocracies.137 In most 
instances, managing these forces and spaces depends on the development 
and maintenance of ‘organized mechanisms of coordination, monitoring, 
and enforcement’.138
Organisational power is determined by three capabilities of unequal 
importance: coercive capacity, ruling-party strength and, last and least, 
control of the economy. The better able a regime is physically to defend 
itself, the greater its stability and chances of survival. Regimes use two 
broad types of coercion to thwart their opponents: high- and low-intensity. 
The first includes measures which, by virtue of their scale or focus or 
design, are conspicuous. These actions are notable either because they are 
too large, too aggressive and too public not to be, or because the regime is 
trying to make a point, to remind its rivals of what it is willing and able to 
do. High-intensity coercion includes the (often lethal) use of force against 
crowds of protestors, the assassination of prominent critics, the incarcera-
tion of activists and their leaders, and armed attacks against recalcitrant 
democratic institutions.139
In contrast, low-intensity coercion comprises measures that are less 
conspicuous. These actions are comparatively unremarkable because they 
are smaller, less violent, cause fewer deaths, or are directed against less 
noteworthy targets. As a consequence, they are often vital to maintaining 
competitive authoritarian rule because they do not attract the same level 
of Western condemnation. Low-intensity coercion takes a range of physi-
cal and other forms. Opposition politicians, activists and supporters are 
routinely monitored and harassed. Their networks are disrupted and meet-
ings broken up. Their offices are vandalised and homes attacked. They 
are denied access to certain jobs, schools, universities and public services. 
They are subjected to fallacious investigations, lawsuits, enquiries and 
probes. By means of the police, armed forces, intelligence and security 
services, paramilitary groups, tax agencies, courts and other regulatory 
bodies, life is made as difficult and unpleasant for them as possible to 
force them to desist and to deter others from following in their path. By 
these means, regimes hope to bully their rivals into submission and, in so 
doing, avoid having to use high-intensity coercion against them later.140
Coercive capacity has two facets: scope and cohesion. Scope is the 
‘effective reach of the state’s coercive apparatus’.141 It is determined by 
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the size and competence of the combined coercive means at a regime’s 
disposal. These include both armed and unarmed agencies, state and 
non-state organisations. They include the military, gendarmerie, police, 
security services and intelligence agencies. And they sometimes include 
local political leaders and state functionaries, judges, courts, tax and 
other regulatory bodies, and paramilitary groups.142 When a regime’s 
security forces are well funded, trained and equipped, and have proven 
their ability ‘to penetrate society, monitor opposition activity, and put 
down protest in all parts’ of the national territory, then it has high coer-
cive scope.143 But, if a regime’s security forces are small, underfunded, 
badly trained and inadequately equipped, have little meaningful presence 
in large swathes of the country, or their personnel are so poorly and 
erratically paid that they are either unable to do much or are reluctant to 
obey orders, then it has low coercive scope. Scope has great bearing on 
a regime’s ability to undertake low-intensity coercion. To undertake the 
full range of low-intensity activities, a regime needs a nationwide infra-
structure. Inevitably, a regime’s capacity is weaker in those places where 
this infrastructure is either incomplete or damaged or missing. These 
areas provide vital spaces in which opposition forces can plan and operate 
in comparative freedom. Indeed, a regime’s resort to high-intensity coer-
cion often indicates the extent to which its low-intensity mechanisms 
have broken down.144
Cohesion is the degree of unity that exists within a state’s coercive 
apparatus. Effective coercion depends on robust chains of command, on 
orders being followed without question, alteration or delay. Cohesion is 
high when those in power can expect their subordinates, regardless of 
rank, to do what they are told. Accordingly, cohesion is low when leaders 
do not have this confidence, cannot assume that their instructions will 
be followed. Cohesion is vital to high-intensity coercion. Such activities 
are conspicuous and likely to result in widespread condemnation both at 
home and abroad. This censure might be sufficient to trigger or hasten a 
regime’s collapse. This means that those officers and functionaries who 
engage in high-intensity activities do so at great personal risk. For not only 
might they be singled out for sanction by the international community but 
they make themselves dependent on the regime’s survival and on those 
in power taking care of them. Should the regime fall or its government 
change or its leaders simply prove fickle, then they could be exposed to 
all manner of retribution. Acts of high-intensity coercion, therefore, pose 
particular challenges to chains of command. Often, only those leaders 
with confidence in the cohesion of their security apparatus or who are 
 completely desperate engage in it.145
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The level of cohesion exhibited by a security apparatus is determined 
by a range of factors. Crucial is the amount of material care lavished on 
its members by the regime. If those in power pay their service personnel, 
police officers and bureaucrats well and on time, then it is more likely 
to be able to rely on their loyalty. If it does not, however, then it is less 
likely to be able to depend on them, especially if it asks them to undertake 
high-intensity coercive actions. Yet cohesion is often strongest when key 
members of the ruling elite and security apparatus are bound by non-
material ties, by shared ethnicity (in a country where such links matter), 
ideology (usually nationalist or revolutionary), or experience (forged in a 
war, revolution or liberation movement). When a regime and its security 
force are led by individuals with direct personal experience of violent con-
flict, they are ‘more likely to possess the cohesion, self-confidence, and 
“stomach” to use force’.146
Strong parties are important to authoritarian regimes as they help 
contain and resolve intra-elite tensions and conflicts. They provide a 
mechanism by which leaders can reward (and thus encourage) the loyalty 
of their supporters. They also offer members of the elite a structure for 
career advancement, thereby encouraging them to stay within the party and 
co-operate with one another. For doing so not only holds out the promise 
of future benefits but defection would put an end to any ambitions an indi-
vidual might have for as long as the party remained in power. Conversely, 
when governing parties are weak, they are unable to offer such opportuni-
ties, leading to more members of the elite seeking power from outside the 
regime. Such defections can greatly destabilise a regime.147 Strong parties 
also help maintain regime stability through their ability to mobilise and 
marshal their grass-roots supporters. On occasion, this faculty is used to 
deploy rank-and-file members alongside security forces to coerce rival 
parties (disrupt their meetings, intimidate their candidates and followers, 
damage and destroy their property). And, more broadly, it discourages 
elite defection by making it harder for individuals to generate support for 
their cause and construct a popular powerbase.148
Strong parties are especially important to competitive authoritarian 
regimes because of their need to organise and participate in democratic 
processes. Strong parties are better able to mobilise their members and 
supporters at election time, to get the vote out in favour of the regime. And 
they have the means and personnel needed to steal elections, to perpetrate 
the various forms of fraud that can determine outcomes. Strong parties are 
also better able to control legislatures and legislative processes. A well-
disciplined party with a commanding majority is not only able to decide 
what laws are, and are not, passed but is more likely to be able to make 
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structural changes to the political system. Through this control, a strong 
party may well be able to amend the constitution, appoint and dismiss 
judges and other important functionaries, and oversee and shape the 
remits of electoral commissions and other vital bodies. And this control 
has other, zero-sum benefits for the regime. For, by exercising it, a party 
is able to deny the opposition easy or equal access to this important politi-
cal space, to use the legislature as a forum in which to debate the regime’s 
policies, and criticise and challenge its actions.149
A strong party can improve a regime’s control of the legislative process 
by enhancing its influence over the national assembly and providing a 
mechanism for managing the succession of its leaders. Strong parties are, 
by virtue of their greater means, better able to win elections. In so doing, 
they can help presidents impose their wills on their parliaments. For, 
without such parties, heads of state often struggle to dominate their national 
assemblies no matter how popular they are or however strong their personal 
mandates. By extension, strong parties can deliver greater control between 
elections and during those periods when the president’s popularity is 
lower. By means of patronage, offers of personal and professional aggran-
disement, and ideological appeal, strong parties can prevent much of the 
factionalism and infighting that occur in their absence. Such sectarianism 
and wrangling not only weakens regimes but provides opposition forces 
with opportunities to establish and develop themselves. Strong parties also 
facilitate succession by recruiting and nurturing a greater number of candi-
dates from whom replacements can be drawn, preventing the defection of 
defeated candidates by offering them other roles and providing an electoral 
and political machine that is not dependent on a single individual.150
Just as state strength is measured by scope and cohesion, so too is that 
of parties. Scope is determined by the size of either a party’s infrastruc-
ture or of the territory in which it has a meaningful presence. High-scope 
parties are large organisations, have many members, maintain permanent 
presences across much of the country, and are actively engaged in vil-
lages, neighbourhoods and workplaces. Low-scope parties, in contrast, 
are weak organisations, have few members, and have little active presence 
outside the major towns and cities, and those regions with close ties to key 
members of the regime.151
Cohesion is determined by a regime’s ability to gain and maintain the 
co-operation of like-minded figures and groups in the government, parlia-
ment, and at the regional and local levels. Cohesion is vital to deterring 
elite defections, especially during times of crisis. Cohesion is high when 
members of the government and other key political figures habitually 
support the regime, even when it is under pressure or threat, defections 
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are rare and, if they do occur, have little effect, and internal rebellions are 
infrequent. Cohesion is low, therefore, when parties have little structure or 
unity and their leading members derive much of their power and standing 
from elsewhere. In such circumstances, those in power frequently have 
to confront challenges to their authority, defections and wider rebellions 
leading to ‘opposition takeovers of the legislature or strong electoral chal-
lenges from erstwhile regime insiders’.152 Cohesion can be achieved by a 
range of means. Patronage can help maintain elite unity during periods of 
stability yet is often less effective at times of crisis and especially during 
economic slumps when there are fewer resources to distribute. Cohesion 
is usually stronger when it is based on non-material ties, such as ethnicity, 
ideology or shared experience. Indeed, cohesion is often strongest among 
individuals who, together, participated in, and won, a profound and violent 
struggle, a war of liberation or a revolution.153
Regimes are also better able to contain and defeat opposition challenges 
if they exercise discretionary control over their national economies. High 
control can be an alternative for strong coercive capabilities or parties. 
High control is achieved when the most important parts of the economy 
and sources of finance are largely at the disposal of the state. This level of 
control is often found in countries with incompletely reformed command 
economies or which depend on rents collected from mineral resources for 
much of their incomes. By means of taxation, controlling access to credit 
and licences, and the award of government contracts and concessions, 
therefore, those in power are able to help and reward their supporters and 
penalise and weaken their adversaries.154
In those countries in which the regime can easily influence the incomes, 
livelihoods and employment of a large portion of the population, engaging 
in opposition activity is a difficult, hazardous and potentially expensive 
decision. Opposition-linked businesses can be denied permits and con-
tracts. Independent media outlets can be starved of advertising, newsprint, 
ink and other essential materials. And critics of the regime can be dis-
missed from their jobs or refused access to basic public services. Control 
of the economy can also be used to deprive opposition parties and groups 
of the resources they need to mount effective campaigns. For, if the most 
important parts of the economy are state controlled and the private sector 
small and poor, few alternative sources of revenue exist for rival parties 
and groups to tap into. Finally, control of the economy can also be used 
to deter elite defections by raising to intolerable levels the financial and 
economic costs for those contemplating it.155
Inevitably, a regime’s organisational power is only one part of the polit-
ical equation. The other comprises the strength, unity and determination 
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of the forces ranged against it. Opposition groups and activists can pro-
foundly influence a regime’s direction of travel, whether it becomes more 
or less democratic. If these groups are strong, they can deprive the regime 
of resources and raise the cost of remaining authoritarian. And, if they are 
large, if they represent and can mobilise substantial numbers of people, 
they can make the electoral calculation confronting incumbents – whether 
to become more repressive or more democratic – much harder. Invariably, 
therefore, the stronger and larger a country’s opposition is, the greater the 
chances of political liberalisation.156
Indeed, organisational power and opposition strength are inextricably 
bound in a zero-sum relationship. When a regime is powerful, it possesses 
the coercive means systematically to undermine and negate its oppo-
nents. Conversely, when a regime is weak, opposition forces have greater 
opportunity to strengthen, and destabilise and challenge, those in power. 
Regimes with high organisational power, therefore, are almost always 
confronted by weak oppositions, while those with low power are some-
times, but not as frequently, faced by strong opponents.157 This explains 
why, in ‘many seemingly protest-driven transitions, incumbents’ inability 
to prevent large-scale elite defection . . . or use coercion to crack down 
on opposition protest . . . contributed directly to their fall from power. In 
effect, protestors knocked down a rotten door.’158
Levitsky and Way’s assessments of a regime’s coercive capacity and 
party strength are based on the scope and cohesion of each. They argue 
that a regime has high capacity if it has a ‘large, well-trained, and well-
equipped internal security apparatus with an effective presence across the 
national territory’ and ‘specialized intelligence or internal security agen-
cies with demonstrated capacity to penetrate civil society and monitor 
and repress opposition activities at the village and/ or neighborhood level 
across the country’; medium capacity if its ‘security forces maintain a 
minimally effective presence across virtually the entire national terri-
tory’ and do not appear to suffer from a lack of ‘funding, equipment, and 
training’; and low capacity if it has an ‘unusually small/ underdeveloped 
security apparatus’ which does not provide even a ‘minimally effective 
. . . presence in significant parts of the national territory’ or seems to lack 
sufficient ‘funding, equipment, and training’.159
And they argue that a regime’s coercive apparatus has high cohesion 
if it shows signs of ‘non-material sources of cohesion’, such as a ‘recent 
history of military conflict’, including a ‘large-scale external war’ that 
did not end in defeat, an ‘intense and enduring military competition or 
threat’, or a ‘successful revolutionary or anticolonial struggle’ in which 
‘leading security officials’ participated’; or ‘pervasive ethnic ties between 
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[the] incumbent party and security forces, in a society that is deeply 
divided along those ethnic lines’; or a ‘shared ideology in a context in 
which this ideological cleavage is dominant’; or ‘evidence of consist-
ent ability to use high-intensity coercion in [the] recent past;160 medium 
coercive cohesion if there is ‘no evidence of non-material sources of 
cohesion’ and has not experienced ‘insubordination [or] recent defeat in 
military conflict’, and has paid its security personnel fully and on time;161 
and low cohesion if there is ‘no evidence of non-material sources of 
cohesion’ and has experienced ‘serious insubordination by state security 
officials, including attempted coups, open rebellion, large-scale deser-
tion, and refusal to carry out major orders’ some time during the decade 
leading up to the period of analysis; or has been defeated recently ‘in a 
major military conflict’; or repeatedly fails to pay its security personnel’s 
wages on time.162
Levitsky and Way argue that a party has high scope if it is a ‘mass 
organization that penetrates virtually all population centres down to 
village and neighbourhood level and/ or civil society and/ or workplace’ 
and engages in ‘significant grassroots activity – during and between 
elections – across the national territory’; medium scope if it ‘possesses 
a national organization that penetrates most population centres and is 
capable of carrying out election campaigns and fielding candidates across 
the national territory’; and low scope if there is either no party at all, or 
‘little or no party organization outside of the capital/ major urban centres’. 
And they argue that a party has high cohesion if it governs by itself after 
achieving ‘power via violent conflict, including revolution or [a] national 
liberation struggle in which much of the current leadership participated’, 
or rules alone after participating ‘in at least two national multiparty elec-
tions’ and its members are bound by ‘non-material source[s] of cohesion’, 
such as a shared ideology or ethnicity in a context in which this ideological 
or ethnic cleavage is dominant’; medium cohesion if it rules alone after 
participating ‘in at least two national elections’, or is new (so ‘has partici-
pated in fewer than two national elections’) and its members are united by 
a ‘shared ideology or ethnicity in a context in which that ideological or 
ethnic cleavage is predominant’; and low cohesion if those in power rule 
without a party, or in collaboration with ‘multiple . . . , competing parties’, 
or with a new party (that ‘has participated in fewer than two national elec-
tions’) and whose members are not bound by a non-material source of 
cohesion.163
Finally, Levitsky and Way argue that a regime exercises discretion-
ary control over the economy if the state-owned ‘mineral sector accounts 
for more than 50 percent of export revenue’, or the ‘centrally planned 
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economy . . . does not undergo large-scale privatization’.164 Each com-
ponent of state and party strength (scope and cohesion), and the regime’s 
discretionary control of the economy are then awarded a score of 0 (low), 
1 (medium) or 2 (high). These five scores (state scope and cohesion, party 
scope and cohesion, and discretionary economic control) are then added 
together to give an overall mark which signifies a regime’s organisational 
power. If the mark is between 0 and 2, then a regime’s power is low; if it 
is 3, then a regime’s power is medium–low; if 4, then medium; if 5, then 
medium–high; and if 6 to 8, then high.165 Again, while this book adopts 
Levitsky and Way’s three grades (low, medium and high) and broad 
approach to assessing organisational power (by examining each of the 
three subdimensions and considering the scope and cohesion of the state 
and party), it does so by qualitative, rather than quantitative, means. That 
is, it does not assign any scores but makes a judgement as to the strength 
of each component of each subdimension.
Conclusions
The end of the Cold War led to a profound shift in international attitudes. 
Whereas once authoritarian rule had been accepted, now it was con-
demned. Whereas once dictators had been hailed and helped, now they 
were censured and undermined. Many of those regimes that had sided 
with the Soviet Union suddenly found themselves without a patron. While 
many of those that had aligned with the United States soon discovered that 
they were surplus to requirements and unwanted. In the space of just a few 
years, democracy was established as the only legitimate form of govern-
ment. And only those countries which embraced it could expect to receive 
any assistance from the now dominant West.
Yet authoritarianism’s defeat was not total. Full dictatorships survived, 
including in some of the states that emerged out of the wreckage of the 
Soviet Union. And democracy’s victory was never complete. Not all of the 
regimes which claimed to be democratic truly were. Nor was their liberali-
sation either assured or inevitable. At least some of those that were com-
petitive authoritarian became more, not less, repressive. It was in response 
to these changes and sweeping, end-of-history assumptions that Levitsky 
and Way devised their model. Their goals were threefold: to develop their 
concept of competitive authoritarianism; to explain why some regimes 
embrace democracy while others become competitive authoritarian and 
others still turn into full dictatorships; and to chart and explain the reasons 
why regimes develop in the ways that they do (either stay the same, or 
become more or less democratic).
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At the model’s core are the three dimensions of leverage, linkage and 
organisational power. Together they cover the international and domestic 
factors that help and hinder democratisation. Leverage refers to the ability 
of Western states and international bodies to compel regimes to become 
more democratic, and the ability of these countries to withstand this pres-
sure. Critical to a regime’s capacity to defy the West is whether it has the 
backing of a Black Knight patron. Black Knights are great powers, usually 
Russia or China, that provide significant economic, military and political 
support to a regime. In so doing, they better enable it to endure any sanc-
tions placed on it by Europe and North America.
Linkage refers to the range of connections, and their individual and 
collective strength, between Western countries and those elsewhere in the 
world. The strength of these ties and the main forms they take are mainly 
determined by history, economics and, above all, geography. Indeed, the 
closer a country is to Europe and North America the greater the number 
and density of its ties to them. High linkage encourages democratisation 
in three material ways: by generating greater international interest in any 
political or human rights abuses committed and thereby raising the likeli-
hood of Western intervention; by creating more domestic actors with a 
stake in appeasing the West and avoiding any sanctions it might impose; 
and by encouraging and strengthening local pro-democracy groups.
Finally, organisational power focuses on domestic factors and refers to 
the strength of a regime’s coercive capabilities and party organisation, and 
control of the economy. Both coercive and party strength are determined 
by two criteria: scope and cohesion. Scope is decided by the breadth and 
depth of a security apparatus’s or party’s reach within its national territory. 
Cohesion is decided by the strength of purpose and degree of unity exhib-
ited by a security apparatus or party. Discretionary control of the economy 
is decided by the amount of influence a regime has over vital sectors of 
the economy and sources of finance. High control of the economy can 
sometimes negate the need for a powerful security apparatus or party 
organisation.
Like leverage and linkage, organisational power can be categorised 
as high, medium and low. When leverage and linkage are both high, 
the pressure to democratise is intense and applied consistently. When 
leverage is low and linkage high, Western pressure is strong but poorly 
directed. When leverage is high and linkage low, the pressure is inconsist-
ently applied. And when leverage and linkage are both low, the pressure 
is infrequently and ineffectively applied. When leverage and linkage are 
lower, domestic factors (organisational power) largely determine political 
outcomes.
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Tunisia is unique. Of the four regimes examined by this book, it is the 
only one to have made the transition from competitive authoritarianism 
to democracy. And, of the numerous Middle Eastern and North African 
countries directly affected by the Arab Spring, it is the only one in which 
pro-democracy protestors have come close to realising their original 
goals. In the years since the Arab Spring began, large parts of Ben Ali’s 
regime have been dismantled. A new, progressive constitution has been 
introduced.1 Opposition parties have been established and legalised.2 
And free and fair elections have been held.3 In Tunisia alone have the 
anger and ambitions which drove and, for a time, defined the Arab Spring 
been harnessed to any satisfactory extent. The country remains the most 
hopeful point on a regional political map that is, in turns, disappointing 
and tragic.
That Tunisia’s demonstrations proved more successful than those 
elsewhere speaks of their instinctive originality. Tunisia’s protestors 
were pioneers, the first in the region to react in this way at this time. And, 
while they certainly came to draw succour from some of the groups and 
actions they inspired elsewhere, they remain the initiators of this particular 
round of popular regional protest. Theirs was an organic moment, a pas-
sionate and devastating response to the actions of the police, the security 
forces, the government and the regime. And, in responding this way, they 
established Tunisia as the unlikely epicentre of the turmoil that quickly 
 escalated into the Arab Spring.
So implausible did Ben Ali’s demise seem to country and regional 
analysts in the months leading up to his fall,4 that most did not even 
entertain the possibility that he could be removed in circumstances as 
fast paced and dramatic as those that transpired, let alone consider and 
dismiss such notions.5 Indeed, so stable and secure did his regime appear 
that the respected London-based think tank, the International Institute 
of Strategic Studies (IISS), made no mention of Tunisia in its 2010 
Strategic Survey,6 which it published just three months before Mohamed 
Bouazizi’s self-immolation.7 And the IISS was not alone in failing to 
anticipate the regime’s collapse. As Schraeder and Redissi observed, ‘to 
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say that Ben Ali’s sudden fall caught specialists by surprise would be an 
understatement’.8
While there are numerous facets to this failure of analysis, most spring 
from two closely related sources: Ben Ali’s success in creating and sus-
taining a positive image of his regime and the West’s willingness to accept 
it. Cavatorta and Haugbølle argue that three mythologies in particular 
– Tunisia’s supposed economic miracle, Ben Ali’s alleged commitment 
to democratic gradualism and the regime’s strict adherence to laïcité – 
‘prevented a clearer understanding of the political and socio-economic 
situation’ from being developed.9 From the moment he seized power 
in November 1987, Ben Ali presented his regime as a modernising and 
democratising force in a country that was favourably disposed to develop 
in these ways. Paradoxically, he was willing and able to exploit the image 
of Tunisia established by his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, whom he 
ousted from power.10 In so doing, he purposefully appealed to Europe’s 
and North America’s preferences for how they would like Tunisia to 
develop. This helps explain their long-term indulgence of this regime and 
hesitant responses to the protests that removed him from power.11
And to these three mythologies can be added a fourth; the seeming 
sturdiness of the regime. By the time Tunisia’s protests began, the 
ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionel 
Démocratique, RCD) was sufficiently well funded, favoured and organ-
ised to be able to dominate mainstream politics.12 Similarly, the security 
forces had been given enough resources and support to allow them to pen-
etrate all parts of the country down to the level of the village and neigh-
bourhood.13 Moreover, in the twenty-five years since Ben Ali had taken 
power, they had proven their effectiveness time and again. As recently 
as the winter of 2006–7, they had successfully prevented an attack by an 
armed Islamist group, killing at least a dozen of its members and arresting 
hundreds more.14 Neither Western governments nor country specialists 
had any reason, therefore, to doubt the ability of these forces to deal with 
the protests of 2010 and 2011.
By consistently and unquestioningly allowing these mythologies to 
frame their analyses, scholars failed to question adequately either the 
“‘unbearable lightness of Arab authoritarianism” ’ or ‘the expectations 
of transitology’ as applied to Tunisia.15 By mostly accepting the regime-
backed narrative that the country was modernising on all fronts, and then 
applying their democratisation models and theories based on this belief, 
scholars inevitably concluded that Ben Ali’s Tunisia was not only as 
stable as it seemed but that it was steadfastly inching towards the sunlit 
uplands of full democracy. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to move 
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beyond these mythologies by using Levitsky and Way’s model to explain 
better what has taken place in Tunisia and its exceptionalism: why it alone, 
of all the countries in the region affected by the Arab Spring, has made the 
transition to democracy.
The chapter argues: that Tunisia has high linkage to Europe and to the 
United States across all six categories of connection; that the West has 
high leverage over Tunis; and that the Ben Ali regime had high organi-
sational power (with both a strong security apparatus and ruling party). 
Yet this assessment raises a range of questions. On the one hand, Tunisia 
seems wholly to conform to Levitsky and Way’s model. The country’s 
strong links to Europe and North America and the West’s high lever-
age over the regime made Tunisia susceptible to the extensive pressure 
Washington, London, Paris and Brussels could bring to bear. And the 
country’s vulnerability to this influence was only heightened by its iso-
lation, by the absence of a Black Knight patron. Indeed, such was the 
significance of these external factors that they relegated domestic consid-
erations (the scope and cohesion of the security forces and ruling party, 
and the degree of discretionary control exercised by the government over 
the national economy) to secondary importance. In these circumstances, 
the strength of the regime largely did not matter because the West had the 
means to bring about change.
Yet, on the other hand, elements of Tunisia’s transition did not proceed 
as Levitsky and Way’s model seemed to suggest they might. To begin 
with, why did the regime fall at all? Why had it not adapted to the chang-
ing political climate? How had it been able to resist the various forms 
of pressure the West had supposedly put on it to implement the types of 
democratic reform which would have addressed at least some of the pro-
testors’ grievances? And why did it fall so quickly? In the end, Ben Ali 
was driven into exile less than a month after Bouazizi’s self-immolation. 
Why did the country’s well-resourced security forces fail to protect the 
regime better? How were these protests different from all the others that 
they had successfully dealt with? 
Indeed, Tunisia is a complex case. And, while Levitsky and Way’s 
model can explain what has happened there, it must be applied with care 
and subtlety. The West’s links to, and leverage over, the country remain 
high. But neither Europe nor the United States put as much pressure on 
Tunis as they could have done. Western governments habitually refrained 
from driving the democratisation agenda as hard as they might, preferring 
instead either to mollify the regime or prioritise other objectives.16 These 
competing goals ensured that individual governments behaved inconsist-
ently towards the regime and failed fully to co-ordinate their efforts with 
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one another. Crucially, therefore, the reduced pressure they exerted was 
due not to a lack of capacity but of will. Their leverage over Tunis was 
high but not exploited to its fullest extent.17
According to Levitsky and Way, if Western leverage is compromised, 
then organisational power plays a more decisive role in shaping political 
outcomes in determining whether a regime stands or falls and, if it does 
evolve, becomes more or less democratic. In which case, the Ben Ali 
regime appeared to be well equipped to survive as it was. For, not only 
had it built up a large and effective security apparatus but the ruling RCD 
was well organised and enjoyed numerous, significant advantages over its 
rivals. Yet it had a brittle strength, carefully nurtured and perfectly able to 
withstand certain types of pressure exerted in particular ways but vulner-
able to other seemingly quite manageable forces to the point of fragility.
Many of the flaws and weaknesses which most seriously compromised 
the regime’s organisational power were the result of its own actions. Such 
were the security forces’ efforts to carpet the country with their presence, 
so that they might be better able to monitor the population and identify 
and deal with any threats as they emerged, that they eroded their capacity 
to deal with crises when they did break out.18 Moreover, Ben Ali’s suspi-
cious treatment of the military, born of his determination to keep it out of 
politics, ensured that it felt little loyalty either to him or to his regime at the 
critical moment. And, even though the RCD enjoyed significant advan-
tages over other parties, key parts of its support, most notably sections of 
the middle and upper classes, were disillusioned with the regime.19 So, 
while the regime had high organisational power, its effectiveness was 
negated by its brittleness.
To sustain this analysis and argument, the chapter is organised along 
the same lines as each of Levitsky and Way’s original case studies. This 
structure is also adopted by each of the following three chapters (on 
Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, respectively). The first section exam-
ines the strength of Tunisia’s links to Europe and North America across 
the six categories of connection. In so doing, the section identifies and 
analyses the various mechanisms and facilities through which Tunisia’s 
relations with the EU and US are conducted. Inevitably, given that this is 
the opening case-study chapter, the section examines these mechanisms in 
more detail than in chapters 3, 4 and 5. The second section then considers 
the forms and extent of the West’s leverage over Ben Ali’s regime and 
whether it had the backing of a Black Knight patron. The third section 
then assesses the regime’s organisational power. And, finally, the fourth 
section traces its origins and development, paying particular attention to 




Tunisia has had strong links with the West since independence. Moreover, 
the number and quality of these ties have increased over the years to the 
extent that the country now has high linkage to the United States and to the 
European Union. Intergovernmental relations between the United States 
and Tunisia take place within a range of policy frameworks, most notably 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle 
East and North Africa (BMENA) partnership initiative.20 These frame-
works are managed and supported by different US government depart-
ments and international bodies. The MEPI is administered by the State 
Department while the BMENA was launched with the backing of the G8, 
European Union and Bretton Woods Institutions.21 And, in response to the 
protests in Tunisia and elsewhere, the Obama administration (somewhat 
belatedly) established a number of new mechanisms. In September 2011, 
the State Department created the office of the Special Coordinator for 
Middle East Transitions (SCMET) to oversee the distribution of American 
aid and development funds to Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.22 And, in 2013, 
the MEPI was subsumed as part of the SCMET and the special coordina-
tor’s area of responsibility extended to incorporate most of the Middle 
East and North Africa.23
The MEPI and BMENA were launched shortly before and after the 
United States’ invasion of Iraq in December 2002 and June 2004 respec-
tively. Their common purpose is to use non-military means to encourage 
Middle Eastern and North African regimes to democratise their politi-
cal processes and structures.24 The MEPI does so by providing financial 
support to national and regional projects that address at least one of its 
four core areas of concern, namely, economic liberalisation, education, 
women’s empowerment and human rights more broadly.25 Under the 
MEPI’s auspices, more than $730 million was distributed to schemes 
across the region between 2003 and 2012.26
Yet these funds represent only a small fraction of the total amount 
of foreign assistance provided to the region by the United States. A far 
greater portion of its spending there – between 70 and 80 per cent – went 
on security-related projects.27 Neither the amount of assistance given by 
the United States nor the proportion of those funds it spent on security 
was greatly affected by the change in administration. In its 2008 and 2009 
budgets, the Bush administration allocated $6.5 billion and $7.2 billion 
in foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa. Of this, more 
than $4 billion each year took the form of Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) through which the region’s governments were given credit to buy 
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US military equipment.28 And, in its 2010 and 2011 budgets, the Obama 
administration allocated $7 billion and $7.1 billion in foreign assistance 
of which up to $4.8 billion each year took the form of FMF credit.29 So, 
even though the amount of funding the United States provided to promote 
democracy and good governance in the region grew exponentially from 
$27.3 million in 2001 to $430 million in 2013, it continued to allocate far 
greater sums under the FMF programme.30
American assistance to Tunisia over this period was initially provided 
on a similar ratio. In 2007, the Bush administration gave the Ben Ali 
regime $11 million in security and military assistance,31 which was the 
equivalent of slightly more than a fifth of the total MEPI budget for that 
year. In 2010, the Obama administration raised that amount to $19.9 
million or around a third of the (higher) MEPI budget.32 And, in 2012, it 
more than doubled the sum to $54.5 million or nearly three-quarters of 
the (higher still) MEPI budget.33 Furthermore, Tunisia was consistently 
given more assistance than any other Maghreb country even though it had 
a much smaller population and territory to secure, and did not initially 
face any threats as serious as those confronting some of its neighbours, 
most notably Algeria. Between 2002 and 2005, Tunis was granted $74.8 
million in security assistance while Morocco and Algeria were granted 
$66.9 million and just $5 million respectively.34
Over the past twenty years, the European Union’s intergovernmen-
tal interactions with Tunisia and the Maghreb’s other countries have 
also been conducted through a range of policy frameworks, includ-
ing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and 
the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP).35 The 
EMP was established in November 1995 under the terms of the Barcelona 
Declaration which was agreed by the Council of the European Union, the 
European Commission, the EU’s fifteen member states and their twelve 
Mediterranean partners.36 The main purpose of the EMP was to promote 
‘peace, security and shared prosperity’ by providing a framework for the 
management of bilateral and regional relations between the various sig-
natories. The partnership was organised into three areas of co-operation. 
The first was political and security: the creation of ‘a common area of 
peace and stability underpinned by sustainable development, rule of 
law, democracy and human rights’. The second was economic: ‘the 
gradual establishment of a free-trade area aimed at promoting shared 
economic opportunity through sustainable and balanced socio-economic 
development’. And the third was social and cultural: the promotion of 
‘understanding and . . . dialogue between cultures, religions and people, 
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facilitating exchanges between civil society and ordinary citizens, particu-
larly women and young people’.37
In accordance with the terms of the EMP, each partner state has signed 
an association agreement (AA) with the European Union under which 
they are committed to engage in ever-greater free trade with Europe 
(except in certain protected sectors) and co-operate more closely with 
the partnership’s other members. To help fund these reforms, the EU 
launched the Accompanying Measures (Mesures d’Accompagnement, 
MEDA) financial programme in 1995. The monies this programme 
provided were augmented by loans from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB).38 Tunisia was the first partner state to sign an association agree-
ment on 17 July 1995.39 And it signed a free trade agreement with the 
European Union on 1 January 1998.40 And between 1995 and 1999, and 
2000 and 2006 it received €428 million and €517.6 million respectively 
in MEDA funding.41
In 2008 the EMP was formally rebranded as the UfM.42 The principal 
differences between the two were the expansion of the UfM’s member-
ship (twenty-eight European Union and fifteen partner states) and the 
reduction in its focus.43 This narrowing of interest was perhaps inevitable 
given that, since 2004, the EU’s bilateral relations with the partner states 
had mostly been managed through the ENP and the association agree-
ments.44 Yet, even so, the EMP’s early ambition remained evident in 
both the ENP’s founding belief that closer integration with Europe would 
strengthen democracy and human rights in the partner states and embrace 
of such grand goals as the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade 
zone.45
In accordance with the ENP, most partner states have agreed an action 
plan with the European Union which sets out their individual ‘agenda[s] 
for political and economic reform’ over the next three to five years, 
‘needs and capabilities’ and interests.46 Each plan also specifies what 
the European Union hopes to gain by entering into partnership with that 
country. The measures outlined in the plans are supposed to complement 
those laid out in the association agreements (for those countries which 
have them). And, to help ensure that the plans are implemented fully and 
to schedule, the EU offers support (financial, technical and political),47 
incentives (economic integration and fewer travel restrictions to Europe), 
and oversight, with the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
and European Commission publishing annual progress reports on each 
partner.48
Tunisia’s action plan with the European Union was agreed in late 2004 
and came into force on 4 July 2005.49 The plan had both a narrower focus 
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and contained more specific requirements than the association agreement. 
Unlike the agreement, the plan was mainly concerned with strengthening 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Tunisia. That it did so helps 
explain the Ben Ali regime’s delay in implementing it. The plan’s tighter 
focus was reflected in the more detailed short- and medium-term goals it 
set the regime and which included developing ‘the role of civil society’, 
encouraging ‘exchanges of experience between Tunisian and European 
members of parliament’, ‘developing structured political dialogue on 
democracy and the rule of law’, providing ‘support to political parties so 
as to further strengthen their involvement in the democratic process’, and 
helping ‘the Tunisian authorities in the area of  administrative reform, with 
a view in particular to greater transparency’.50
In response to what had happened during the first months of the Arab 
Spring, the European Union quickly launched a review into the ENP 
which it published in May 2011 as A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood.51 The review’s main finding was that the European Union 
had ‘been caught on the wrong side of history, in alliances with autocratic 
leaders . . . that focussed on energy and security and turned a blind eye 
to abuses’.52 To make up for this error of positioning, and recalibrate and 
relaunch its relationship with the governments and, in particular, peoples 
of North Africa, the European Union promised to provide more support for 
democracy and democratisation in the region. Indeed, the new-look ENP 
would offer ‘more money, markets and mobility in return for  evidence of 
political reform’.53
In addition to the changes it made to the ENP, the European Union also 
launched its fourth and most recent policy framework, the Partnership 
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) on 8 March 2011.54 The 
PfDSP was the first framework both devised by the European Union in 
the wake of the Arab Spring and which sought to structure and regulate 
Europe’s relations with its North African and Middle Eastern partners 
on the basis of what they were experiencing.55 The EU did not intend 
for the PfDSP to replace either the ENP or UfM, but reframe and rein-
vigorate them. The PfDSP’s initial function, therefore, was curative and 
declaratory; to try to repair the EU’s strained relations with the region’s 
inhabitants by reaffirming its commitment to democracy, acknowledging 
its failure to better support the Arab Spring protestors,56 and pledging to 
provide them with greater assistance from then on.
The PfDSP’s second purpose was to set out the EU’s priorities: those 
areas of reform in which it was most eager for progress to be made and 
towards which it would direct more of its energies. These included: 
strengthening the various institutions which together make up and sustain 
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healthy democratic systems; working more closely with the citizenries of 
partner states and generating greater opportunities for ‘people-to-people’ 
contact; and encouraging economic liberalisation and improving those ele-
ments of worker welfare and development crucial to economic growth.57 
These priorities were subsequently embraced and endorsed by the ENP. 
And, to advance them, the European Union established new programmes 
and made additional money available. Intriguingly, these programmes 
did not come with their own resources but, instead, drew from the ENP’s 
expanded budget.58
In May 2011, the EIB raised its loan ceiling for the Middle East and 
North Africa from €4 billion to €5 billion, and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) agreed to extend its cover-
age to the southern Mediterranean and ‘make up to €2.5 billion of public 
and private sector investment’ available each year for ‘the establish-
ment and expansion of businesses and the financing of infrastructure’.59 
In September 2011, the European Union established the Support for 
Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) fund with a budget 
of €359 million, and the Civil Society Facility (CSF) with an initial annual 
budget of €26.4 million.60 And in October 2012, the EU launched the 
European Endowment for Democracy (EED) with an initial budget of 
€14 million.61 To date, Tunisia has been one of the main beneficiaries of 
SPRING funding receiving €140 million in payments between 2011 and 
2013.62 Egypt and Morocco were given €130 million and €115 million 
respectively over the same perion.63
In addition to the changes it made to the ENP and launch of the PfDSP, 
the European Union created other new structures in response to the Arab 
Spring. In July 2011, it appointed a Special Representative (EUSR) for the 
Southern Mediterranean whose task it was to further the objectives of the 
ENP in the region.64 And, between September 2011 and February 2012, 
the EU convened task forces for Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan ‘to coordinate 
European and international support to allow quicker and more effective 
assistance’,65 by bringing ‘together officials from the EU, members states, 
the European Investment Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as 
well as representatives from other international financial institutions and 
from the private sector’.66
It was in this renewed spirit of solidarity with the peoples of North 
Africa that the European Union signed a privileged partnership agreement 
with Tunisia’s Association Council at the first meeting of the Tunisian 
task force on 28 September 2012.67 In accordance with it, the EU pledged 
to provide over €300 million in grant monies and to return all the ‘illicitly 
acquired assets of the previous regime’.68 It also promised to encourage 
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the EIB and EBRD ‘to bring investment finance to the country’.69 Through 
their respective policy frameworks, therefore, both the European Union 
and the United States have forged extensive links with successive Tunisian 
governments and acquired significant leverage over them all. Moreover, 
as a result of the conditions these frameworks have imposed on Tunis and 
the types of funding they have made available, they have encouraged and 
facilitated the creation of numerous important economic ties between the 
country and the West.
Indeed, the value of Tunisia’s trade with the United States has increased 
steadily over the past twenty years. This growth is mainly the result of 
the various commercial agreements Tunis has made. On 29 March 1995, 
the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). In so doing, it 
satisfied one of Washington’s key requirements for closer economic co-
operation. Then, on 2 October 2002, the Ben Ali regime signed a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States. Under 
its terms, both Tunis and Washington pledged ‘to promote an attractive 
investment climate and expand trade in products and services’.70 And, on 
9 May 2003, the Bush administration launched the Middle East Free Trade 
Area (MEFTA) initiative with Tunisia as a prospective member.71
The value of Tunisia’s imports from the United States has more than 
doubled over the past two decades. Between 1995 and 1999, their annual 
average value was $342.03 million.72 Between 2000 and 2004, they rose 
slightly to $342.41 million.73 Then, between 2005 and 2010, they increased 
markedly to $584.36 million.74 And, most recently, between 2011 and 
2013, they were worth $845.98 million.75 The rise in the value of Tunisia’s 
exports to the United States has been even more dramatic. Between 1995 
and 1999, their annual average value was just $50.75 million.76 Then, 
between 2000 and 2004, they grew to $64.58 million.77 Then, between 
2005 and 2009, they increased significantly to $209.04 million.78 And, 
between 2010 and 2013, they were worth $347.19 million.79 As a result 
of these increases, the United States is now the sixth largest importer 
of Tunisian goods and third highest exporter to the country, making it 
Tunisia’s third biggest trading partner.80
And Tunisia has long sought closer economic relations with the 
European Union as well. Not only was it the first partner state to sign 
an association agreement in July 1995 but it began removing tariffs on 
individual imports from the EU as early as 1996, a full two years before 
the agreement was ratified and came into force.81 Since then, and in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, Tunis has reduced the import 
tariffs on more than half the products it said it would and eliminated them 
entirely for capital goods.82 These measures, and the broader ambition 
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which sustains them, have helped to establish the European Union as 
Tunisia’s most important economic partner.83 In 2003, the total value of 
the country’s trade with the EU was €13.5 billion. Over the next decade it 
grew almost annually so that, by 2013, it was worth €20.5 billion.84
More indicative, though, is the amount of business Tunisia conducts 
with the European Union as a proportion of its total trade. In 2003, the 
European Union accounted for 79.2 per cent of the country’s exports and 
provided 73.7 per cent of its imports.85 And, while these figures had fallen 
by 2013, the EU was still Tunisia’s biggest trading partner by a consider-
able margin, receiving 61.9 per cent of its imports and supplying 65.3 per 
cent of its exports.86 In comparison, the country’s second highest import 
and export partners (China and Libya) accounted for 5.4 per cent and 
8.1 per cent of trade respectively.87 Moreover, Tunisia’s imports to and 
exports from the European Union amounted to more than double those of 
its next nine largest trading partners.88
A key condition of Tunisia’s membership of the European Union’s 
various policy frameworks is that it opens up its economy to greater 
private and foreign investment. This requirement was underscored by the 
EU’s insistence that all partner states join the WTO.89 Indeed, one of 
the main reasons it sought closer relations with Europe was to increase 
the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country. And, while 
Tunis has been slow to derestrict some sectors, most notably the country’s 
financial services, it has pressed ahead with the privatisation of several 
large state-owned firms.90
In so doing, Tunisia has been able, over the past two decades, to gen-
erate increasing amounts of FDI. Between 1995 and 1999, the country 
attracted an average of $367.8 million in foreign investment each year.91 
Between 2000 and 2004, this grew to an average of $625.2 million a 
year.92 Then, between 2005 and 2009, it increased again to an average of 
$1.9 billion per year.93 And, between 2010 and 2013, it amounted to an 
average of $1 billion a year.94 By opening up the country to outside invest-
ment, successive governments have encouraged and facilitated the forging 
of extensive economic links between their country and Europe and North 
America. A growing number of Tunisian companies, industries and enter-
prises, across a range of sectors, along with their owners, managers and 
workforces now value and depend on customers, suppliers and investors 
in the West.
And these economic ties are augmented by the remittance payments 
made by the members of the country’s extensive diaspora.95 When meas-
ured by their effect on ordinary Tunisians’ daily lives and total value, these 
disbursements are arguably more important than foreign direct investment 
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in the country. For, between 1995 and 1999, remittances were worth an 
average of $715.4 million each year.96 And, between 2000 and 2004, their 
value grew to an average of $1 billion a year.97 Then, between 2005 and 
2009, their value rose again to an average of $1.7 billion per year.98 And, 
most recently, between 2010 and 2013, their worth increased yet again to 
an average of $2.1 billion a year.99 These payments ensure that millions 
of Tunisians have a common vested interest in their country maintaining 
cordial relations with those in which their friends and  relations live and 
work.
Such is the great size of Tunisia’s diaspora that it also performs an 
important social function as its members form human chains between 
the country and their new homes in the West. For, as of 2012, there were 
20,300 Tunisian citizens living in Canada and 15,308 in the United States; 
668,668 in France and 189,092 in Italy; 86,601 in Germany and 24,810 
in Belgium and Luxemburg; and 16,667 in the Netherlands and 8,776 in 
Austria. That is, there were 35,608 Tunisians living in North America and 
1,032,412 in Europe out of a total diaspora population of 1,223,213.100 So, 
out of the 11.35 per cent of the country’s population which lived overseas, 
87.3 per cent resided in the West.101
This social connection continues to be strengthened by the movement 
and transfer of other populations. In each of the past ten years, Tunisia has 
attracted millions of tourists, a majority of whom came from the European 
Union.102 This flow of people peaked in 2008 when the country had 7.04 
million visitors. And, even in 2011, when the number of tourists travelling 
to the country was at its lowest owing to the instability and uncertainty 
caused by the Arab Spring, it still received 4.78 million visitors. And, since 
then, tourist numbers have risen steadily, with 5.95 million people visiting 
the country in 2012, 6.26 million in 2013,103 6.06 million in 2014,104 and 
0.34 million in January 2015.105 Tourism is also an important source of 
revenue and foreign currency earnings for Tunisia, making the country 3.5 
billion dinars in 2010, 2.4 billion in 2011, 3.1 billion in 2012, 3.2 billion in 
2013,106 3.5 billion in 2014,107 and 206,500 in January 2015.108
The improved access to information offered by émigrés and tourists has 
been greatly enhanced by the rapid spread of Internet and mobile phone 
use in Tunisia. In 2000, only 2.8 per cent of the country’s population had 
any Internet access.109 By 2005, it had increased exponentially to 9.7 per 
cent.110 By 2010, it had nearly quadrupled to 36.8 per cent. And, most 
recently, in 2013, it had leapt to 43.8 percent.111 The rise in mobile phone 
subscription over this period has been even more remarkable. In 2000, just 
1 per cent of the population subscribed to a mobile telephone service.112 
By 2005, this had increased to 57 per cent of the population.113 By 2010, 
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it had nearly doubled again to 105 per cent. And, by 2013, it had jumped 
to 116 per cent.114
And thousands of Tunisians continue to be educated in the West. 
Indeed, pursuit of educational opportunities is one of the main reasons 
why Tunisians emigrate to Europe and North America.115 Ben Ali, like 
many of his military and socio-economic peers, attended training courses 
in both France and the United States.116 And, in so doing, he made and 
helped reinforce the now well-established pedagogical pilgrimage to 
Europe and North America. Spending a little time at a French, German or 
Canadian school, college or university is an important rite of passage for 
many middle-class sons and daughters. Attending such institutions and 
receiving instruction in either French or English are rightly seen as sig-
nificant advantages in the job market back home. Many of those fortunate 
enough to be educated in the West quickly assume important, influential 
and  comparatively lucrative posts in either the private or public sectors.
And in response to the Arab Spring, the European Union has suppo-
sedly taken steps to make it easier for more young Tunisians to study in 
Europe. One of the measures it introduced with the launch of the PfDSP 
was to double (to €30 million) Erasmus Mundus scholarship funding (for 
the 2011–12 academic year) for Southern Mediterranean students and aca-
demic staff ‘wishing to spend part of their studies, research or . . . teaching 
period in the European Union’.117 And, in May 2013, the European Union 
made an additional €10 million available through the Erasmus Mundus 
and Tempus programmes ‘to further develop the modernisation of higher 
education as well as the international cooperation capacity of higher edu-
cation institutions in Tunisia’.118
It was always the EU’s intention that the expanded Erasmus Mundus 
programme would complement its new Civil Society Facility. Launched 
along with the PfDSP in March 2011, the CSF had an initial budget of 
€26.4 million to be used ‘to strengthen the capacity of civil society’ in the 
southern and eastern partner states.119 Since then, the EU Delegation in 
Tunisia has assumed responsibility for fifty-four projects which receive 
€16 million in funding from various European sources.120 And the 
European Union is also developing a new Programme of Support to Civil 
Society (PASC). With a budget of €7 million, its purpose will be ‘to 
support the capacity building of civil society organisation so that they can 
better contribute to the development and . . . democratic transition of the 
country’, and ‘facilitate dialogue and partnerships between civil society 
organisation and public actors, and make recommendations for legislative 
reviews related to the actions promoted by the NGOs as well as their work 
environment’.121
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Leverage
The West has high leverage over Tunisia. The country does not have a 
large or medium-sized economy.122 It is not a major or intermediate oil 
producer.123 It does not possess, or have easy access to, nuclear weapons. 
And it does not enjoy the backing or protection of a Black Knight patron. 
It does not have, therefore, the economic means, strategic resources, 
military capabilities or great power alliances needed effectively to deter, 
counter, mitigate or resist European and North American influence.
Yet the West’s leverage over Tunisia is also compromised and not as 
great as it might be. The lessening of its influence is mainly because of 
its long-running security concerns in and for the region. According to 
Levitsky and Way, Western leverage over a country must be classed as 
medium if the target state does not satisfy any of the criteria for low-level 
influence and is a central actor in ‘a major security-related foreign-policy 
issue for the United States and/ or EU’.124 Since the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001, European and North 
American governments have been extremely sensitive to the dangers 
posed by Islamist terror groups operating in and out of the wider Middle 
East.125 As a country in this region in close proximity to Europe, Tunisia 
continues to be viewed with apprehension and treated with caution.
The West’s leverage over Tunisia, however, is still high rather than 
medium even though its security concerns for the country have seldom 
been specific and never as great as its fears for other countries in the 
region. Only recently has Tunisia been identified as the home and main 
operating base of terrorist factions that pose significant national and inter-
national threats. Until then, the country went mostly unnoticed: a small, 
comparatively quiet corner of an important and worrisome region. Indeed, 
there seemed to be little of individual import about it beyond its location. 
This both explains, and is reflected in, its earlier failure to generate similar 
levels of Western interest and anxiety as Algeria and Egypt, Lebanon and 
Syria, Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen.
More importantly, though, these concerns gave rise to, and still sustain, 
a series of sapping inconsistencies. Western democracy promotion in the 
region continues to be marked by at least two important tensions. The first 
is the divergence between rhetoric and action, between what the United 
States and European Union say they want and will support and what they 
actually tolerate and the types of assistance they provide.126 This diver-
gence has evolved subtlety over time and is slightly different today from 
how it manifested itself both before and during the Arab Spring. Initially, 
in the years leading up to the protests, the United States and European 
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Union claimed to prioritise and be wholly committed to extending and 
deepening democracy in the wider Middle East. The more democracy 
there was, so the prevailing wisdom in Washington, London, Paris and 
Brussels ran, the safer everyone would be.127
And, to an extent, the United States and European Union were true 
to their words. Both placed democracy promotion either at or near the 
heart of their various policy frameworks for the region and the country. 
And both buttressed these promises with large amounts of money. Under 
President George W. Bush, funding for democracy promotion in the 
Middle East grew exponentially from a paltry $27.3 million in 2001 to 
$183 million in 2005. And, under President Obama, it continued to rise at 
a similar rate, climbing to $430 million in 2013.128 Similarly, the EU was 
contributing around half of the estimated $2 billion that was spent annu-
ally worldwide on democracy-related aid projects, making it the world’s 
largest democracy donor.129
Yet this expenditure was but a fraction of what the West spent on secu-
rity in the region. The size of this funding discrepancy inevitably raised 
difficult questions about where the United States’ and European Union’s 
true priorities lay. Moreover, it cast serious doubt on their claims to be 
willing and able to hold local security providers to account, to cajole and 
compel the region’s militaries, police forces, security services and intel-
ligence agencies to pay democracy greater respect. The dilemma which 
gave rise to this funding imbalance undoubtedly helps explain the US’s 
and EU’s initial, faltering responses to the Arab Spring. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy began by defending Ben Ali before leading the NATO 
charge against Libya’s Gaddafi.130 And President Obama did not come 
firmly down on the side of the protestors until 19 May 2011, some five 
months after the Arab Spring had begun.131
Washington’s failure to back the protestors more fully sooner also 
sprang from its misapprehension of at least some of their motives. It 
viewed their economic grievances in largely local terms, as stemming 
more from domestic abuses, ‘corruption, crony capitalism, a lack of 
accountability and technical failures’, than from any opposition to global 
market forces.132 It has, therefore, defined events in Tunisia and elsewhere 
in terms that make them more compatible with its existing policy frame-
works and points of reference. In fact, the existence and configuration of 
these frameworks have prejudiced its thinking. Washington has broadly 
accepted their intellectual parameters, allowed its thinking to be shaped 
and clipped by their goals, requirements and structures. And it was encour-
aged to do so by expediency, by the automatic and perhaps understandable 
hope that these mechanisms would suffice and cope, and provide it with 
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the means to respond. Yet, as a result, it has missed some of the nuance, 
failed to appreciate fully the true extent and complexion of the Tunisian 
protestors’ grievances and the broader changes they unleashed and formed 
part of. In such circumstances, its response would always struggle fully to 
match its rhetoric.133
This seeming double standard was ruthlessly exposed by the Arab 
Spring.134 The European Union, in particular, coyly acknowledged that it 
should have been more supportive of those demanding political reform.135 
Since then, both the US and EU have tried to stay on the right side of 
history. And, while they have not been wholly successfully in this endeav-
our, leading to accusations of backsliding and regression, they remain 
more aware of the promises they have made and the level of international 
scrutiny they are under. As a result, one of the main causes of this diver-
gence now is process: failings in the mechanisms by which the United 
States and, in particular, the European Union try to promote democracy.
Part of the problem for the EU was undoubtedly timing. The Arab 
Spring began just as one of the worst economic crises to hit modern 
Europe was starting to bite. Brussels and the national governments had 
to try to find this extra funding at a time when there was little to be had. 
Moreover, they had to explain why they were doing so to their own belea-
guered electorates who increasingly viewed such spending in zero-sum 
terms. The outcome, therefore, has been a surreptitious fudge. Ostensibly, 
the European Union has promised more: extra aid, new loans, additional 
investment.136 Yet, so far, it has failed to deliver fully. Moreover, despite 
these pledges, it is actually committing less than it was before the Arab 
Spring began,137 is needed by these countries, and what the Gulf States are 
providing.138
The European Union is also struggling to honour its mobility pledge, 
to ease the travel restrictions it imposes on North African citizens.139 
The surge in migration to Europe, caused by the unrest in Tunisia, Libya 
and elsewhere, made it politically difficult for EU governments to relax 
their visa requirements. So, too, did the continent’s rapidly worsening 
economic outlook. With many of their economies entering recession and 
a growing number of their citizens out of work, European governments 
found themselves under mounting domestic pressure to reduce inward 
migration.
Financial pressures, however, are only one cause of this first discrep-
ancy. The ongoing instability in parts of North Africa and the Middle 
East is also making it harder for the EU to disburse its funds as recipient 
states simply do not have the capacity to absorb all the monies it is offer-
ing them.140 And, in an effort to promote democracy better and safeguard 
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its taxpayers’ investment, the EU has increased the number of conditions 
it attaches to the funding it provides, thereby making it harder for recipi-
ent countries to access this money easily or quickly. The EU measures 
its funding cycle in years, not months, leading to a degree of tolerance in 
Brussels for this current shortfall.141
Indeed, Mouhib argues that the EU’s very structure ensures that some 
level of inefficiency and inconsistency in its democracy promotion efforts is 
unavoidable.142 The ‘autonomy of the different institutional groups’ within 
the European Union dictates that these efforts resemble less a coherent strat-
egy and more a ‘complex “political process” ’.143 Fundamentally, there is no 
consensus within the European Union on what its democratisation policies 
should be or how they ought to be implemented. Responsibility for external 
relations, of which democracy promotion in North Africa and the Middle 
East is clearly part, is divided between the EEAS and the Commission. The 
former has oversight of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
the latter of managing economic relations and the various financial instru-
ments involved in them.144 This division makes the EEAS responsible for 
policy formulation and activity programming, and the Commission for 
policy implementation and the disbursement of funds.145 A slight discon-
nect exists, therefore, between those parts of the EU (the EEAS) that devise 
policy and those (the Commission) that instigate it. And the high degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by the Commission allows it to ‘interpret, adjust and 
change’ both the ‘form and substance’ of policies if it so wishes.146 This 
means that some of the actions the EU takes do not fully conform to what 
was originally planned.
The complexity of this organisational picture has been added to in 
the wake of the Arab Spring as, in response to the protests, the European 
Union established new offices, and reinvigorated and launched new 
programmes. In July 2011, it appointed Bernardino Léon as its Special 
Representative for the Southern Mediterranean. Between taking office 
and the autumn of 2013, Léon participated in a series of succession 
and other negotiations in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere. Yet 
he did not fully co-ordinate his actions with the ENP.147 Rather, he 
became another moving part in the EU’s vast and intricate foreign policy 
machine. Despite its renewed efforts to stay on the right side of history 
and support better those campaigning for greater democracy in North 
Africa and the Middle East, the European Union is still not living up to 
its rhetoric.
Another noteworthy cause of this divergence is the growing competi-
tion the United States and European Union face as aid providers. Their 
post-Cold War pre-eminence as the main, or only, sources of significant 
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development assistance is under increasing challenge. Other govern-
ments are now also willing and able to offer such help. This broadening 
of aid provision means that recipient states are not as dependent on the 
West as perhaps they once were. They are better able to pick and choose 
what help they accept on the basis of what they will be expected to do 
in return. They are more able to decline specific aid offers and avoid the 
attached conditions. Furthermore, Western governments are finding it 
harder to dispense with such stipulations given the high level of scrutiny 
paid to their provision by their own populations, the international com-
munity and the recipient countries.148 And their actions in Tunisia and 
North Africa are subjected to especially close analysis because of their 
previous support of Ben Ali and the region’s other authoritarian regimes, 
and their subsequent solemn pledges to be a greater friend to local pro-
democracy forces.
Indeed, on 7 June 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
agreed to provide the Tunisian government with a $1.75 billion loan. This 
arrangement had taken months of negotiations to reach. And, to receive it, 
Tunis had to agree to the IMF’s conditions, to overhaul public spending 
and reform the country’s banking sector.149 In contrast, a week later the 
Tunisian government announced that it had been given $1.2 billion in new 
funding by Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Development Bank (IDB). No require-
ments or riders were attached to this loan. Inevitably, therefore, the West’s 
leverage over Tunisia has been weakened. So, while Saudi Arabia might 
not be Tunisia’s Black Knight, its actions are sufficient ‘to constrain and 
limit the effects of Western support for democratic change’.150
The second key divergence is between Western governments: the 
United States and the European Union; the EU and national capitals. To 
be clear, these governments actually agree on a great deal and interact 
with the region’s countries in similar ways. Moreover, their relations with 
these countries have developed along largely the same lines. In the years 
leading up to the Arab Spring, Washington and Brussels, Paris, Rome and 
Madrid all supported democratisation but were arguably more concerned 
with maintaining stability which led them to treat Ben Ali and the other 
authoritarian leaders with leniency and even sympathy. As a result, they 
responded slowly and hesitantly to the Arab Spring before eventually 
committing themselves more fully to the cause of democracy and the local 
actors striving for it. Since then, they have all tried to maintain this com-
mitment but remain fearful of the instability that continues to grip parts of 
the region, and the insecurity it gives rise to.
Nevertheless, important differences between these governments persist. 
Prior to the Arab Spring, the European Union provided both the region 
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and Tunisia with far more non-military and democracy-building aid than 
the United States did. The MEPI’s political funding stream for 2006 
totalled $43 million which was then distributed between all the participat-
ing states. Inevitably, therefore, some countries, such as Algeria, received 
very little from it if anything at all.151 In contrast, in 2005–6, the EU gave 
€30 million to democracy-supporting projects in Tunisia alone.152 And, 
more fundamentally, the European Union, unlike the United States, seeks 
to promote both democracy and its broader values through socialisation, 
by drawing its Mediterranean neighbours into its institutional frame-
work. By these means, it seeks to expose them to the same norms and 
expectations that shape and dictate political life in Europe, to normalise 
attitudes and patterns of behaviour that it identifies as being conducive of 
democracy.153
Undoubtedly the European Union is better placed – geographically, 
ideologically and institutionally – than the United States to adopt this 
approach. But, in addition to promoting democratic institutions, pro-
cesses and rights, the EU is seeking to advance its own influence and 
interests in the region. This, again, it has in common with the United 
States although the fact of it is an important cause of divergence as both 
Brussels and Washington seek to maximise their positions, importance 
and advantages.154 National interests are also a vital source of difference 
within the European Union. Broadly, the northern member states would 
like to see the EU take a tougher line, be more forthright in its demands, 
resolute in its actions, uncompromising in its expectations, especially over 
transition processes, than the southern members.155 They, perhaps under-
standably given their front-line location, are ‘more risk-averse and less 
change-prone’.156
Certainly, southern European anxiety over the Arab Spring helps con-
textualise and explain the alternative policy lines taken by some of its gov-
ernments. By the time the protests began, France, Spain and Italy had all 
forged close working relationships with Ben Ali, Gaddafi and many of the 
region’s other authoritarian leaders.157 As part of its action plan, Tunisia 
was supposed to introduce democratic reforms but was never compelled 
to do so.158 Similarly, of the €365 million in bilateral aid France provided 
North Africa in 2003, only €5 million went to governance projects.159 
Initially, therefore, they opposed Ben Ali’s removal though they soon 
switched their support to the protestors.160 Despite this Europeanisation 
of their positions, Paris, Rome and, in particular, Madrid have continued 
‘to pursue interest-based policies’ in the region.161 That is, they largely 
devolve ‘value-based issues’ to the European Union and continue to 
pursue their own interests bilaterally.162
Democratisation in the Maghreb
66
Yet, even with these tensions, inconsistencies and divergences, the 
West’s leverage over Tunisia remains high. The numerous strong links 
that exist between the country and North America and Europe give 
Washington, Brussels, Paris and Berlin extensive influence over Tunis. 
And, more crucially, the country simply does not have the wherewithal 
to evade, resist or mitigate this pressure. Its economy is too small. It does 
not possess any strategic resources in sufficient quantities. It does not have 
any nuclear weapons. And it does not have the backing of a Black Knight 
power. Certainly, countries such as Saudi Arabia have the ability to under-
mine Western influence. But none chooses to do so to the extent and with 
enough consistency to be designated a Black Knight.
Organisational Power
The Ben Ali regime had high organisational power. Not only did it build 
and maintain a strong ruling party and coercive apparatus but it also exer-
cised considerable control over the country’s economy. During his near 
quarter of a century in office, Ben Ali raised state spending on security 
every year except one (2005).163 In truth, he perpetuated a pattern of 
investment established by his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba. Yet, under 
Ben Ali, this expenditure grew both as a proportion of total state spending 
and in monetary terms. Indeed, in 1987, the year in which Ben Ali took 
over as acting president, the Ministry of Interior’s portion of the national 
budget was raised from 5.7 to 8.2 per cent.164 And it continued to be 
increased almost annually until it peaked at 9.7 per cent in 1992 before 
being lowered to Bourguiba-era levels in 1997.165
By the time this reduction was introduced, however, the government’s 
total expenditure was almost four times greater than that which it had 
been a decade earlier.166 Moreover, it nearly doubled again between 1996 
and 1997,167 thereby ensuring that, even though the size of the Ministry 
of Interior’s allocation fell as a portion of total public spending, it still 
received more money in 1997 than it had the previous year. This increase 
was entirely consistent with Ben Ali’s long-term spending priorities. Only 
in 2001 and 2005 did the Ministry of Interior’s budget contract slightly 
from what it had been in the years before.168 Indeed, by the time Ben Ali 
fled office in 2011, the Ministry of Interior’s budget was more than six-
and-a-half times larger than what it been when he assumed power in 1987. 
Similarly, the Ministry of Defence’s budget had increased more than 
 sevenfold over the same period.169
The Ben Ali regime’s consistently high level of investment in the 
security forces enabled them to penetrate almost the entire country down 
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to the level of the neighbourhood and village.170 Yet, despite their ‘omni-
presence’, they still ‘failed to prevent crime in the cities or trafficking in 
the border regions’.171 And, perhaps more crucially, they lacked cohesion. 
This was also true, to an extent, of the military. For neither was bound 
by strong, non-material ties. Unlike Algeria, Tunisia had not had to fight 
for its independence. And, since then, it had not had to confront any 
serious internal or external threats. The members of the security forces 
and military, therefore, had no glorious reference points or memories to 
unite them. Nor had they had any real opportunities to acquire the single-
mindedness and steely determination that often come from engaging in 
existential struggles.172
More serious still was the lack of cohesion between the security forces 
and the military. Indeed, the Arab Spring ruthlessly exposed the depth 
of their disunity. And one of its main causes was the highly partial and 
partisan policies pursued by Bourguiba and Ben Ali. An important tipping 
point in their resource allocation came in 1984 when, for the first time 
ever, the Ministry of Interior was given a bigger share of the national 
budget than the Ministry of Defence.173 And for each year from then until 
Ben Ali fled office, this funding pattern was continued. Furthermore, the 
amount of extra money the Ministry of Interior was given also grew to the 
extent that, by 2011, its budget was around one-and-a-half times the size 
of the Ministry of Defence’s.174
This sustained favouritism was the mainstay of an enduring strategy to 
exclude the military from public life. Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali were 
extremely anxious to avoid becoming politically dependent on it. In addi-
tion to controlling its finances, therefore, Bourguiba imposed a raft of 
other restrictions on its personnel, banning them from either founding or 
joining political parties [including the ruling Socialist Destourian Party 
(Parti Socialiste Destourien, PSD)], or participating in any way in policy 
formation (including defence policy).175 Rather, he and Ben Ali wanted 
it to concentrate solely on defending the national territory.176 Indeed, 
such was Ben Ali’s antipathy towards it that, between 2002 and 2009, 
he allocated an average of just 1.4 per cent of GDP to defence each year 
compared to the 3.4 per cent, 3.1 per cent and 2.7 per cent allotted by the 
governments of Morocco, Algeria and Egypt respectively.177
What made Ben Ali’s treatment of the armed forces all the more 
intriguing was his own extensive background in them. He was com-
missioned into the Tunisian army in 1956 and served in it until 1977. 
During that time, he held several high-profile and important posts includ-
ing Director of Military Intelligence (1964–74) and Military Attaché to 
Morocco (1974–77). But, even after he left, he retained strong ties to it, 
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serving twice as Director of National Security (1977–80 and 1984–85), 
then as Secretary of State for national security (1985) and subsequently 
as Minister of the Interior (1986–87).178 Ben Ali’s antipathy towards the 
military, therefore, was born not of ignorance but familiarity. He well 
knew what the military and security forces could and could not do, and 
made his choice accordingly.
The division between the security forces and military broadly cor-
responded to another crucial fault line: that separating low- and high-
intensity coercion. Levitsky and Way are clear that an ability to threaten, 
intimidate, bully and browbeat is vital to a competitive authoritarian 
regime’s longer-term survival. In part, this is because high-intensity 
measures are very conspicuous and, therefore, force the regime to take 
greater risks. And the most serious of these is exposure: doing something 
that invites sustained Western criticism.179 Low-intensity coercion, in 
contrast, is less noticeable and observable. By engaging in it skilfully and 
effectively, regimes are often able to manage and nullify their opponents 
for long periods of time without incurring potentially devastating levels of 
international and domestic wrath.
Ben Ali’s security forces were perfectly able to engage in low-inten-
sity coercion. Indeed, it was their proven ability to do so that led many 
observers initially to dismiss the Arab Spring protestors’ chances of 
success. Precedence suggested that the regime would prevail. But what 
proved to be beyond them, what they could not adequately engage in, was 
high-intensity coercion. And their inability to do so was matched by the 
military’s unwillingness to try. After decades of suspicion and marginali-
sation, its officers and units felt little loyalty to the regime or inclination to 
defend it.180 As a result, Ben Ali was unable to take the sorts of measures 
that might have broken the protestors’ resolve and saved his political skin.
No such divisions, or at least none of equal depth and width, pervaded 
Ben Ali’s ruling party, the RCD. Upon inheriting it from his predeces-
sor, he quickly reorganised, reinvigorated and relaunched it as a cohesive 
and effective political force, one that was better able to motivate and 
discipline its activists, mobilise large parts of the general population, and 
counter the arguments and actions of rival parties. He did so by expand-
ing its membership by 50 per cent, attracting scores of new and younger 
members, co-opting candidates and functionaries from rival parties, as 
well as technocrats from public institutions, and changing its name from 
the PSD to the Democratic Constitutional Rally.181 The induction of these 
younger members also helped him strengthen his control over it by dilut-
ing the influence of its older, Bourguiba supporting cadre, and increasing 
the number of individuals in its ranks who depended on him for their 
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political positions.182 And to enhance his control still further, he assumed 
and exercised the right to select 125 of its governing Central Committee’s 
two hundred members.183
And, in an effort to maintain its vitality and prevent it from slipping 
into lethargy, irrelevance and flabby ineffectiveness, he repeatedly remade 
these reforms, periodically launched recruitment drives, inducted younger 
members, changed the make-up of the Central Committee.184 These meas-
ures went hand in hand with his economic reforms and continuing devel-
opment of his clientelist network.185 For discipline was encouraged and 
enforced by economic means. Belonging to the RCD brought benefits or, 
at the very least, potential benefits. Following Ben Ali’s and the Central 
Committee’s directives earned rewards while failure to do so resulted in 
punishments. Very tellingly, none of the main opposition parties (legal 
and unrecognised) that confronted Ben Ali was founded by individuals 
who had left the RCD. Some of its best-known and supported competitors, 
including the United Popular Movement (Mouvement d’Unité Populaire, 
MUP), the Socialist Democrats Movement (Mouvement des Démocrates 
Socialistes, MDS), and the Popular Unity Party (Parti de l’Unité Populaire, 
PUP), had been established by defectors from its predecessor, the PSD.186 
Indeed, such was its discipline and ability to encourage loyalty and deter 
adventurism that it did not endure any significant or wholesale defections 
until the last days of the regime.
Yet, just like the security forces and the military, the RCD’s cohe-
sion was based mainly on material ties, to the extent that, once it became 
apparent that the protests had spiralled beyond Ben Ali’s control, the 
party’s other leaders quickly turned against him and his family.187 With a 
speed born of both mounting panic and ruthless avarice, they hoped that, 
in doing so, they would be better able to save the party, themselves and as 
much as they could of the wealth and as many of the privileges they gained 
through it. The RCD was outlawed on 9 March 2011.
Throughout its time in power, the Ben Ali regime sought closer eco-
nomic relations with the West, especially the European Union. This 
enduring goal led it to sign a series of US- and EU-sponsored agreements 
designed to facilitate greater economic integration. Under the terms 
of these accords, the regime pledged to introduce a range of sweeping 
reforms as well as take other important measures. In addition to joining 
the WTO, it set about liberalising Tunisia’s economy: removing tariff bar-
riers, encouraging overseas investment, selling off state-owned industries, 
and courting private investors. And it made notable progress in several of 
these areas. By 1996, it had removed all tariffs on capital goods imported 
from the European Union. By 2004, it had earned over 1 billion DT from 
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public asset sales.188 And, by 2010, it was attracting $1.3 billion of FDI in 
the country.189
Yet, despite the introduction of these reforms, which were all intended 
to reduce the state’s direct involvement in the economy, the Ben Ali 
regime continued to exercise significant control over several key sectors, 
most notably banking, communications and other service industries. And 
it did so by two main means, firstly by delaying the implementation of 
particular policies and changes. Indeed, for all its eagerness to co-operate 
with the United States and European Union, and general willingness to 
meet their requirements, the regime was still perfectly prepared to defy 
them over certain issues, to the extent of missing key targets and dead-
lines.190 That it was largely able to do so without serious consequence 
highlights Ben Ali’s shrewd reading of his relations with the West. By 
repeatedly confirming and demonstrating his desire to work with it, secure 
in the knowledge that it was equally keen to collaborate with him, he was 
able to create political space in which to take certain indulgences.
And the second was through his family and friends by ensuring that a 
large number of those economically important and valuable state-owned 
companies, corporations, enterprises and assets which were sold off 
passed into their hands.191 Indeed, by the time the Arab Spring began, 
the Ben Ali family and its wider Trabelsi clan owned a vast network of 
holdings across a range of crucial sectors. Through them, the regime was 
able to wield considerable economic influence as well as put pressure on 
individuals and groups that opposed and resisted it.
The Ben Ali regime was assisted in its maintenance of its high organisa-
tional power by the enduring weakness of Tunisia’s opposition parties.192 
It first achieved ascendancy over them shortly after Ben Ali took office 
when he persuaded them to sign up to his National Pact. In return for 
his promise gradually to liberalise the country’s politics, they agreed to 
abstain from destabilising his rule, to refrain from doing precisely what 
they were supposed to.193 Yet, more important than the pact’s content 
were the intellectual parameters it helped to establish. For, in agreeing to 
it, these parties not only allowed themselves effectively to be co-opted by 
the regime194 but they also waived their right, at least for a little while, to 
set the political agenda.195 By means of the National Pact, therefore, the 
regime was able to inculcate within its rivals a degree of compliance and 
timidity that ultimately served to make it more secure.
For much of the period Ben Ali was in power, a number of the legal 
opposition parties struggled to build popular bases of support, not least 
because their leaders had little interest in doing so. Rather, they tended 
to view their respective organisations in highly personalised terms, as 
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mechanisms for promoting their opinions, enacting their wills, making 
their individual voices heard, and attacking their enemies. Indeed, per-
sonal rivalry was often a key motivation for the establishment of these 
groups. The MUP, MDS and PUP were all founded by disgruntled former 
members of the PSD who had left because they felt that their ambitions 
were being thwarted by Bourguiba.196 Creating their own groups, there-
fore, was how they sought both to cope with this disappointment and 
prevent it from happening again. As a result, their parties were seldom 
rooted in the Tunisian populace. They were not intended, initially at least, 
to act as ‘transmission belts between society and the state’.197
Indeed, it was not until the mid 2000s that the mainstream parties were 
better able to set aside this reticence and their differences, and mount more 
effective challenges. Two of the most capable opposition movements to 
confront the regime were the Rencontre Démocratique and the 18 October 
Collectif. The former was an alliance of four parties – the PUP, the Social 
Liberal Party (Parti Social Libéral, PSL), the Unionist Democratic Union 
(Union Démocratique Unioniste, UDU), and the Greens (Parti des Verts 
pour le Progrès, PVP) – founded to contest the 2004 legislative election. 
The fashioning of their alliance was eased by their ideological homogene-
ity because they all promoted broadly leftist programmes, strongly sup-
ported laïcité, and, by extension, opposed political Islam. Accordingly, 
they built their union on common ground around three core objectives: 
defending freedom of expression, association and press; reforming the 
country’s political institutions including its electoral system; and securing 
the release and exoneration of political prisoners.198
More remarkable was the Collectif which was established the fol-
lowing year. For, not only did it include three ideologically dispa-
rate  organisations – the leftist and secular Congress for the Republic 
(Congrès pour la République, CR) and Progressive Democratic Party 
(Parti Démocrate Progressiste, PDP), and Islamist Ennahda – but it also 
survived until the start of the Arab Spring.199 Its foundation and durability, 
therefore, showed what was possible, the extent to which fundamentally 
different groups could work together. Moreover, and just as crucially, it 
helped dispel at least some (but by no means all) of the concerns secular 
organisations had about political Islam. Ennahda’s seeming willingness to 
collaborate, commitment to democracy and respect for the various civil 
liberties associated with it, went some way towards easing the subsequent, 
difficult and protracted, post-Ben Ali constitutional negotiations.
Yet, even so, despite being more organised, better able to hold the 
regime to account and mobilise popular support against it, as well as 
offering real-life examples of the extent to which rival groups could, 
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when willing, co-operate with one another, neither the Rencontre nor the 
Collectif initiated or led the protests that removed Ben Ali from power. 
On the contrary, they were as much taken by surprise by the Arab Spring 
as the rest of Tunisia’s mainstream opposition.200 Furthermore, their 
initial responses were as hesitant and equivocal as those of the United 
States and European Union. The Collectif did not quite give the uprising 
its full support. And the PDP stopped just a little short of demanding Ben 
Ali’s departure.201 Even at the end, these more cohesive and effective 
groupings were reluctant to go in for the kill. They remained plagued by 
uncertainty and continued to treat Ben Ali with the kind of reverence that 
had so marked and compromised the mainstream opposition movement 
throughout his time in office: so much so, in fact, that the Collectif has not 
survived. It, like the regime it was forged to oppose, has been swept away 
by the Arab Spring.202
Origins and Evolution of the Regime
It is hard to overstate the profundity of Ben Ali’s fall from power. The 
seeming strength of his regime, the longevity of his rule, the speed with 
which the protests escalated, their effect on Tunisia’s neighbours, and the 
abruptness of his departure all added to the scale of the surprise. And, for a 
while, they transformed Tunisia from a political backwater into an epicen-
tre, ground-zero of the remarkable shockwaves that caused such damage 
to so many of the region’s anciens régimes. Yet, after this initial upheaval, 
and largely because the decapitation of the Ben Ali regime was compara-
tively clinical, global attention quickly turned elsewhere. Inevitably, the 
political, analytical and popular eye was drawn to the bloody tragedies still 
unfolding in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq.
Yet Ben Ali’s fall did not automatically lead to democracy’s triumph. 
On the contrary, many months of difficult negotiation and hard-fought 
politicking lay ahead before it was achieved. Rather, his demise was one 
(albeit very important) milestone on the country’s long and tortuous road 
to democracy. For the first thirty years of independence, Tunisia was 
stably authoritarian.203 During that time, it had only one president (Habib 
Bourguiba) and one electoral political party (the Neo-Destour/ PSD).204 
Elections were held regularly but amounted to little more than political 
pageants, regime-organised exercises in self-affirmation and congratula-
tion. In the four presidential elections which were staged, Bourguiba stood 
unopposed and never secured less than 100 per cent of the vote. And only 
once did the Neo-Destour/ PSD face (very limited) competition, in the first 
parliamentary ballot held in November 1959. Indeed, it was the Tunisian 
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Communist Party’s (Parti Communiste Tunisien, PCT) moderate success 
in the few constituencies in which it was permitted to field candidates that 
led the regime simply to ban all other parties from competing in future 
elections.205
Under Ben Ali, the country quickly became competitive authoritar-
ian although his commitment to preserving the democratic features of 
his regime waxed and waned throughout his time in office. After seizing 
power on 7 November 1987, in a medical coup d’état,206 Ben Ali prom-
ised to build ‘an advanced, institutionalized political life . . . based on 
the principles of a multiparty system and the pluralism of mass organiza-
tions’.207 Seemingly to those ends, he soon sought closer relations with the 
country’s main opposition groups and leaders. Over the next two years, he 
granted official party status to the PDP and PSL,208 pardoned thousands 
of political prisoners arrested by Bourguiba, and entered into dialogue 
with Rashid al-Ghannushi,209 leader of the Islamic Tendency Movement 
(Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique, MTI), who had himself only 
recently been released from gaol.210
Though Ben Ali did not legalise the MTI (even after it changed its 
name to Ennahda in order to comply with the new law prohibiting parties 
from appealing directly to specific religious, ethnic or linguistic communi-
ties),211 he made several other concessions to it.212 In addition to granting 
it representation on the country’s High Islamic Council (Conseil Islamique 
Supérieur, CIS) and allowing it to establish its own students union – the 
General Union of Tunisian Students (Union Générale Tunisienne des 
Étudiants, UGTE) – he invited it to sign up to his National Pact and par-
ticipate in the 1989 parliamentary election.213 The pact, in particular, was 
widely hailed as an important and positive step towards democracy, as 
evidence of the regime’s commitment to work with the opposition, as a 
promise too public and profound to be either ignored or neglected.214
Under Ben Ali, Tunisia was undoubtedly less authoritarian than it had 
been when Bourguiba had been in power. Yet it was still never a democ-
racy. Single-party rule was replaced not by political pluralism but by 
ruling-party hegemony.215 Indeed, almost as soon as the 1989 ballot was 
over, Ben Ali reversed or discarded many of his earlier compromises. The 
Ennahda party, in particular, came in for harsh treatment, its fate sealed 
by its strong showing in the election.216 In December 1990, the UGTE’s 
journal, Al-Fajr, was banned. Then, in March 1991, the union itself was 
dissolved.217 And, in May that year, the Minister of the Interior announced 
the discovery of an Ennahda-led plot to overthrow the regime. By March 
1992, the ensuing crackdown had resulted in the arrest and imprisonment 
of around eight thousand of the party’s members and supporters.218
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Ben Ali’s reaction to the result betrayed his pragmatism, confirmed that 
his easing of Bourguiba’s restrictions had been entirely instrumental.219 
Early supporters of the National Pact were dismayed. Its purpose was 
not to encourage or empower the opposition but strengthen the regime. 
For ‘virtually all the signatories of the pact represented dependencies of 
the perennial ruling party: far from a compromise or bargain amongst 
equals, the pact was an effort to create the appearance of political plural-
ism in the absence of political actors with autonomous social and eco-
nomic power’.220 Once Ben Ali had legitimised his seizure of power and 
cemented his rule, once his grip on power was secure, ‘he discarded the 
more formidable opponents such as the Islamists’.221
This pattern of conciliation and co-optation, concession and repression 
continued for the duration of Ben Ali’s time in power. Elections were held 
regularly, and often included rival candidates and parties, but were never 
free and fair. In the 1989 and 1994 presidential elections, not only did 
Ben Ali stand unopposed but he secured victory in each with 100 per cent 
of the vote. In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 ballots, he faced competition but 
still managed to win with 98 per cent, 94.5 per cent,222 and 89.2 per cent 
of the vote respectively.223 And the RCD was similarly successful. It won 
154 seats (out of 154) in 1989, 135 seats (out of 154) in 1994, 148 seats 
(out of 182) in 1999, 152 seats (out of 189) in 2004,224 and 161 seats (out 
of 214) in 2009.225
The size and sheer implausibility of these winning margins speak 
clearly of the scale of abuse perpetrated by the regime. Electoral law was 
overwhelmingly weighted in favour of Ben Ali and the RCD. Typical 
was the 2008 constitutional amendment which set out the criteria that 
would-be presidential candidates had to meet to be eligible to stand. Its 
insistence that each entrant either have the backing of thirty members of 
parliament or mayors, or have served as the elected leader of a legally rec-
ognised party for at least two years proved to be particularly onerous and 
resulted in the disqualification of most of Ben Ali’s putative rivals for the 
2009 vote. For, of the country’s 189 parliamentarians, only thirty-seven 
belonged to parties other than the RCD. And, by the time the election 
was held, only six parties, excluding the RCD, had been granted official 
status.226
The timing of the amendment was also noteworthy. For it was intro-
duced just a few months after Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, former secretary 
general of the PDP, declared his intention to stand. The amendment barred 
him from doing so on the grounds that he could not muster sufficient 
support for his candidacy from the right sources and was not at that time 
the leader of a recognised party. And it also disqualified another of Ben 
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Ali’s more credible rivals, Mustapha Ben Jaafar. He was the leader of the 
Democratic Forum for Work and Freedoms (Forum Démocratique pour 
le Travail et Les Libertés, FDTL) and had been since its legalisation in 
October 2002. Yet he had been elected to that position only in 2008 which 
meant that his previous years in charge were declared inadmissible. As a 
result, he failed to satisfy the amendment’s two-year leadership require-
ment.227 Not only were Tunisia’s electoral laws heavily skewed against 
opposition candidates and parties to the advantage of Ben Ali and the 
RCD, therefore, but they were also altered and updated on an entirely ad 
hoc and self-serving basis. Their purpose was not to strengthen democracy 
but weaken it, to entrench disparity, to preserve the distribution of benefits 
and obstacles, to give the regime the greatest chance of victory.
Yet Ben Ali still shied away from dispensing with elections altogether, 
preferring instead to preserve his regime’s democratic facade no matter 
how gossamer-thin and threadbare it might appear. To the extent that, 
even though he never evinced any desire to step down as president and 
clearly had no qualms about abusing the electoral process, he still felt 
required to repeal the law (which, paradoxically, he had introduced in 
1988 shortly after seizing power) limiting the number of terms a president 
could serve to three.228 Similarly, even though he categorically refused to 
face any serious competitors in the 2009 election, he still wanted some to 
take part, hobbled, hopeless and with virtually no chance of winning for 
certain but present all the same.
In the end, therefore, three challengers were permitted to participate 
in the 2009 presidential election. Two of them, Mohamed Bouchiha and 
Ahmed Inoubli, who led the PDP and UDU respectively, quickly con-
fessed the limits of their ambitions. They declared that their goals were 
not to challenge Ben Ali but strengthen the electoral process by taking 
part in it.229 As a result, their campaigns unfolded largely without incident 
and ended in the crushing defeats they had been aiming for (Bouchiha 
won 5 per cent of the vote and Inoubli 3.8 percent).230 The third con-
tender, Ahmed Brahim, leader of the Movement for Renewal (Mouvement 
Ettajdid), took a less conciliatory path and was subjected to sustained 
harassment throughout the election. Just weeks before the polls opened, 
the authorities confiscated the 10 October edition of his party’s weekly 
newspaper (Ettarik al-Jadid) on the grounds that it contained his mani-
festo which, they claimed, he was not allowed to publish until 11 October. 
The Ministry of Interior then ordered him, in the interests of public order, 
to strike five points from his proposed programme, most notably his criti-
cisms of one-party rule.231 In the final count, Brahim came last with just 
1.5 per cent of the vote.232
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The 2009 parliamentary election was similarly uncompetitive. And, 
even though the number of seats set aside for opposition parties had been 
increased to fifty-three (from thirty-seven) since the last ballot in 2004, the 
RCD still picked up three-quarters of them.233 The regime’s maintenance 
of this quota not only emphasised the general futility of voting in National 
Assembly elections but further institutionalised the electorate’s lack of 
choice as, for the most part, it did not matter for whom they voted. The 
opposition together could not win more than a minority of seats (25 per 
cent). The RCD would always be preponderant.
Since the Ben Ali regime’s demise, Tunisia’s elections have improved 
in quality. The first to be held in the wake of his departure was for the 
National Constituent Assembly on 23 October 2011. It was ‘judged “free 
and fair” by a range of international observer missions’.234 The success 
of this ballot owed much to the painstaking preparatory work under-
taken by leading opposition figures and those members of the government 
who remained in place. In particular, they successfully managed ‘the 
twin dynamics of constitutional change and revolutionary protest’ which 
‘moved together in a dialectical pas de deux’ and ‘saw the impetus for 
progress alternate between institutional office and the street’.235
After an abortive attempt by Ben Ali’s last prime minister, Mohammed 
Ghannouchi, to form a new government comprised almost equally of RCD 
and opposition party members, a Committee to Defend the Revolution 
(Conseil de Défense de la Révolution, CDR) was established on 23 
January 2011. It included twelve prominent opposition and civil society 
figures and appropriated for itself two key responsibilities: to keep an eye 
on the government and continue to press for fundamental political reform. 
In response, Ghannouchi asked the prominent and respected lawyer, Yadh 
Ben Achour, to review and revise the country’s electoral laws. Along with 
the members of the CDR, he quickly became part of another new body 
called the Higher Commission for the Achievement of the Objectives of 
the Revolution, Political Reform and the Transition to Democracy (Haute 
Instance pour la Réalisation des Objectifs de la Révolution, de la Réforme 
Politique et de la Transition Démocratique, HIRORRPTD). With 155 
members, the commission was much larger than the CDR and met for the 
first time on 17 March 2011.236
Shortly after the commission was established, Ghannouchi and all the 
other ministers who had served under Ben Ali resigned from the govern-
ment.237 At this point, responsibility for implementing the reform pro-
gramme fell to acting President Fouad Mebazaa. After announcing that 
the new government would be elected later that year and would assume 
responsibility for drafting the country’s constitution, he disbanded the 
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political police of the General Intelligence Directorate (7 March), dis-
solved the RCD (9 March) and legalised Ennahda (11 March). Then, on 
12 April, he passed by presidential decree the new electoral law written 
by the commission. In addition to setting out how the assembly would 
be organised and the rules governing political campaigning and party 
funding,238 the law called for the establishment of an independent electoral 
commission, the Higher Authority for Independent Elections (Instance 
Supérieure Independante pour les Élections, ISIE).239
Though the ISIE initially lacked enough trained members and staff to 
discharge its duties fully, it quickly established its influence. It insisted 
that the date of the election be moved from 24 July 2011 to 23 October 
2011 to give it more time to prepare. It accredited dozens of new parties, 
raising their number from just eight to over a hundred. It set the period in 
which parties were allowed to campaign at three weeks (1 to 21 October 
2011). It issued strict guidelines on from whom parties could accept 
donations and funding. And it restricted the amount of media activ-
ity each party could engage in. While these regulations and directives 
undoubtedly made it hard for parties really to engage with the Tunisian 
public or mount truly national campaigns, they ensured that none enjoyed 
an officially sanctioned or condoned advantage over any other. They 
were a first important step towards creating a far more level electoral 
playing field.240
The election was won by Ennahda which secured 41 per cent of the 
vote and eighty-nine seats. Short of an outright majority, it entered into 
coalition with the CR (13 per cent and twenty-nine seats) and FDTL (9 per 
cent and twenty seats).241 Despite once again confirming its willingness to 
co-operate with its secular rivals, which extended to allowing the leader 
of the CR, Moncef Marzouki, to replace Mebazaa as president, Ennahda’s 
victory triggered a ferocious debate about Islam’s role in Tunisian poli-
tics and the future provisions of the new constitution,242 to the extent that 
the drafting of it became a dominant feature of political life for the next 
two years. Deadlines for its completion came and went, with the passing 
of each prompting fresh accusations and recriminations. Yet, as painful 
as this process undoubtedly was at times, it was arguably as important 
as what it eventually produced. The sustained involvement of dozens of 
political parties and civil society groups helped create a legal document 
and political blueprint in which as wide a cross section of Tunisian society 
as could have been hoped for had a stake.
A draft of the new constitution was finally submitted to the assembly 
for approval in December 2013. After a comparatively short debate, it 
was endorsed by the overwhelming majority of members on 26 January 
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2014.243 In accordance with its provisions and in keeping with what had 
been practised since Ben Ali’s fall, power was spread much more equita-
bly across the political system. The president is authorised to appoint the 
ministers of interior and defence, one-third of the Constitutional Court, call 
states of emergency and, in exceptional circumstances, dissolve the newly 
established Chamber of Deputies. He or she is also granted limited legisla-
tive powers, including returning draft laws to the Chamber of Deputies for 
further debate, challenging their legality before the Constitutional Court 
and calling public referendums. The prime minister is chosen by the gov-
erning party or coalition in the Chamber of Deputies and empowered to set 
the broad policy agenda, create and fill ministerial posts, and call and chair 
cabinet meetings. And the Chamber of Deputies is charged with scrutinis-
ing and, if need be, challenging the actions of the president and premier. 
It can countermand the president’s veto, remove them from office, compel 
them to give testimony, and control public spending through budget bills. 
Furthermore, chairmanship of the chamber’s important and powerful 
finance committee can be filled only by someone belonging to a non-
governing party.244
Yet the effectiveness of these reforms remain, at least in part, 
unproven. What has been argued over in committee and carefully set on 
paper still needs to be put into practice and tested in the heat of political 
battle. The importance of this alignment, of matching deed with word, 
is provided by the political class’s ongoing treatment of the country’s 
media. Under Ben Ali, Tunisia had ‘one of the worst media environ-
ments in the Arab world’.245 Those journalists, broadcasters and outlets 
not co-opted by the regime were either bullied into quiescence or simply 
silenced. Newspapers, magazines, periodicals and journals had to submit 
all their copy to the Ministry of Interior for approval. Those that defied 
the censors either had their offending editions seized or were temporarily 
closed down. Repeated and serious transgressors were placed under severe 
financial pressure and even bankrupted as the regime exploited its control 
over advertising revenue and the printing presses to withhold vital income 
or demand the immediate payment of all outstanding production costs.246
This ability to control the means of production gave the regime unpar-
alleled influence over Tunisia’s print media, more than that which it could 
achieve over the audiovisual sector. The advent of affordable personal-
ised satellite technology, in particular, enabled ordinary people to access 
information and news broadcast from places over which the regime had 
no jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Tunis still asserted its control over those 
public and private stations based within the country. It controlled the two 
television and nine radio public channels through the Tunisian Television 
79
Tunisia
Establishment (Établissement de la Télévision Tunisienne, ETT) and 
Tunisian Radio Establishment (Établissement de la Radio Tunisienne, 
ERT) respectively.247 And it controlled the growing number of private tel-
evision and radio stations by strictly regulating the accreditation process. 
Not only did it never make public the terms on which licences were 
awarded, thereby preventing open competition for them, but it also only 
ever granted them to members of the president’s Trabelsi clan.248
Nor did the Internet offer a virtual haven for journalists. While its 
content was inevitably far less regulated than that of the country’s other 
media sectors, accessing it in Tunisia was still closely monitored and 
policed. By operating its own Internet provider,249 controlling providers’ 
access to band width, monitoring fixed-line traffic, making Internet cafés 
responsible for what their customers viewed, using online word filters and 
arresting critical bloggers, the regime limited ordinary people’s ability 
to access other sources of information easily and their willingness to do 
so.250 ‘Political opposition groups, foreign journals . . . and human rights 
websites . . . were all habitually blocked, as were YouTube, Facebook and, 
from 2010, Skype.’251
As well as targeting particular publications, stations and websites, the 
regime ruthlessly pursued individual reporters, editors and owners. It 
used physical violence, libel actions and other laws to threaten and punish 
those who crossed it or simply tried to retain their independence.252 By 
these means, it was able to inculcate and sustain a strong culture of self- 
censorship within the country’s media. The potential consequences of 
defiance were numerous and high, both professionally and personally. For 
the most part, therefore, journalists, editors, owners and publications were 
cowed into submission. They did not strongly or consistently challenge 
official statements and explanations. They did not closely investigate the 
actions and interests of prominent regime members. They gave the RCD’s 
candidates and policies greater and more preferential coverage. And they 
paid the opposition less attention and were more critical of them. As a 
result, the media served less to involve ordinary Tunisians in the country’s 
political and decision-making processes, and more to disseminate infor-
mation that the regime either wanted, or was willing for, them to know.
Yet, crucially, these abuses did not occur because of an absence of 
guaranteed rights and freedoms. The regime was not able to act as it did 
because there were no laws in place to stop it. Certainly, there were legal 
shortfalls and loopholes. Newspapers, magazines, journals and periodicals 
were subject to the illiberal Press Code (Code de la Presse, CP).253 But 
safeguards and provisions did exist. Not least in the form of constitutional 
guarantees which were supposed to override everything else. Indeed, 
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the problem lay not in what was promised but what was delivered or, 
more accurately, what media outlets, civil society groups and ordinary 
Tunisians were able to claim.
So it is with no little trepidation, therefore, that human rights activ-
ists and pro-democracy campaigners note and condemn the current gap 
between pledge and action. Tunisia’s new constitution is undoubtedly 
more liberal and popular than that which it replaced. Articles 31 and 32 
guarantee freedom of thought, conscience, expression, publication and 
access to information.254 And, since 2010, the country has climbed a full 
forty places in the Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom 
Index.255 Yet it still remains rooted in the index’s bottom third. Not all of 
the controls and disciplinary mechanisms that existed under Ben Ali have 
been completely dismantled.256 Intimidation is still practised. Journalists 
and publications continue to be threatened and prosecuted. On 13 
September 2013, no less a figure than the President of the National Union 
of Tunisian Journalists (Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisiens, 
SNJT) was arrested for accusing the Public Prosecutor of fabricating 
evidence. And, though the charge was eventually dropped, his detention 
bore disturbing similarities with others from the Ben Ali era when it was a 
crime to criticise prominent political figures.257
Ben Ali’s treatment of Tunisia’s journalists, like his persecution of 
human rights activists, Ennahda’s members, other Islamists and political 
opponents and, indeed, anyone who was either critical of him or tried to 
retain their independence, provided clear confirmation of the importance 
of repression to his rule. Underpinning the authoritarian laws, ignored 
rights and corrupted judiciary,258 was the barely concealed threat of 
state-sanctioned and perpetrated violence.259 The chain-mail glove of 
the country’s distorted and defiled legal system contained the iron fist 
of state coercion. Legalised intimidation was  buttressed by even harder 
power.
Conclusions
Discrepancies have defined Tunisia’s political development over the past 
ten years. Clearly Ben Ali was never as committed to democracy, civil lib-
erties and human rights as he said he was. Indeed, this was the very basis 
of his competitive authoritarian regime. It constructed and maintained a 
democratic facade comprising unfair elections, ineffective and hollowed-
out institutions, solemn yet never honoured promises of liberalisation, and 
cataclysmic warnings about who could take power if he was ever ousted. 
These trappings, along with Ben Ali’s determination to preserve them, 
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were what prevented his regime from sliding into full dictatorship. And, 
for nearly two-and-a-half decades, they were sufficient to satisfy the West, 
help contain domestic opposition and preserve his rule.
Inevitably, therefore, this discrepancy does not explain why the regime 
fell when it did or why Tunisia, alone of all the countries examined by this 
book, and which experienced significant Arab Spring unrest, has made the 
transition from competitive authoritarianism to democracy. Rather, the 
answer lies in other vital incongruities, between what the United States 
and European Union said and did, and the amount of democratising pres-
sure they put on Tunis compared to that which they could have exerted. It 
is these discrepancies that make Tunisia a complex case and hold the key 
to both Ben Ali’s longevity and the country’s eventual transition.
From the moment he seized power, Ben Ali sought to fortify Tunisia’s 
already strong links to the West. He eagerly signed up the country to a 
range of US- and EU-sponsored policy frameworks including the MEPI, 
BMENA, EMP, UfM, ENP and PfDSP. To qualify to join these schemes, 
especially those launched and backed by the European Union, he had to 
introduce a raft of (mostly economic and fiscal) reforms as well as promise 
to make other (mainly political and legal) changes in due course. In so 
doing, and as of course was his intention, he strengthened his govern-
ment’s diplomatic relations with its Western counterparts, and brought 
about and paved the way for Tunisia’s closer economic integration with 
the United States and Europe.
One of the most important economic ties binding the country to the 
West remains the millions of dollars in remittance payments made each 
year by the thousands of Tunisians living and working in North America 
and Europe to friends and relations still in the Maghreb. This large trans-
national community also continues to play vital social and technocratic 
roles and act as a significant alternative source of information, albeit one 
of declining importance. The members of the diaspora, along with the mil-
lions of American, Canadian and European citizens who visit the country 
every year, form a human link between Tunisia and their homes overseas. 
The rapid expansion in mobile-phone, Internet and social-media use has 
made it easier for them to provide friends and family members back home 
with additional and international views on events in their country. And a 
sizeable minority of them are in the West to study and train, to learn and 
acquire new skills and knowledge to take back home with them.
The United States and European Union also had high leverage over 
Tunisia. Crucially, the country did not have a large or medium-sized 
economy, was not a major or intermediate oil producer, did not possess 
any nuclear weapons or enjoy the backing of a Black Knight patron. The 
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West’s considerable influence over Tunisia should have negated the Ben 
Ali regime’s high organisational power, its strong and cohesive security 
forces and ruling party, and ability to control critical parts of the economy. 
But Washington and Brussels steadfastly refused to bring their true power 
over Tunis to bear. Not only were they reluctant to do so for fear of cre-
ating political instability in the country for Islamists to exploit but they 
proved unable and unwilling to co-ordinate better with one another what 
pressure they did apply. Significant inconsistencies existed between what 
Washington and Brussels, the EU Commission and European national 
governments did.
As a result, the regime’s high organisational power enabled it to nullify 
its opponents and perpetuate itself for over two decades. And when the 
end finally came for Ben Ali, it was triggered by domestic not interna-
tional factors and actors. The regime’s prolonged neglect of the military 
proved crucial. So, too, did its construction of a ruling party out of mainly 
material ties and allegiances. These pivotal weaknesses ensured that not 
only could the regime not adequately defend itself against the Arab Spring 
protests when they broke out but that the broader ruling elite quickly 
turned against Ben Ali and his family. It was only at this point that the 
United States and European Union weighed in more heavily on the side 
of the demonstrators, their high leverage over and links to Tunisia helping 
ensure the end of competitive authoritarianism and the country’s political 
liberalisation.
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Algeria is perplexing. Like Tunisia, it has defied expectations. Yet it 
has done so in very different ways. For, unlike its near neighbour, it has 
not succumbed to dramatic or fundamental political change. Certainly, 
it was affected by the Arab Spring. Its protests were sufficiently large, 
frequent and angry to frighten the regime into making several noteworthy 
concessions. Opposition parties were promised more media coverage. A 
new job-creation scheme was launched. And most significant of all, the 
nineteen-year-long state of emergency was lifted.1 Yet the regime did not 
fall. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika not only survived but went on to win 
an unprecedented fourth term in office. Algeria is puzzling, therefore, not 
for how it has changed but the reasons why it has remained the same.
Paradoxically, some of the main factors that were initially highlighted 
as likely reasons why Algeria would soon follow Tunisia down the path of 
decisive unrest were quickly recast as impediments to its political trans-
formation. Commenting on the growing expectations of specialists that 
Bouteflika’s regime would be one of the next to fall, James Gelvin notes 
the high level of expert emphasis placed on Algeria as a trendsetter.2 The 
country, so the argument ran, had been here before. In the late 1980s it had 
been one of the very few Arab states to form part of the so-called Third 
Wave of democratisation that had been triggered by the end of the Cold 
War. In June 1990 and December 1991 it had held free and fair multiparty 
elections which had been won by the opposition Islamic Salvation Front 
(Front Islamique du Salut, FIS).3 By the time the Arab Spring began, 
therefore, Algeria had already experimented with democracy. Its citizens 
had demanded and won greater political freedoms once before. Moreover, 
they had done so in a way similar to that in which Tunisians had during 
the Arab Spring. They had experience of pressuring their government into 
introducing democratic reforms.
Furthermore, Algerians bore many of the same burdens in 2011 that 
had prompted them to act before and which had driven their neighbours 
to oust Ben Ali.4 Conditions in the country, therefore, appeared propitious 
to decisive unrest. Gelvin argues that four factors in particular encour-
aged this perception.5 The first was the government’s abandonment of its 
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‘ruling bargain’ with the people whereby, in return for withholding their 
political rights, it promised to satisfy their basic material needs.6 This 
social contract had been systematically eroded since the early 1980s as 
successive governments had rejected Arab socialism in favour of greater 
economic liberalisation.7 The second was the demographic youth bulge 
which made it hard for many young adults to find gainful or legal employ-
ment,8 and prompted thousands to try each year to migrate illegally to 
Europe.9 The third was the rapid rise in food prices which drove down 
standards of living.10 And the fourth was the air of crisis which seemed to 
hang over the regime as it remained locked in battle, as it had been for the 
past twenty years, with a range of armed Islamist factions.
Yet these precedents, similarities and appearances were deceiving. 
The regime did not succumb but emerged from the Arab Spring largely 
unscathed. Indeed, of all the region’s republics, Algeria was one of the 
least affected by the protests.11 As a result, the scholarly debate has turned 
to explaining why this was, to identifying and analysing the causes of the 
country’s exceptionalism. Among the factors most frequently highlighted 
are the size, strength and determination of the Algerian military and 
security forces. Their role was both vital and varied. They defended the 
regime. They policed and contained the protestors. They protected ‘key 
urban areas – in central Algiers around the Parliament, the Senate, and 
other government buildings and left the rest to the rioters’.12 In so doing, 
they helped stop the demonstrations from either metastasising into some-
thing more dangerous to the government or easily sweeping Bouteflika 
from power.
The military’s and security forces’ willingness to defend the regime 
inevitably gave it confidence. It was not abandoned by the army as Ben 
Ali and Mubarak were. It was not attacked by mutinous units as Gaddafi 
was. Bouteflika’s long-standing compact with the military held firm.13 
So armed, both psychologically and materially, it simply had to keep its 
nerve. And it could also draw comfort from the considerable experience 
its defenders had accumulated over the past two decades. They had suc-
cessfully dealt with numerous serious threats. By the time the Arab Spring 
began, they had been slowly strangling the life out of several terror groups, 
most notably al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), for a number of 
years. Paradoxically, this threat was itself the result of their earlier success 
against various insurgent factions, including the Armed Islamic Group 
(Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA), the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée 
Islamique du Salut, AIS) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et la Combat, GSPC). Indeed, 
the pressure they had brought to bear had helped force these factions 
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to recalibrate their armed campaigns and confront the regime in less direct, 
more asymmetric ways.14
Just as crucially, the country’s armed and security forces demonstrated 
a capacity to learn and evolve. Throughout the early and mid 1990s, they 
successfully adapted to the rapidly growing insurgency for which they were 
initially ill-prepared.15 And, more pertinently, by the time the Arab Spring 
protests began, they had identified and absorbed many of the most impor-
tant lessons from the Black October riots of 1988. Arguably, the army’s 
response to these demonstrations had contributed greatly to the chain of 
political events that had led first to the multiparty elections of June 1990 
and December 1991, its subsequent intervention in the nascent democratic 
process, and the ensuing serious violence from which the country has yet 
to emerge fully. Unsurprisingly, the most vital lessons were how best to 
manage a series of large, well-coordinated protests. In 2011, therefore, the 
military and security forces did not respond with anything like the same 
level of brutality that they had in 1988. In so doing, they ensured that their 
actions ‘did not become the cause of further protests (as had happened in 
Tunisia)’, to the extent that ‘even radical acts, such as a self-immolation 
on January 12, failed to reignite the contestation’.16
Yet, paradoxically and perhaps fortuitously, the military and security 
forces were still able to draw some benefits from their past actions and, in 
particular, the fearsome reputations they had rightly earned as a result of 
what they had done. For, almost as soon as the Arab Spring protests began 
in Algeria, the local press made a connection with the Black October 
riots.17 While this invocation certainly did not deter the tens of thousands 
of demonstrators who repeatedly took to the streets of Algiers, Oran 
and the country’s other major urban centres throughout early 2011 and, 
with far less frequency, in 2012 and 2013, it helped to establish the early 
psychological context. Algeria’s Arab Spring did not take place in an his-
torical vacuum. The shadow of the recent past loomed large for everyone. 
And no one wanted to return to the excessive violence and widespread 
bloodshed of before.
The strength and coherence of Algeria’s security apparatus are undoubt-
edly integral to the country’s experiences and political development 
over the last few years. Indeed, Algeria has high organisational power. 
Yet this alone cannot explain what has happened there, particularly the 
United States’ and European Union’s responses to the Bouteflika regime 
after they sought to reposition themselves on the right side of history.18 
Crucially, why did they not put more pressure on Algiers to democratise? 
Why, given everything that had happened in the country and wider region, 
did they not press for greater liberalisation during the build-up to the 
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2014 presidential election, especially after Bouteflika confirmed that he 
would stand for a fourth term? Why were they seemingly content to allow 
Algeria to remain competitive authoritarian? 
As with Tunisia, the West’s failure to put more democratic pres-
sure on the Bouteflika regime was due to both reluctance and poor 
co-ordination. Despite everything that had happened and all they had 
said, the United States and European Union remained unwilling to force 
the issue. And what pressure they were prepared to bring to bear was 
marked by many of the same inconsistencies that had diluted their influ-
ence over Tunis. Yet, important differences in their interactions with the 
two regimes remained. Though the West was anxious to avoid destabi-
lising Ben Ali for fear of encouraging and enabling Islamist groups to 
gain greater power and influence, it was also prepared to accept (if not 
believe) the promises he made slowly to liberalise the country’s politics. 
Its dealings with Algiers, in contrast, continue to be dominated by secu-
rity concerns to the general exclusion of most other issues. Terrorism and 
energy, fighting al-Qaeda and safeguarding the flow of Algerian gas, are 
uppermost in its thoughts.
And there is another crucial difference – capability. The West did not 
put as much pressure on the Ben Ali regime as it could have done. It does 
not possess the same level of influence over Algiers. For the United States’ 
and European Union’s linkage to Algeria is but medium and their lever-
age over the ruling elite only low. Accordingly, their capacity to demand 
change, to press for democratisation, is reduced. This makes Algeria a 
more conventional case for Levitsky and Way’s model. Washington’s 
and Brussels’ weaker ties to, and influence over, Algiers mean that the 
regime’s high organisational power plays a more decisive role in deter-
mining its political development. Algeria has remained competitive 
authoritarian because that is what those in power want and are able to 
achieve. They currently have the means to withstand any democratising 
pressure put on them by internal and external forces.
To sustain this analysis and argument, and facilitate Algeria’s compari-
son with its neighbours, the chapter is organised along the same lines as 
each of Levitsky and Way’s original cases and this volume’s other country 
studies. The first section assesses the strength of Algeria’s links to the 
United States and the European Union across the six categories of connec-
tion. The second considers how much leverage each has over the country 
and whether they must compete with a Black Knight patron. Section three 
then evaluates the regime’s organisational power, the strength and cohe-
sion of its ruling party and coercive forces. And, finally, the fourth section 
charts the regime’s origins and development, especially since 2005.
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The strength of Algeria’s links to North America and Europe vary sig-
nificantly across the six categories of connection. In some – technocratic, 
social, information and civil society – the ties are strong. Yet, in the 
remaining (arguably most important) two – economic and intergovern-
mental – these bonds are weaker, thereby ensuring that the country’s 
overall linkage to the West is medium rather than high. The reasons for 
this discrepancy are rooted in Algeria’s past and, as such, raise important 
and challenging questions about some of Levitsky and Way’s underlying 
assumptions. For they argue that strong linkage is determined by ‘histori-
cal factors, including colonialism, military occupation, and . . . alliances’ 
and, above all, ‘geographic proximity’.19 The nearer a country is to either 
Europe or North America, and the closer its past association with them, 
the more likely it is to have strong links to the EU and US today. Indeed, 
powerful bonds to one often precipitate closer ties to the other.
This certainly explains those strong links that Algeria currently has to 
the United States and to various European countries. That so many of its 
citizens live in, rely on, and look to Spain, Italy, Germany and, above all, 
France for jobs, training, news, and opportunities is the result of numer-
ous, powerful historical factors. This trans-Mediterranean population, 
along with the aspirations and impulses which created and sustain it, 
inevitably account for the close human ties forged between Algeria, these 
countries and the European Union more broadly. Yet these factors have 
an additional, more divisive, dimension. For it is Algeria’s shared history 
with France that makes it such a wary and, at times, reluctant political, 
military and economic partner. It is this shared history that is preventing 
the creation of stronger intergovernmental and economic links today.
While important, this lesson does not fundamentally compromise 
Levitsky and Way’s model. Nor does it completely invalidate their spe-
cific claim. History and geography, even when they have given rise to 
difficult and painful encounters, invariably create and sustain robust bonds 
between a country and the United States or European Union. Rather, it 
represents an important caveat: that sometimes such shared pasts, which 
were frequently enabled by geographic proximity, can generate and per-
petuate, by various cultural means over several generations, powerful 
emotions that can complicate relations today. As will be shown, Algeria 
could have stronger economic and intergovernmental ties to Europe than 
those that it presently has. The opportunities and mechanisms to enhance 
them exist while the EU’s appetite to forge them is hearty. Algiers’s con-
tinuing, albeit slowly softening, reluctance to do so is due to its colonial 
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experiences, and the national myths, attitudes, expectations and demands 
they sustain. History and geography are not neutral forces that only 
encourage greater linkage. They are complex processes that can separate 
as well unite.
Like Tunisia, Algeria is a member of both the MEPI and BMENA 
policy frameworks. While the MEPI is currently supporting four local 
and three regional projects with Algeria-specific dimensions,20 Algiers 
does not receive nearly as much aid and development funding as its neigh-
bours.21 Between 2009 and 2014, Washington planned to give Algeria 
$40.83 million of financial assistance but Tunisia $358.62 million.22 
Moreover, between 2009 and 2015, the United States did not provide 
Algiers with any Foreign Military Financing credits but gave Tunis 
$142.17 million worth.23
Algeria’s relations with the European Union are also not as close as 
those of its near neighbour. While Tunisia’s attitude towards, and interac-
tions with, the European Union have long been willing and enthusiastic, 
Algeria’s have been hesitant and circumspect. Initially, Algiers was eager 
to join the EMP. It saw the new framework as a golden opportunity to 
rehabilitate its international reputation in the wake of its suspension of 
the democratic process in January 1992, subsequent persecution of FIS 
members and supporters, and launch of its uncompromising armed cam-
paign against the various insurgent factions it had done so much to create 
and provoke.24 Yet this early enthusiasm quickly dissipated in the face 
of EU reluctance to include ‘specific counter-terrorism provisions’ in the 
country’s association agreement25 to the extent that, in 1997, President 
Liamine Zéroual suspended the AA negotiations, thereby effectively 
throwing Algeria’s EMP application into abeyance. These talks did not 
start again until 2000 and were only truly revitalised when international 
events and attitudes shifted in Algeria’s favour. Following the terror 
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001, 
the European Union finally relented and agreed to include the provisions 
Algiers wanted.26 The AA was duly signed on 22 April 2002 and finally 
came into force on 1 September 2005, nearly a decade after the EMP’s 
initial launch. In contrast, Tunisia’s and Morocco’s agreements were 
signed on 17 July 1995 and 26 February 1996, and took effect on 1 March 
1998 and 1 March 2000 respectively.27
The warning signs for the EU, therefore, were plainly visible. Algeria 
was not to be persuaded, pressured, cajoled or browbeaten as perhaps its 
neighbours might. Even when the regime was at its most isolated and 
 vulnerable – when global oil and gas prices were at their lowest in a gen-
eration,28 when it confronted a large and determined insurgency that had 
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the backing of many ordinary Algerians,29 when it stood on the brink of 
being cast from power,30 was being kept at arm’s length by most Western 
governments at a time when it needed their help most of all – it held fast 
to its demands. And, in the end, it prevailed and Brussels compromised.
Algiers’s determination only to join the EU’s frameworks when it was 
in its clear interests to do so, and on terms which it deemed acceptable, 
was inevitably buttressed by its experiences in negotiating the AA. By 
resolutely matching the European Union’s sustained opposition to the 
terrorism provisions it had initially proposed, it had eventually prevailed 
and gained the settlement it had originally wanted. Paradoxically, Algiers 
cited the successful conclusion and imminent implementation of its AA 
as a reason why it did not need or want to join the ENP.31 Rather than 
encourage Algiers to join other frameworks and seek closer relations with 
Europe, as Brussels had hoped, the agreement of the AA saw it lapse into 
reticence. Of all the EU’s southern Mediterranean partners, Algeria was 
the only one not to sign up to the new framework.
As well as being unnecessary, Algiers decried the ENP as Eurocentric 
and unhelpful. It argued that the framework spoke primarily of and to the 
EU’s new-found obsession with security and good governance,32 and, as 
a result, did not pay adequate attention to either the wider region’s urgent 
socio-economic concerns or advancing Algeria’s strategic objectives.33 
Not until 2012, therefore, did the Algerian Association Council (AC) 
(the body charged with leading and conducting negotiations with the 
EU) acquiesce to open talks with Brussels over the country’s action plan 
(AP).34 Just as with the AA, progress has been slow and no agreement has 
yet been reached. In contrast, Tunisia and Morocco both consented to join 
the ENP almost as soon as it was launched (in May 2004), signed their 
APs shortly after (on 9 December 2004),35 and implemented them seven 
months later (on 4 and 27 July 2005 respectively).36
While Algeria has, with the recasting of the EMP, joined the UfM, 
it remains a cautious and only tentatively engaged member. As the 
product of mainly French diplomatic efforts, the framework was duly 
treated with considerable wariness by Algiers. It alone of all the southern 
Mediterranean partners evinced little desire to take ‘an active part in the 
UfM’s institutional arrangements’.37 During the ‘fierce deal-making that 
preceded the setting up of the secretariat’, it declined either to bid to host 
the new institution or lobby to fill any of the executive positions that were 
being created.38 Moreover, it has displayed a similar level of circumspec-
tion towards some of the framework’s programmes and initiatives, includ-
ing those with goals it broadly supports. Despite its desire to develop 
the country’s solar energy potential, it has responded cautiously to the 
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framework’s Mediterranean Solar Plan.39 Again, Algeria was the only 
southern Mediterranean partner to display such reticence.
In the light of its diminished involvement in the European Union’s various 
policy frameworks, Algeria has not received as much investment through 
their associated financial mechanisms as either of its immediate  neighbours. 
Under the EMP’s accompanying MEDA programme, the country was 
given €164 million and €338.8 million in funding between 1995 and 1999, 
and 2000 and 2006 respectively. This compared unfavourably to the €428 
million and €517.6 million, and €660 million and €980.1 million, granted to 
Tunisia and Morocco over the same the periods.40 And, given Algeria’s far 
more circumspect involvement with the ENP framework, to the extent that 
it opened negotiations over its AP only in 2012, it has received significantly 
less European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) invest-
ment than either of its neighbours. Between 2007 and 2013, the country 
was awarded €366.1 million in ENPI funds compared to the €775 million 
and €1.3 billion given to Tunisia and Morocco respectively.41 These dis-
bursements include the €35 million, €140 million and €115 million granted 
to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco under the SPRING programme.42
In addition to concluding its association agreement and opening negoti-
ations on its action plan, Algiers signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the European Commission on 7 July 2013 on establishing a 
Strategic Energy Partnership (SEP) with the EU.43 Talks between the two 
sides had begun in 2006 but had quickly stalled as Bouteflika’s govern-
ment had objected to Brussels’s attempts to use its own ‘market regulatory 
norms’ as the basis of their agreement.44 Algiers had also been frustrated 
by the EU’s overly technocratic focus, its seeming obsession with rules 
and guiding principles that not even all its member states and institutions 
believed in or adhered to.45
While the signing of the MOU was a noteworthy step forward, it rep-
resented slight return on seven years of talks. More importantly, the SEP 
has still not been concluded nor seems likely to be any time soon.46 As 
with all Algeria’s negotiations with the European Union, these discussions 
have proved as difficult as they have been protracted. That both parties are 
still committed to them testifies to the importance Algiers and Brussels 
place on what they are trying to achieve and of energy to their relation-
ship. For each side depends on the other. Algeria is one of the European 
Union’s most important energy providers. In 2013, the country was the 
EU’s eighth largest source of oil (3.9 per cent),47 fourth of natural gas (22 
per cent) and second of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) (22 per cent).48 And 
its importance to particular member states is even greater still. In 2013, 
it was the largest supplier of natural gas to both Portugal (24.4 terawatt 
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hours, TWh) and Spain (192 TWh), and the third and fourth biggest to 
Italy (132.3 TWh) and France (59.1 TWh) respectively.49
The European Union is, by a considerable margin, Algeria’s most 
important energy customer. In 2013, Europe imported 72 per cent of the 
country’s crude oil and 75 per cent of its natural gas.50 And its export 
capacity to the bloc will soon increase once work on the new Galsi pipe-
line to Italy and Spain has been completed.51 Hydrocarbons dominate 
Algeria’s balance of trade with the European Union. Between 2010 and 
2014 the total value of the EU’s imports from the country was €164 billion 
of which €139.32 billion comprised mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials.52 Furthermore, in 2013, the European Union took 65 per cent of 
all Algeria’s exports and provided it with 52.2 per cent of its imports. In 
that year, the country conducted more trade with the EU (59.1 per cent) 
than the rest of the world combined.53
While clearly not on the same scale, Algeria’s trade with the United 
States has grown in value over the past two decades and is similarly 
dominated by hydrocarbons.54 Between 2010 and 2013 the total value 
of US imports from Algeria was $45.01 billion of which $44.98 billion 
comprised fuels.55 Much of this bilateral trade is conducted under the 
TIFA Algeria signed with the United States on 13 July 2001.56 Like 
Tunisia’s agreement, it commits Algiers and Washington to ‘take appro-
priate measures to encourage and facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services and to secure favorable conditions for long-term development 
and diversification of trade between their respective nationals and compa-
nies’ including establishing a bilateral ‘Council on Trade and Investment 
. . . to hold consultations . . . ; . . . identify agreements appropriate for 
negotiation; and . . . identify and work toward the removal of impedi-
ments to trade and investment’.57 The United States is also actively 
encouraging and supporting Algeria’s efforts to join the WTO. Once it 
has done so, it will be able to participate more fully in the United States 
MEFTA initiative.
The value of Algeria’s exports to the United States have grown 
exponentially over the past two decades. Between 1995 and 1999, their 
annual average value was $1.75 billion.58 Between 2000 and 2004, they 
nearly quadrupled to $4.23 billion.59 And then, between 2005 and 2010, 
they more than tripled again to $14.57 billion,60 before decreasing to 
$9.98 billion between 2010 and 2013.61 The increase in the value of its 
imports from the United States has been less dramatic but more consist-
ent. Between 1995 and 2004 their annual average value was $1 billion.62 
Between 2005 and 2009 they rose slightly to $1.44 billion.63 And then, 
between 2010 and 2013, they nearly doubled to $2.11 billion.64 By 2013, 
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therefore, the United States was Algeria’s second largest export market 
(8.1 per cent) and third biggest import partner (4.3 per cent).65
Algeria has also been able to generate increasing amounts of FDI 
over the past twenty years. Between 1996 and 1999, it attracted $357 
million of overseas investment on average each year.66 Between 2000 and 
2004, this amount grew significantly to $793 million per year.67 Then, 
between 2005 and 2013, it more than doubled again to $2.01 billion a 
year.68 These figures do not include the considerable sums sent into the 
country each year by the tens of thousands of Algerians living abroad. 
For decades now, this expatriate population has provided vital financial 
support to an even larger number of people living in Algeria. Between 
1995 and 1999, remittances were worth an average of $982 million a 
year.69 And between 2000 and 2004 their value grew to an average of 
$1.34 billion per year.70 Then, between 2005 and 2009, their value fell 
markedly to an average of $142 million a year.71 And, most recently, 
between 2010 and 2013, their worth increased a little again to an average 
of $205 million per year.72 Even allowing for the significant decline in 
their value over the past decade, these payments still ensure that mil-
lions of ordinary Algerians have a powerful financial interest in their 
country maintaining cordial relations with those in which their friends and 
 relatives live and work.
The diaspora also plays an important social role as part of the vast 
transnational network of people and communities which connects Algeria 
to other, mainly Western, countries. For, as of 2012, there were an esti-
mated 961,850 Algerian citizens (or 2.9 per cent of the country’s total pop-
ulation) living abroad. Of these, most (721,796) were based in France. But 
many were also living in Spain (60,207), Canada (33,575), Italy (23,278), 
Britain (22,000) and the United States (17,068). Taken together, there 
were 950,641 Algerians (or 98.8 per cent of the total diaspora population) 
living in Western countries.73 In recognition of their great number and sig-
nificant financial contribution, these émigrés are allowed to elect eight of 
the Algerian parliament’s 389 members.74 While the political effect of this 
right may be limited, especially under the current regime, it still performs 
an important social function by helping to bind those living overseas to the 
country they have left behind.
A significant number of those Algerians who travel overseas do so 
to further their educations. In the 2013/ 2014 academic year, there were 
21,935 Algerian nationals registered at French universities alone. And 
Algerians have comprised the third largest foreign continent in French 
universities in each of the last six academic years.75 Most of those who 
study in France and elsewhere in the West make their own arrangements 
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to do so. Only a tiny fraction participates in the exchange programmes run 
by either Brussels or Washington, such as the EU’s Erasmus and Tempus 
Mundus schemes,76 or the MEPI’s Student Leaders Programme (SLP) and 
Leaders for Democracy Fellowship (LDF) initiative.77 Indeed, to date, 
only fifty MA students, one PhD candidate and sixteen scholars from 
Algeria have taken part in the Erasmus programme.78
The majority of those who study in Europe and North America, there-
fore, are from wealthy families. Attending a Western college or university 
has become an important coming-of-age experience for many affluent 
young Algerians. By virtue of the educations they receive and qualifica-
tions they are awarded, and having the socio-economic backgrounds that 
allow them to study abroad in the first place, they are well placed to secure 
rewarding and responsible jobs in either the public or private sectors once 
they return home. In this way, Algeria’s long-standing and strong tech-
nocratic links with the West, and especially with France and Europe, are 
maintained.
Algeria’s émigré communities are also important sources of alterna-
tive news and additional information. They can share Western media 
coverage of global affairs with their contacts in North Africa. They can 
explain to their friends and relations how events in Algeria are viewed and 
interpreted in the rest of the world. They can better enable Algerians to 
question and challenge the regime’s arguments and claims. The improved 
access to information offered by the diaspora has been greatly enhanced 
by the rapid spread of Internet and mobile phone use in Algeria. In 2000 
only 0.5 per cent of the country’s population had access to the World Wide 
Web.79 By 2005, it had increased exponentially to 5.8 per cent.80 By 2010, 
it had more than doubled again to 12.5 per cent. And, most recently, in 
2013, it had jumped to 16.5 per cent.81 The rise in mobile phone subscrip-
tions over this period has been even more dramatic. In 2000, virtually no 
Algerian subscribed to a mobile telephone service.82 By 2005, this had 
risen to 40 per cent of the population.83 By 2010 it had more than doubled 
again to 88 per cent. And, by 2013, it had jumped to 101 per cent.84
The movement of so many Algerians, both to and through Europe and 
North America, has inevitably encouraged and led to the establishment of 
a range of transnational civil society groups.85 And, within Algeria, the 
European Union continues to make funding available through the ENPI, 
CSF and other initiatives to a range of civil society groups and projects. 
For example, in June 2015, the EU Delegation in Algiers invited organi-
sations working with young people to compete for up to €4 million of 
funding offered by the European Union’s Youth Support Programme.86 
There are now, therefore, a growing number of civil society groups, both 
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in and connected to, Algeria which, either through their members, activi-
ties, target constituencies or sources of funding, have strong and important 
links to Europe.
Leverage
The West’s leverage over Algeria is not only low but cannot, unless there 
is a profound and very unlikely shift in circumstances, be higher. For the 
country meets two of the three criteria Levitsky and Way set for determin-
ing regime ability to withstand outside pressure.87 It has a large economy 
with an estimated GDP of $214.1 billion.88 And it is a major energy pro-
ducer, extracting 1.2 million barrels of crude oil and 6.4 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas a day during the course of an average year.89 Indeed, the 
only criteria it does not meet is possession of nuclear weapons. It does not 
need, therefore, the backing of a Black Knight patron (which it does not 
have) effectively to deter, resist and mitigate the limited democratising 
pressure the United States and European Union are willing and able to 
bring to bear.
Moreover, what leverage Washington and Brussels do possess is ren-
dered less effective by their inconsistent use of it. Their failure to press 
Algeria more rigorously is due mainly to the country’s importance as a 
security provider and the assessment this has led them to make about how 
best to treat Algiers to ensure that their interests are met. For, crucially, 
Algeria has been at the forefront of the fight against Islamist terrorism in 
the Maghreb and wider Western Mediterranean for nearly two-and-a-half 
decades.
Ranged against the country’s successive military-backed governments 
over this period have been an assortment of violent factions, including 
the Armed Islamic Movement (Mouvement Islamique Armé, MIA), the 
Movement for the Islamic State (Mouvement pour l’État Islamique, MEI), 
the GIA, the AIS, the GSPC and AQIM. The campaigns these groups 
continue to wage (for they have never united and pursued a common set 
of aims) have made Algeria both the site for, and epicentre of, much of the 
Islamist violence that has plagued the region. In addition to the scores of 
attacks carried out by these groups, they have also enabled (through the 
provision of money, weapons, training and encouragement) like-minded 
factions in other parts of Africa and elsewhere to take up arms. And, in 
so doing, they have compelled Algeria’s military and security forces to 
grow, learn, adapt and improve. Not only has Algeria witnessed much of 
the worst Islamist violence to take place in the region over the past twenty 
or so years, and is home to some of the largest and longest-established 
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terror groups operating in the Maghreb which are, in turn, helping factions 
elsewhere to carry out their own attacks, but its armed and security forces 
are the most experienced and best adapted of any in North Africa to wage 
a sustained counterterrorism campaign. In more ways than one, therefore, 
Algeria is, and will remain at, the heart of the struggle against Islamist ter-
rorism in the region for the foreseeable future.
And the country’s importance as a bulwark against Islamist terror-
ism has only increased since the start of the Arab Spring. The political 
upheaval that was unleashed by the various iterations of the Jasmine 
Revolution has created significant opportunities for AQIM and its fellow 
travellers to exploit. Libya’s reduction to a state of failure has been particu-
larly significant. The Council of Deputies’ authority is either challenged 
or simply ignored, to the extent that there is currently no single nationally 
and internationally recognised government exercising a monopoly over 
the legitimate means of coercion throughout the whole of the country’s 
territory. As a result, the borders are not secure or properly policed. Many 
of the weapons and pieces of equipment belonging to Gaddafi’s assorted 
armed forces are unaccounted for.90 So, too, are some of the munitions 
France, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and other international actors 
have provided their respective local allies over the past five years.91
Unsurprisingly, some of these missing arms have made their way, by 
various routes, into the hands of AQIM fighters.92 Algiers has responded 
by intensifying its efforts to isolate the six hundred to nine hundred mili-
tants at large in the mountainous and heavily wooded area of Kabylia, and 
deploying an extra sixty thousand troops along its eastern border.93 Others 
of the region’s countries have also been adversely affected by Libya’s 
failure. Mali’s protracted civil war was exacerbated by the return of around 
three thousand of Gaddafi’s Tuareg auxiliaries still in possession of most 
of their arms and equipment.94 Tunisia has similarly been flooded with 
weapons precipitating the sharp increase in the number of terror attacks 
carried out both on its territory and by its citizens. Up to three hundred 
of its nationals fought for AQIM against French forces in northern Mali 
between January and March 2013. A majority of the militants who seized 
the Tigantourine gas facility near Ain Amenas in southern Algeria on 16 
January 2013 were Tunisian citizens.95 And the devastating gun attacks at 
the Bardo Museum in Tunis on 18 March 2015 and on a tourist beach in 
Sousse on 26 June 2015 were carried out by Tunisian fighters belonging to 
AQIM and Islamic State (IS) respectively.
Many of the region’s other governments, however, are not able to 
respond as effectively to the Islamist terror threat as Algiers. The Council 
of Deputies does not control and, therefore, cannot adequately police 
111
Algeria
large parts of Libya. Bamako’s authority over Mali’s northern territories 
was tenuous long before the start of the civil war in January 2012 and is 
only weaker now. Nouakchott has enjoyed some recent successes against 
AQIM units operating within Mauritania but has needed extensive help 
from France to achieve them.96 And Tunis is struggling to maintain the 
fragile political consensus so crucial to the forging of the country’s new 
democratic settlement, and rehabilitate the armed and security forces. 
Indeed, all of Algeria’s neighbours must confront this growing terror 
threat at precisely the time circumstances have rendered them less able to 
do so. Algiers is better placed to respond not only because of its extensive 
counterterrorism experience but because it has been less disturbed by the 
Arab Spring.
Yet Algeria’s role as a key security provider is marked by a surprising 
paradox. For, even though Western governments acknowledge it as such, 
they do not provide it with nearly as much help and support as they do 
Tunisia. Most military-related aid is furnished by the United States and 
individual European countries rather than by the European Union. To date, 
Algiers has been given far less funding for peace and security projects by 
Washington than its neighbour. And, whereas Tunis has been granted mil-
lions of dollars in Foreign Military Financing credits by the United States, 
Algeria has received none. This discrepancy cannot easily be attributed to 
capability and necessity alone, to Washington channelling funds to where 
it believes they are needed most. For, while Tunisia’s military was starved 
of resources by Ben Ali, and is, as a result, desperately trying to make up 
for lost time and modernise, its security forces were generously provided 
for. Moreover, the scale of the Islamist terror threat confronting Tunis has 
not, until very recently, been as great as that facing Algiers. Put starkly, 
no Tunisian government, past or present, has had to deal with a compara-
ble level of threat for the same amount of time that the Bouteflika regime 
has. In terms of capability and necessity, therefore, Tunisia has received 
levels of military and security assistance from the United States and other 
Western governments that Algeria has long had a stronger operational 
claim to.
That this is so casts the United States’ and European Union’s Algeria 
dilemma in a slightly unedifying light. On the one hand, they appear eager 
for the Bouteflika regime to succeed, to wage an effective counterterror-
ism campaign against AQIM. Yet, on the other, they seem reluctant to 
back this aspiration with the types and levels of support they have pro-
vided other similar regimes, some of which have faced far less serious 
threats. Indeed, the West is acting like Algiers’s unwilling accomplice. 
Western governments want the Bouteflika regime to remain sufficiently 
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strong and capable to deal with the danger but do not want to be seen to be 
helping it too much or in certain, mainly security related, ways.
This seeming contradiction is partly informed by the persistence of the 
dark reputation the country’s armed and security forces acquired while 
fighting the insurgency of the 1990s. Though the US, French and other 
Western governments were not displeased by the Algerian military’s 
prevention of the FIS’s almost certain victory in the legislative election,97 
they and their citizenries grew increasingly alarmed by the rapidly rising 
level of violence and growing number of reports accusing the army and 
security forces of failing to minimise civilian casualties,98 abusing the 
human rights of suspects and prisoners,99 and even perpetrating some of 
the war crimes attributed to the Islamists.100 In response, Washington and 
the European Union quietly distanced themselves from Algiers and placed 
restrictions on the amounts and types of weapons that could be exported 
to the country.101 This pressure was to prove instrumental in driving the 
Zéroual regime to seek membership of the EMP.
By the time that it did, however, the West’s united front had already 
started to fragment as individual governments questioned the wisdom of 
seeking to isolate the country. One of the first to break ranks was France 
which, by virtue of the strength of its hostility to the FIS, was broadly 
sympathetic to what the Algerian military had done.102 The last vestige of 
the Élysée Palace’s ostensible early concern for the behaviour of Algeria’s 
armed and security forces was torn away by the GIA’s hijacking of Air 
France flight 8969 on Christmas Eve 1994,103 and subsequent bombing of 
the Paris Metro on 25 July, 17 August and 17 October 1995 and a Jewish 
school in Lyon on 7 September of that year. Yet, even before then, it had 
started to provide Algiers with increasing amounts of material support. 
In November 1994, it announced that it had recently sold Algiers some 
decidedly military-looking equipment.104 The following year it encour-
aged the European Union to invite the Zéroual regime to join the EMP.
In December 2002, President Bush lifted the United States’ own 
embargo on the sale of military equipment to Algeria, thereby bringing an 
end to the West’s limited and half-hearted efforts to sanction the country’s 
armed forces.105 Almost from the moment these measures were intro-
duced, they were challenged, rejected and emasculated by a succession 
of Western governments for reasons of national security. In so doing, the 
West not only reduced democracy and security to an unforgiving binary, 
whereby the achievement of one was assumed to come at the expense 
of the other, but also made clear which of these outcomes it prized most 
highly. Moreover, in making this compromise, in not pressing Algiers 
harder to reform, the West sided with a regime it had previously criticised 
113
Algeria
yet had, in part, given up trying to change. International circumstances, 
not modifications of behaviour, made the West back Algiers. As a result, 
Western governments feel compelled to support the Bouteflika regime but 
at something of a distance.106
Algeria is also a vital energy provider to several EU countries. France, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, in particular, all depend heavily on Algerian 
gas, to an extent that the European Commission is anxious to conclude a 
Strategic Energy Partnership with Algiers better to safeguard supply. Yet 
the European Union’s concerns are not solely the result of its high reli-
ance on Algeria. They have been given additional weight by the recent 
political, economic and attitudinal shifts the EU believes it has identified 
taking place within the Bouteflika regime and wider country. More spe-
cifically, it fears the reawakening of Algerian resource nationalism which 
would probably lead the regime to limit foreign involvement in the coun-
try’s energy sector. It is alarmed by the rapid growth in domestic energy 
demand which could reduce the amounts of oil and gas available for 
export. It is wary of the Algerian oil and gas company Sonatrach’s new 
business strategy which may result in European companies and inves-
tors being increasingly excluded from the Algerian market.107 And it is 
mindful, paradoxically, of the fall in global gas prices which could drive 
Algiers to explore either establishing or joining an OPEC-style cartel with 
greater urgency.108
Confirmation of Algeria’s special significance as a security provider, 
the dilemma this creates and sustains in Western capitals, and the EU’s 
inconsistent application of its own rules and principles are provided by 
the country’s protracted application to join the World Trade Organization. 
The Barcelona Declaration affirmed the signatories’ commitment to create 
a free-trade area by 2010 ‘with due observance of the obligations result-
ing from the WTO’.109 This clause coyly expressed a crucial and fully 
understood expectation: that all partner states would actively seek to join 
the WTO. That Algeria is the only North African partner not yet a member 
is entirely in keeping with its broader approach to the European Union. It 
has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to adopt a unique position, to 
take a separate line in its dealings with Brussels. More instructive is the 
length of time its WTO application has taken so far. The country’s mem-
bership working party was established on 17 June 1987 but did not meet 
until more than a decade later on 22 April 1998.110 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
therefore, its application has taken nearly thirty years and is still ongoing. 
Algiers is seemingly in little rush to expedite the process or satisfy this 
key requirement of the Barcelona Process. And the European Union is 
sufficiently accepting of the country’s slow progress not only to allow it to 
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join the EMP/ UfM but actively solicit its membership of the ENP and seek 
closer working relations with it on other matters.
Börzel and van Hüllen attribute the EU’s seeming double standards 
to a ‘substantive inconsistency’ within the ENP.111 Certainly, the start 
of the Arab Spring was a damning indictment of the framework, not 
because it opposed the democratic changes being demanded by so many 
Tunisians, Algerians, Moroccans and others but because it had clearly 
failed to deliver them itself. For the framework’s primary purpose had 
been (and remains) to help the European Union promote good governance 
in the Mediterranean with the same effectiveness and success that it had 
achieved in Central and Eastern Europe. The onset of the protests, there-
fore, provided stark confirmation that it had failed to achieve what it had 
been set up expressly to accomplish.
Indeed, the ENP was created with a fundamental flaw, a structural 
weakness that greatly impaired its ability to bring about political change 
in North Africa. For, unlike in Europe, it could not encourage its reforms 
with the offer of EU membership. Deprived of this ultimate inducement, it 
had to trust to the appeal of those lesser benefits which could be accessed 
by closer (but not complete) integration with the European Union.112 
These enticements were far from inconsequential. Yet the European 
Union struggled to make the most of them owing to its ineffective ‘use of 
conditionality and capacity building’.113 As a result, it failed to push the 
southern Mediterranean partners quite as hard as it could to become more 
democratic.
According to Börzel and van Hüllen, the EU’s failure to achieve more, 
however, was not because it lacked internal cohesion or ‘actorness’.114 
The European Commission and member states consistently spoke with 
‘one voice’ in their dealings with the southern Mediterranean partners.115 
Rather, this failure was because of the EU’s inaccurate or unrealistic 
assumption about the compatibility of its political goals. For it believed 
that democratic and effective governance were complementary, that by 
promoting one it could strengthen the other even in the short term.116 
Yet, the moment it began negotiating individual action plans with each 
partner state, it effectively abandoned this principle.117 Instead of treating 
democratic and effective governance as mutually reinforcing, it cast them 
as mutually exclusive. As a result, these negotiations became marked by 
a paradoxical inversion. The more authoritarian a regime was, and in need 
of having outside democratising pressure put upon it, the less willing the 
European Union was to press it to change for fear of the instability that 
could be unleashed by doing so.118 Time and again, the EU gave priority 




Overall, the Bouteflika regime has high organisational power although its 
capacity varies across the three subdimensions. The bedrock of its strength 
is the country’s armed and security forces. These are large, well funded 
and cohesive, and have a meaningful presence across much of the country. 
And, though the regime does not exercise total control over them – final 
authority still rests with their commanding officers – it has sufficient influ-
ence to be able to rely upon them when it needs to. The regime also controls 
the most important parts of the Algerian economy, namely, the oil and gas 
sectors. While successive governments have allowed, and even encour-
aged, greater private and foreign involvement in other hitherto state-owned 
industries, they have jealously guarded their domination of these two.
Ostensibly, the only restriction on the regime’s organisational power 
is the absence of a dominant ruling party. Bouteflika currently has the 
backing of the two largest parties in parliament – the National Liberation 
Front (Front de Libération National, FLN) and the National Rally for 
Democracy (Rassemblement National Démocratique, RND) – yet neither 
of them commands a majority. Such a situation was unknown in Ben Ali’s 
Tunisia where the ruling RCD always held far more seats than all the other 
parties combined. The FLN’s and RND’s failure to achieve a comparable 
level of primacy is in part due to the existence of the other. Ultimately, 
though, the regime has never allowed either of them to achieve the sort 
of pre-eminence that the FLN used to enjoy prior to President Benjedid’s 
abolition of one-party rule in 1989.
Since then, no government has tried to recreate the status quo ante. In 
truth, it would have been politically difficult for it to do so. Yet there was 
much more they could have done short of that. They could have manipu-
lated the electoral process to ensure that either the FLN or RND enjoyed 
the same level of dominance as the RCD. They could have turned one or 
other of them into a mass-membership organisation capable of mobilising 
large swathes of the population. Certainly, this was one of the functions 
the FLN used to perform under President Boumedienne. But, to date, no 
government has seriously attempted any of this.
Their disinclination to do so reveals much about Algeria’s competi-
tive authoritarian order, the strength of the Bouteflika regime, the com-
plexion of inter-institutional rivalries within it and the potency of the 
non-violent opposition. The regime neither needs nor wants a dominant 
ruling party to achieve high organisational power, in part because the 
demise of the single-party order removed one of the triumvirate of insti-
tutions that had ruled the country from independence to 1989.119 With it 
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gone, the power and influence of the other two members of the triad were 
inevitably enhanced. And, while this may not be to Bouteflika’s personal 
 disadvantage – because he has one less institution to play off against the 
others – the military does not lament its passing as a rival. That the regime 
does not seem to need such a party speaks volumes about the weakness of 
the opposition forces ranged against it. It has not had to create one because 
the current arrangements are sufficient to give Bouteflika and the ruling 
elite the level of control over the political process they crave. As a result, 
the regime’s party strength must be graded medium rather than high.
Algeria’s security apparatus is just as divided as Tunisia’s was 
under Ben Ali. Deep and bitter rivalries separate its constituent parts, 
most notably the army and the Department of Intelligence and Security 
(Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité, DRS). Indeed, the 
competition between them helps explain their involvement in the political 
process as each seeks to safeguard its interests against the other.120 Yet, 
unlike Ben Ali, Bouteflika has been careful not to choose sides. He has 
tried to retain the support and goodwill of both. In December 2010, his 
government announced that it was giving most of the country’s 170,000 
police officers both a 50 per cent pay rise and back pay for the previous 
three years. Exactly a year later, it announced a similar deal for members 
of the military, increasing some salaries by as much as 40 per cent and 
again offering three years of back pay.121 Not only was Bouteflika mindful 
to be generous to the armed and security forces at a time when the regime 
was under pressure but he also ensured that they were treated fairly 
equally.
This apparatus has high scope and high cohesion based on non-material 
ties. During his sixteen years in office, Bouteflika has maintained military 
spending at a consistently high level. In so doing, he has perpetuated a 
pattern of investment established by his predecessors. Between 1995 and 
2004, both President Zéroual and he spent an average of 3.5 per cent of 
the country’s GDP on the armed forces each year.122 Between 2005 and 
2009 he reduced this investment slightly to an average of 3.02 percent of 
GDP per annum,123 before raising it substantially to an average of 4.58 
per cent of GDP a year between 2010 and 2014.124 Yet, even with these 
fluctuations, defence spending has increased almost every year for the 
past two decades.125 And it has grown exponentially since the start of the 
Arab Spring, to the extent that, in 2014, Algeria spent more on its military 
($11.8 billion) than Morocco ($4 billion), Libya ($3.3 billion), Tunisia 
($906 million) and Mauritania ($150 million) combined ($8.35 billion).126
The Bouteflika regime’s heavy investment in the armed and security 
forces has enabled them to penetrate most of the country down to village 
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and neighbourhood levels. This presence has been built up over the past 
two decades in response to the threat from Islamist insurgents and ter-
rorists. There are still parts of the country in which the military has no 
permanent presence, most notably in Kabylia and the Sahel. These are the 
areas in which the majority of the remaining Islamist fighters are based. 
Yet almost all these places are remote, inhospitable and sparsely popu-
lated. And they are also fluid: their borders are not fixed or static. Rather 
their locations change depending on where the military and the militants 
are operating. Their existences are not evidence of the armed forces’ lack 
of scope. Such is Algeria’s great size, it would be virtually impossible to 
maintain a permanent military presence everywhere at all times. More 
noteworthy is the ability of these forces to move into such spaces at will. 
Indeed, there is no part of the country they cannot occupy and hold should 
they need to.
The high scope of these forces is confirmed by their ability to conduct 
low-intensity operations. Even though the state of emergency has been 
lifted, the regime continues to deter and disrupt public meetings and pro-
tests. During the 2014 presidential election campaign, the police arrested 
hundreds of opposition members who demonstrated against Bouteflika’s 
re-election.127 Rival parties, candidates and supporters are also harassed 
and treated unfairly by other state institutions and bodies. The courts are 
not wholly independent and are regularly used to punish and silence critics 
of the regime, including human-rights activists.128
This heavy investment has also helped give Algeria’s armed and secu-
rity forces strong cohesion. It has ensured that they are well equipped, 
thoroughly trained, and have robust command and control structures. And 
these forces are also bound by other even more powerful non-material ties 
born of two critical and violent experiences. The first is the war of libera-
tion which remains Algeria’s most important national myth. Even today, 
some fifty years since its conclusion, and despite the youthfulness of the 
greater part of the population, it provides the overarching historical, emo-
tional and psychological context in which public life is conducted. The 
constitution quickly identifies ‘the 1st of November 1954 . . . [as] a turning 
point . . . [in Algeria’s] destiny and . . . long resistance to [the] aggression 
carried out against its culture, . . . values and . . . identity’ before rooting 
the country’s ‘current struggles . . . in the glorious past’.129 The war is a 
hallowed memory and those who fought in it highly revered. Indeed, so 
great are the ‘material benefits and prestige attached to . . . veteran status’ 
that the number of people claiming to be ex-combatants leapt from 24,000 
in 1962 to 420,000 in 1999.130 And, through bodies such as the National 
Organisation of the Children of Mujahidin (Organisation Nationale des 
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Enfants de Moudjahidine, ONEM), even those born after the war are eager 
to associate themselves with it.131
The enduring strength of this myth is perhaps unsurprising given that 
the country continues to be run by men who fought in the war. Not only do 
they partly owe their positions to having done so but, as ex-combatants, 
they are helping to maintain the war’s political importance through their 
veneration of it and by the fact of their being in power. They have influ-
ence because they are veterans and they have then used this influence 
to preserve and exalt the memory of the conflict. The president, army’s 
Chief of Staff (General Ahmed Gaid Salah) and head of the DRS (General 
Mohamed Mediène) are former combatants, as were all their predeces-
sors. Crucially, therefore, Algeria’s government and security apparatus 
have long been led by men who know how to win and hold on to power. 
Moreover, the great trials they had to overcome to acquire it have both 
proven and strengthened their resolve to retain it.
Their willingness and ability to preserve their authority have also been 
tested and enhanced by their second, more recent, violent experience – the 
protracted armed struggle against Islamist insurgents and terrorists. Unlike 
before, when they were the insurrectionists trying to capture the state, 
Bouteflika and the other veteran leaders have had to defend what they hold 
from determined and capable foes who have tried to exploit the revolu-
tionary tradition they helped establish and promulgate.132 While the insur-
gents came desperately close to victory in the mid 1990s,133 the regime 
fought back to reduce steadily both the size and seriousness of the threat. 
In so doing, Algeria’s leaders showed once again that they have the 
know-how and determination to do what is necessary to stay in power. 
Moreover, the continued existence of a dogged rump of groups and fight-
ers has helped them justify their high defence spending and curtailment 
of certain political and civil rights. In addition to strengthening the armed 
and security forces’ non-material cohesion, this second violent experience 
has provided a fig leaf of legitimacy for the maintenance of competitive 
authoritarian rule.
The strength of the armed and security forces’ cohesion is confirmed by 
their ability to conduct high-intensity coercion. Indeed, it was by carrying 
out such operations that they first triggered the chain of events that led 
President Benjedid to introduce his democratic reforms, and later caused 
the start and rapid expansion of the Islamist insurgency. Their brutal 
behaviour during the 1988 Black October riots arguably left the govern-
ment with little option but to take bold and decisive action, while their 
subsequent efforts to destroy the FIS drove thousands of the party’s sup-
porters to take up arms against the state. Since then, they have continued 
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to engage in high-intensity coercion. And, even though their conduct 
has been heavily criticised at times, the threat to the Algerian state from 
Islamist militants is now much lower than it used to be. And, perhaps more 
crucially, the armed and security forces themselves have endured. They 
have not collapsed or been defeated or fragmented into warring clans.
Both the FLN and RND have broad but brittle scope. They are the 
country’s two largest parties, fielding candidates and winning votes across 
its territory. Yet, the RND does not have deep roots in society while the 
FLN’s are not as strong as they once were. It was founded in 1954 by 
the so-called ‘nine historics’ as a revolutionary vanguard.134 Its pivotal 
role in winning independence for Algeria led to its installation as the coun-
try’s only legal political party. By the time President Benjedid revoked 
this privilege in 1989, however, it had lost much of its early mystique and 
support. Brutal confirmation of its decline was provided by the 1990 and 
1991 elections when, despite enjoying numerous unfair advantages over 
its rivals, it was soundly beaten. After several years removed from power, 
it has successfully re-established itself as a party of government.
It was during the FLN’s short period in the political wilderness that 
the RND emerged. It was established on 6 January 1997 by Abdelak 
Benhamouda to give President Zéroual the type and level of control that 
the FLN no longer could.135 More specifically, it was created to help 
manage and manipulate the soon-to-be-reestablished National Assembly. 
It continues to perform this function for Bouteflika, as well as provide him 
with an affiliation and platform when standing for election. The RND by 
origin and the FLN through choice, therefore, are ‘personal vehicles’ for 
elite politicians.136 As such, they do not seek to facilitate, or even greatly 
encourage, the electorate’s ‘integration and mobilization’, its involvement 
in the political process. Nor do they try to ‘articulate and aggregate’ its 
interests, to discover, collate and channel popular concerns. And they do 
not ‘formulate much public policy’, suggest or help develop many new 
laws.137
Confirmation of the regime’s considerable influence over the National 
Assembly was provided by the November 2008 parliamentary vote on the 
abolition of the constitutional limit on the number of terms an individual 
could serve as president. This amendment was proposed by Bouteflika’s 
supporters as a prelude to him standing for re-election. That the regime 
felt compelled to seek the National Assembly’s approval could be seen 
as evidence of the value it placed on due process. Certainly, this decision 
indicated its desire to at least be seen to be abiding by the constitution. 
More telling, though, was the passing of the motion by a simple show 
of hands without any prior public consultation. The regime solicited 
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parliament’s approval because it wanted to maintain its democratic facade. 
It did not, however, want a proper debate or to be challenged. And, in this, 
the National Assembly duly obliged.138
The RND’s cohesion is based mainly on material ties. As an establish-
ment party, its primary purpose is to serve the regime. It has little function 
or sense of identity beyond that. It does not represent anything especially 
important or profound, proclaim or occupy a distinct ideological or politi-
cal position that is likely to generate and retain a large and devoted con-
stituency of followers. Moreover, it has no non-material ties to speak of 
and upon which it can draw. Inevitably, some of its members and leaders 
share common pasts fighting either the French or Islamists. Yet, they did 
not do so on behalf of the RND. Such links, therefore, are almost entirely 
incidental to the party. What it does have, though, is access to power and 
patronage. Its rewards for supporting the regime are a bit part in govern-
ment, money and opportunities. This is what it can offer its members.
The FLN, in contrast, has a rich and illustrious history. It will forever 
be venerated as the agent of Algeria’s liberation. Yet the power of this 
past to bind and motivate its members will inevitably decrease as their 
numbers decline in comparison with those born after independence. And 
this trend is exacerbated by the loss of its privileged status. Now, there 
are other parties to join, some of which have comparable, or even better, 
access to those in power. By extension, the FLN can no longer guarantee 
its members the benefits that it once did. Moreover, belonging to it is not 
as important as it used to be. Membership is not essential for accessing 
certain opportunities, for the party’s renaissance was not instigated by 
the regime. Rather, the FLN has sought to re-establish itself as a party of 
government. It is a supplicant to those in power.
The country’s programme of economic liberalisation over the past 
twenty-five years has been marked by at least two inconsistencies. The first 
is the degree of enthusiasm with which successive regimes have pursued 
it. They have long viewed such reforms with distaste, suspicion and even 
hostility. President Benejdid’s initial decision to start selling state-owned 
assets to private and foreign investors was driven more by necessity than 
any deep-felt desire to recast the country’s economy. He, the High State 
Council (Haut Comité d’État, HCE) and President Zéroual were subse-
quently compelled to make these changes, first to qualify for the emergency 
loans they desperately needed from the IMF and World Bank, and later to 
satisfy the terms of the agreements they had signed with these bodies.139
The general antipathy felt by successive governments towards making 
these reforms is mainly born of their shared and abiding desire to exercise 
as much control over the economy as they can. The country’s harrowing 
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experiences in freeing itself from French rule created and sustain a power-
ful cultural impulse to prize and defend all forms of national independ-
ence. The second inconsistency, therefore, is the regime’s determination 
to retain this control while encouraging greater outside involvement in 
the economy. Together, these discrepancies have helped give Algeria’s 
liberalisation programme a patchy complexion. Over the years, succes-
sive governments have implemented the associated reforms with varying 
degrees of urgency and rigour. By extension, some of the changes they 
have made have proved to be more effective than others, leading to peri-
odic jumps in foreign investment. Often, one of the key influences on gov-
ernment behaviour has been the state of the country’s finances – its level 
of indebtedness and export earnings from oil and gas sales.
Since Bouteflika took office, Algeria’s fiscal situation has stabilised. 
The size of its debt has fallen substantially from 65 per cent of GDP in 
1998 (the year before he took office),140 to just 4.5 per cent in 2015.141 And 
its hydrocarbon export earnings have increased exponentially from $9.7 
billion in 1998,142 to $63.8 billion in 2013.143 Together, these develop-
ments have enabled Bouteflika to retain control of the most important parts 
of the economy and reverse some of the liberalising reforms introduced 
previously. In 2006 he made a series of amendments to the Hydrocarbon 
Act which governs the country’s oil and gas industries.144 In addition to 
revoking some of the concessions the act had awarded foreign firms oper-
ating in these sectors, he gave Sonatrach the right to take a controlling 
stake in all future oil and gas projects undertaken in the country.145 Then, 
in 2009, he extended this obligation to the rest of the economy, passing a 
law requiring all companies to be at least 51 per cent Algerian owned. 146
Algeria’s lowly position in the World Bank’s 2015 Doing Business 
Index, therefore, is not only unsurprising but provides clear confirmation 
of the limited effect the liberalisation programme has had.147 Despite the 
declared commitment of successive governments to encourage greater 
private and foreign investment, and the changes they have implemented, 
the economy has still only been partially reformed. Substantial portions of 
it remained unchanged. Some of the old command structures, along with 
the impulses that gave rise to them, survive intact. Moreover, and more 
crucially, the country depends on the state-controlled oil and gas sectors 
for 95 per cent of its export revenue.148
The regime also uses its control of large parts of the economy to disci-
pline and shape the behaviour of thousands of people it employs. During 
the 2009 presidential election, over eight thousand bodies – including 
trade unions and occupational associations – all publicly declared their 
support for Bouteflika. Many of the members of these groups subsequently 
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claimed that they had been compelled to do so upon pain of receiving 
official reprimands, losing their jobs, being denied promotions or having 
their careers blighted in some other way.149 In addition to helping the 
regime resist external democratising pressure, therefore, its control of the 
economy gives it decisive influence over the livelihoods of hundreds of 
thousands of Algerians which it uses to defend and perpetuate competitive 
authoritarianism.
The Bouteflika regime continues to benefit from the collective weakness 
of the country’s opposition parties. Indeed, its ascendancy over them has 
been little affected by the Arab Spring. Like Ben Ali, Bouteflika and his 
predecessors have established a series of political and psychological param-
eters that limit and constrain their rivals’ behaviour and imagination. Unlike 
Ben Ali, they have done so by more brutish means. They have made no offer 
of a National Pact. They have proved reluctant to compromise. They have 
not tried to placate. The military’s intervention in the democratic process 
confirmed both the limits of its patience and the lengths it was willing to 
go to. The HCE’s outlawing of the FIS showed what happened to groups 
and organisations that challenged the established order. And Zéroual’s and 
Bouteflika’s repeated refusals to lift the ban, despite being petitioned to do 
so by other opposition parties, demonstrated the long-term consequences of 
crossing the regime. It did not forget and it did not forgive.150
In return for not declaring them illegal and persecuting their members, 
the regime is prepared to suffer the existence of these parties. In truth, it 
needs them to help maintain its democratic facade. Yet, as it has made 
clear, it is not particularly concerned which parties perform this function, 
just that they do not threaten the established order. Regardless of whatever 
criticisms they make of the regime and its works, therefore, their participa-
tion in political life legitimises what it has done and continues to do. They 
have effectively surrendered the right to make the political running. 
They are willing to abide within the limits the regime has set and which 
support a partially competitive (that is, not completely) democratic order. 
They have allowed themselves to be co-opted.
Many of Algeria’s opposition parties suffer from other debilitating 
weaknesses. The Socialist Forces Front (Front des Forces Socialistes, 
FFS) is well established with a loyal and substantial following. But its 
close association with the Kabyle community means that it struggles to 
attract much support among the Arab majority and build a national pres-
ence. As the other main Berber party, the Rally for Culture and Democracy 
(Rassemblement pour le Changement et la Démocratie, RpCD) faces 
similar challenges and is also completely dominated by its founder and 
head, Saïd Sadi.151 Similarly, the Justice and Development Party (Parti 
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de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) is simply a vehicle for advanc-
ing the political ambitions of its leader, Abdallah Djaballah. And, while 
the Workers’ Party (Parti des Travailleurs, PT) claims long and illustri-
ous antecedents – arguably stretching all the way back to Algeria’s first 
nationalist organisation, Messali Hadj’s North African Star (Étoile Nord 
Africaine, ENA) – it struggles to attract much support outside the country’s 
small and relatively privileged urban working and intellectual classes.
Little wonder, then, that, when the first protests broke out in the country 
in 2011, these parties played largely peripheral roles. For, just as in Tunisia 
and Morocco, the demonstrations were mainly orchestrated and led by 
unofficial groups and organisations. Even later on, only a minority joined 
the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (Coordination 
Nationale pour le Changement et la Démocratie, CNCD), the umbrella 
body that was created to try to expand and better manage the demonstra-
tions. One of the few parties to do so was the RpCD, and its influence was 
not entirely constructive. Its attempts to use the body to help nationalise 
Sadi’s reputation led to the CNCD being seen as a mainly Kabyle entity 
which further undermined the participating groups’ faltering efforts to 
forge a common platform.152 The reluctance of most mainstream parties to 
get more directly involved in the demonstrations highlighted just how igno-
rant they were of grass-roots grievances and the strength of their disinclina-
tion to challenge the regime outside the ascribed channels and conventions.
Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Under Bouteflika, Algeria has completed its transition to competitive 
authoritarianism. After its brief experiment with democracy, it reverted 
to being a dictatorship, ruled by the military dominated HCE. Yet, rather 
than either perpetuate the army’s overt and highly divisive involvement in 
government or resurrect Algeria’s pre-1989 authoritarian order, those in 
power decided to take the country’s politics in a new direction. Arguably, 
the first step towards this goal was Zéroual’s election as president in 1995. 
In practical terms, his appointment to this post changed little, as power 
continued to be distributed along much the same lines as before. As chair-
man of the HCE, he was already the country’s most high-profile politician 
and acting head of state. The abolition of the ruling council did not lead 
to any significant reduction in the military’s influence and authority. And, 
while the ballot was commended by international observers as mostly free 
and fair, its outcome was never in doubt.
Nonetheless, the election mattered both for presentational reasons and 
because it helped launch the country’s current electoralist order. While 
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Zéroual’s de facto powers may have remained largely unchanged, the 
re-establishment of the presidency resurrected a pivotal pre-coup institu-
tion, thereby paving the way for the normalisation and civilianisation of 
political life. Though the armed forces’ power and influence were mostly 
unaffected, the HCE’s abolition reduced their political exposure and 
eliminated a body that served as a painful and damaging reminder of their 
abuse of the democratic process. And, even though the result of the elec-
tion was never truly in doubt, the staging of it provided the regime with a 
degree of legitimacy and restarted the electoral process.
Since then, the regime has held regular presidential (1999, 2004, 2009 
and 2014) and parliamentary elections (1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012). Some 
of these votes have been freer and fairer than others. Often, the amount of 
fraud practised by the regime has reflected the amount of importance it 
attaches to achieving a particular outcome and sense of what it needs to 
do to secure the result it wants. This helps explain why many of the most 
serious concerns raised by domestic and international observers have been 
about the conduct of presidential elections. As the ostensible means of 
determining who holds the country’s most important political office and, 
in so doing, becomes its greatest dispenser of patronage, they are deemed 
to be of far greater consequence than those to decide which party holds the 
most seats in the National Assembly.153 Their outcomes, therefore, have 
been left less to chance.
Arguably the freest and fairest presidential ballot held since the  restoration 
of the electoral process was the 1995 vote.154 The international observers’ 
praise for its conduct appeared justified by the result. For, unlike Ben Ali’s 
winning margin the year before (94.5 per cent), Zéroual’s was not a total 
affront to credibility (61 per cent). Similarly, the share of the vote secured 
by the second-placed candidate, Mafoud Nahnah for Society for Peace 
(Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix, MSP) (25.6 per cent), seemed plau-
sible.155 The regime’s decision not to interfere in this election as much as 
it would in future ballots reflected both its confidence in Zéroual’s victory 
and reluctance to jeopardise its relaunch of the electoral process by getting 
caught manipulating the first vote it had staged in nearly seven years.
Since then, however, the regime has showed less restraint. In 1999, 
Bouteflika stood unopposed after the other six candidates all withdrew 
hours before the polls opened in protest at how the election had been con-
ducted and what they foresaw as the inevitable outcome.156 In 2004, 2009 
and 2014, he faced competition but still managed to win with 85 per cent, 
90.2 per cent and 81.5 per cent of the vote.157 The popular Algerian news-
papers El Watan and Le Matin described the 2004 result as ‘worthy of Kim 
Il Sung’ and ‘Brezhnevian’.158 So serious was the malfeasance witnessed 
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by Western observers in 1999 and 2004, that the European Union, United 
States, United Nations and Organization for Security Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) refused to send any monitors to oversee the 2009 and 
2014 elections which were also marked by extensive fraud.159 In 2009, 
there were credible allegations of widespread vote buying, repeat voting, 
ballot-box stuffing and thefts.160 And, in 2014, the regime was accused of 
inflating the electoral register by three million names in order ‘to facilitate 
ballot-stuffing and multiple voting’.161 As Freedom House noted in its 
2015 country report, ‘each of Bouteflika’s four elections to the presidency 
has been tainted by accusations of fraud’.162
Though less dramatic than Bouteflika’s victories, the FLN’s and 
RND’s triumphs have been remarkable and important. Since 1997, they 
have come first and second in every election held and, between them, 
never occupied less than half the seats in parliament.163 Together, they 
have dominated the reformed National Assembly and, in so doing, 
enhanced the regime’s control over it. Their electoral successes have also 
been subject to censure. While not every election they have done well in 
has been as roundly criticised as those that Bouteflika has won, domes-
tic and international observers have still raised serious concerns about 
some. They condemned the 1997 vote as ‘seriously flawed’.164 And, even 
though foreign monitors declared the 2012 ballot ‘largely free and fair’, 
opposition candidates and some local human rights groups dismissed it as 
‘fraudulent’.165
In addition to practising fraud during elections, the regime continues 
to assume numerous unfair advantages between them. It has routinely 
made arbitrary and ad hoc use of the country’s electoral and other laws 
to prevent candidates and parties from competing, and disadvantage and 
undermine their campaigns. After his commendable performance in the 
1995 presidential election, Mafoud Nahnah was barred from standing in 
1999 on the grounds that he could not prove his participation in the war 
of liberation.166 Not only does this remain the sole occasion on which 
this qualification has been applied but no subsequent runner-up has come 
close to winning as large a share of the vote as he did.167 The regime 
responded to Nahnah’s success by denying him the chance to repeat it and 
has  seemingly succeeded in preventing anyone else from doing the same.
To stop the FLN from adopting Ali Benflis as its candidate in the 
2004 presidential election, Bouteflika won a court order banning it 
from holding its nominating conference. When it did so anyway on 30 
December 2003, Bouteflika successfully petitioned the Court of Algiers to 
freeze its assets. Then, on 22 January 2004, he encouraged his own sup-
porters in the party to hold a separate convention at which they switched 
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the party’s nomination from Benflis to him.168 In the end, they both stood 
as FLN candidates. Benflis finished a distant second with 6.4 per cent of 
the vote.169
Then, in the run-up to the 2009 election, Bouteflika gained several sig-
nificant advantages over his rivals by breaking a number of electoral laws. 
Not only did he begin campaigning long before the start of the official 
three-week electioneering period and make extensive use of public money 
and materials but he also promised lucrative government contracts to 
private businessmen in return for their financial support. The regime also 
ensured that his campaign was given both greater and more favourable 
media coverage. The Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights 
(Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Driots de l’Homme, LADDH) esti-
mated that 27.6 per cent of press and as much as 88.5 per cent of television 
coverage of the election was sympathetically focused on him.170
Under Bouteflika, the regime has closely controlled party registration 
and participation. Between April 1999 and April 2011, the Ministry of the 
Interior rejected every one of the dozens of applications it received from 
groups requesting accreditation. As a result, no new party was granted 
formal recognition by the regime in twelve years.171 And, of those that 
were sanctioned, not all were permitted to take part in elections. Only 
those groups which the regime deemed reliable, posed little threat to its 
favoured candidates and were willing to abide by its debilitating rules 
were allowed to do so. Certain minority parties, for reasons that were 
never fully explained, were exempt from these requirements. Otherwise, a 
party had to have won at least 3 per cent of the vote in the last election and 
be able to field candidates in no fewer than twenty-five wilayas (adminis-
trative districts) to qualify to participate. Inevitably, these measures dis-
advantaged the smaller and newer parties which had neither the resources 
nor pedigrees to meet these conditions.172
And, although, in the wake of the Arab Spring, the regime has tried to 
convince the Algerian public of its greater commitment to competition and 
political openness by relaxing the electoral code, the changes it has intro-
duced pose little threat to either its power or the established, competitive 
authoritarian order. Typical is its relaxation of the criteria for registering 
political parties. In the 2012 parliamentary election, the field increased 
by nearly a third as twenty-one new parties joined forty-four established 
ones on the ballot.173 Yet, rather than leading to any significant loosening 
of the regime’s grip on either the election or the National Assembly, this 
expansion had barely any effect, for most of these groups were not only 
tiny but had broken away from ‘existing parties – especially the FLN and 
the RND – or [were] vehicles for self-promotion by personalities and 
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businessmen close to the regime’.174 As such, they posed virtually no 
danger to the regime nor prevented the two establishment parties from 
once again winning a collective majority. Instead, these groups have 
slightly weakened the established parties and mostly been incorporated 
within the regime’s expanded patronage network.175
The regime also uses the law and litigation to try to control the coun-
try’s media. In June 2009, it passed new cybercrime legislation which 
has greatly enhanced its ability to monitor and regulate what takes place 
online. All service providers operating in the country are now obliged to 
block access to any website the government deems a danger to ‘public 
order and decency’.176 By 2010, this requirement had been extended to 
include certain content on some opposition parties’ websites. And perhaps 
more significantly, the regime has established a new national Internet-
monitoring centre which observes and follows all of the country’s Internet 
traffic.177 By these means, the regime has been able to find, arrest and 
charge a number of bloggers for material they have posted online.178
Then, in April 2011, in a move intended to appease the Arab Spring 
protestors, the government announced the decriminalisation of certain 
press offences. Yet, such was the wording of this amendment, it has actu-
ally increased both the regime’s ability to block reporting on any topic 
deemed a threat to the country’s security and economic interests,179 and 
journalists’ exposure to outside pressure, by introducing custodial sen-
tences for the non-payment of any fines they incur during the course of 
their work.180 Similarly, in January 2014, the government passed a new 
law which authorised the establishment of privately owned television 
channels, and imposed additional restrictions on what they could broad-
cast, most notably, news that has not been cleared by the censors.181 
Moreover, even with this reform, the regime still dominates the country’s 
broadcast media.182
Journalists, reporters, editors and outlets are also routinely prosecuted 
under the country’s defamation laws. Dating from 1990, this legislation 
makes insulting Islam and questioning or challenging the nation’s unity 
criminal offences. Amendments to them introduced in 2001 have extended 
the list of proscribed subjects to include the president, parliament, courts 
and military. Anyone convicted of saying, writing or even drawing some-
thing derogatory about these institutions can be imprisoned for up to five 
years. Publicly disparaging the armed forces and senior political figures is 
also illegal under the 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation 
(Charte pour la Paix et la Réconciliation Nationale, CPRN) and carries the 
far more serious charges of aiding and abetting terrorism.183
Yet the law is not the only way in which the regime disciplines the 
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media. Because most of the country’s newspapers depend on the state 
both to print their copy and for advertising revenue,184 it can put sig-
nificant economic pressure on any that displease it.185 Even those pub-
lications which use private presses are not necessarily any better able 
to resist this interference as the regime habitually harasses the printing 
companies on which they rely.186 By these means, and the DRS’s sus-
tained  harassment of individual journalists and editors, the regime tries to 
enforce self-censorship. Little wonder that Algeria was ranked 119th out 
of 180 countries in the 2015 Reporters Without Borders press freedom 
index.187
Conclusions
Algeria has defied expectations. Shortly after the Arab Spring began, it 
was identified by specialists, eager to make amends for their collective 
failure to predict what was happening in Tunisia, as one of the next most 
likely countries to succumb to the rising tide of unrest. Its recent past as 
the region’s trailblazer was highlighted as evidence of the Algerian peo-
ple’s predisposition to democracy. These suspicions were strengthened 
by the government’s rushed and nervous response to the demonstrations 
and riots that broke out in Algiers, Tizi Ouzou and elsewhere. The Arab 
Spring protestors managed to achieve in just a few weeks what the coun-
try’s mainstream parties and politicians had failed to accomplish in nearly 
twenty years: the lifting of the state of emergency.
Yet the regime did not fall nor, crucially, has it changed very much. 
While its response to the demonstrations was undoubtedly apprehensive, 
the concessions it has offered and reforms it has made have not greatly 
weakened its grip on power. This much was confirmed by Bouteflika’s 
re-election in April 2014. That Algeria continues to be governed by the 
same president who was in office at the time the protests began is not the 
most telling outcome of this election. More significant, is what the regime 
was able to achieve in the circumstances that existed. For, against a back-
drop of unparalleled regional upheaval, it succeeded in engineering the 
re-election of a candidate who was seventy-seven years old, had already 
completed three full terms in office, had held a senior political post for 
much of the past half century,188 and was so ill that most of his campaign-
ing had to be carried out by proxies.
In many ways, in fact, Bouteflika is the antithesis of the type of leader 
most of the Arab Spring protestors wanted to see in power. For fifty years 
he has helped build, strengthen and sustain the very order they were 
seeking to dismantle. Unlike Tunisia, Algeria has remained competitive 
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authoritarian. It holds regular, multiparty elections which are seldom 
free and fair. Regime-backed candidates invariably prevail because of 
the significant advantages they enjoy over their rivals. While opposition 
parties have opportunities to compete, they are very unlikely to cause 
any political upsets. For the electoral playing field is tilted decisively in 
the regime’s favour. This gerrymandering takes place both between and 
during elections.
The European Union and United States are able to bring only limited 
democratising pressure to bear. Their links to the country are medium 
and leverage over its regime low. In this, Algeria provides an important 
addendum to Levitsky and Way’s model. For, according to them, its close 
proximity to Europe and long, shared history with France should have 
made the forging of strong links and high leverage more likely. Yet, in 
actual fact, this common past born, at least in part, of propinquity, sus-
tains a fierce cultural and political determination to defend the country’s 
independence and preserve its freedom of manoeuvre. Furthermore, both 
the EU and the US have long prioritised issues of security over those of 
governance and human rights in their dealings with Algeria. The West, 
therefore, has neither the means nor the inclination to try to make Algeria 
democratise. As a result, domestic factors are decisive.
The Bouteflika regime has high organisational power. The armed and 
security forces each has extensive scope and strong cohesion. They are 
large and well funded. They have penetrated the most important parts of 
the country down to the level of the village and neighbourhood. They are 
able to enter and occupy the remaining areas largely at will. They have 
proven their abilities to conduct high- and low-intensity operations. The 
heavy financial investment made in them by successive governments 
ensures that they are well equipped, thoroughly trained and have robust 
command and control structures. These bonds are buttressed by more 
important and hard-forged non-material ties. For, like the government, 
each is led by men who fought in the war of liberation. And, since the 
early 1990s, they have confronted and steadily gained the upper hand over 
a committed Islamist foe.
The regime also exercises discretionary control over the most impor-
tant parts of the country’s economy. Despite the sustained, albeit at times 
reluctant, commitment of successive governments to attract greater private 
and foreign investment, the crucial oil and gas sectors are still dominated 
by Sonatrach. In addition to generating most of Algeria’s export and 
foreign currency earnings, these industries help the regime to resist and 
mitigate any democratising pressure put on it by the West. They also grant 
it direct economic influence over thousands of ordinary Algerians. The 
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regime exploits its position as employer to shape the political behaviour of 
the country’s public-sector workers, to discipline them into voting for its 
preferred candidates and parties.
Indeed, the only shortcoming in the regime’s organisational power is 
the medium strength of its ruling parties. Both the FLN and RCD have 
broad scope. The FLN has a long and illustrious history with which to 
attract voters and supporters, and develop non-material ties. Nevertheless, 
both it and the RCD lack strong cohesion. And the regime has declined 
to elevate either of them to the same position that the RCD occupied in 
Tunisia under Ben Ali. Certainly, they enjoy preferential treatment com-
pared to other parties. But they do not dominate parliament or the political 
system. Only together do they hold a (far from large) majority of seats. 
Instead of creating a single overbearing party, the regime courts them both 
and, in so doing, limits its dependence on each of them.
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Of all the cases examined here, Morocco presents some of the greatest 
challenges. For, despite appearances, Levitsky and Way’s model cannot 
be easily applied to it. Indeed, they explicitly rule it out as a potential study 
on the grounds that ‘the most important executive office is not elected’.1 
More specifically, they argue that ‘the power of actors outside the electoral 
process’ – in this case the monarchy – ‘generates a distinct set of dynam-
ics and challenges not found under competitive authoritarianism’.2 That 
the king’s powers are numerous and great is beyond question. That his 
political position is far more secure than those of elected heads of state 
is similarly irrefutable. Unlike the presidents of competitive authoritarian 
Algeria and Mauritania, he does not have to submit to the vote. And, even 
though Bouteflika and Abdel Aziz have successfully minimised the risk of 
defeat, they have been able to do so only through enormous and sustained 
effort and still cannot eliminate it entirely.
In fairness to Levitsky and Way, they did not argue that their model 
could never be applied to countries like Morocco. Rather, they were 
explaining their choice of case studies for their book. They also picked 
their words carefully. They ruled nothing in or out but, instead, spoke of 
uncommon dynamics and unusual challenges. Indeed, the only phrase 
they used which requires closer interrogation is ‘outside the electoral 
process’. While this is, of course, literally true in the case of Morocco, it is 
also misleading. For the king is deeply affected by elections. Confirmation 
of just how important they are to him is provided by their very occurrence 
and by the palace’s increasing efforts to ensure that they at least appear to 
be free and fair.3 That a regime headed by an executive who supposedly 
occupies political space somewhere beyond the reach of ballots and voters 
should go to such lengths to hold elections and be so anxious about their 
conduct belies claims and suggestions that he is impervious to them.
The staging of these ballots has already led Immaculada Szmolka to 
describe Morocco as competitive authoritarian. She justifies doing so 
on the grounds that, even though elections are held regularly, opposition 
parties have been allowed to help reform the country’s voting laws, and 
safeguards have recently been introduced to better ensure the integrity of 
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the ballot, abuses still take place. In particular, ‘the distribution of seats’ 
in parliament continues to be fixed while parties and movements which 
‘might aim to modify the constitutional system’ are routinely barred from 
the political process.4 This final observation is especially important for, in 
identifying such a powerful motivation for the monarchy’s high level of 
interest in the electoral system, Szmolka offers a compelling reason why 
Morocco can and should be labelled competitive authoritarian
Yet, frustratingly, having done so, she then drops this line of enquiry. 
Rather than explain why the monarchy is so wary of constitutional reform 
or how these fears engender competitive authoritarianism, she simply 
lapses into silence. This chapter, then, undertakes the analysis and offers 
the explanation that Szmolka alludes to but does not conduct or provide. 
Morocco is competitive authoritarian because the monarchy uses the 
limited amount of democracy it allows to take place to avoid and counter, 
diminish and contain those arguments and groups calling for significant 
reductions in its powers and greater political liberalisation. And, while it 
does not necessarily face the same level of existential threat as the regimes 
in Algeria and Mauritania – the king is as unlikely to be removed as head 
of state as the monarchy is to be abolished – its overriding objective is still 
largely the same as theirs. It does not want to surrender its great powers. 
It does not want to play the sort of decorative and symbolic role that most 
genuinely constitutional monarchies now have to perform. It does not 
want to be reduced to the status of mere figurehead. So, even though it 
could well survive democratisation, it would probably only do so much 
altered. And, at present, it would rather not undergo those changes.
The Moroccan regime, then, shares several notable similarities with 
its competitive authoritarian neighbours. Like its Algerian counterpart, 
it has emerged from the Arab Spring largely unchanged. Of course, the 
country experienced serious and sustained unrest. There were multiple 
demonstrations and riots in Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier and elsewhere 
throughout much of 2011 and the summer of 2012.5 These protests were 
sufficiently frequent, large and angry to draw an official response. A Royal 
Commission was quickly established to consider and recommend changes 
to the constitution.6 And the delayed Economic and Social Environment 
Council (Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental, CESE), long 
portrayed as an at least partial solution to the country’s endemic youth 
unemployment, was hastily launched.7 Yet, despite these dangers and 
the reforms they elicited, the regime survived with its powers largely 
intact. Like its Algerian counterpart, the Moroccan regime entered the 
Arab Spring competitive authoritarian and emerged from the Arab Spring 
 competitive authoritarian.
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At least some of the reasons why it did are the same as those that 
enabled Ben Ali to remain in power for the better part of twenty-five 
years. For, like its Tunisian counterpart, the Moroccan regime continues 
to benefit from not having too much democratising pressure put on it by 
the West. For, despite having strong links to the country, their leverage 
over Rabat is only low. Furthermore, and just as they were with Ben Ali, 
they remain reluctant to bring to bear the full extent of the influence they 
do have. Their disinclination to do so stems from similar considerations to 
those that shaped their treatment of Tunisia. Morocco has long been one of 
the United States’ and Europe Union’s closest allies in North Africa. And 
the leniency this has led them to show the regime has only been strength-
ened by the Arab Spring’s aftermath. As a stabilising influence in a less-
stable region, the West is determined to avoid doing anything – including 
forcing the issue of democracy – that might undermine Morocco’s current 
equilibrium. And, just as with Ben Ali’s Tunisia and Bouteflika’s Algeria, 
what tentative pressure they do apply is rendered less effective by its 
inconsistent application, by the discrepancies between individual Western 
governments’ behaviour towards Rabat.
Nevertheless, the monarch’s freedom from having to seek election 
has led the Moroccan regime to develop its organisational strength in 
a subtly different manner from that set out by Levitsky and Way. In so 
doing, it would appear to conform to their assessment about how the pres-
ence of a powerful non-elected official can alter the currents of power 
within a hybrid regime. Yet the palace’s attitude towards, and treatment 
of, the country’s political parties is not very far removed from President 
Bouteflika’s handling of the RND, FLN and Algeria’s other groups. 
Rather than create or elevate a party to a position of unrivalled supremacy, 
as Ben Ali did with the RCD, King Mohammed and, to a lesser extent, 
Bouteflika have both courted and divided power across a range of groups. 
As a result, none is in a position effectively to challenge or easily disobey 
either of them. By dissipating power and inculcating competition among 
their respective country’s parties, they have enhanced their authority over 
their political systems. Not only, therefore, has the palace continued to act 
in a profoundly competitive authoritarian way but its behaviour is similar 
to that of another of the region’s competitive authoritarian leaders.
To sustain this analysis and enable better Morocco’s comparison with 
its near neighbours, the chapter is organised along the same lines as each 
of Levitsky and Way’s original cases as well as this book’s other country 
studies. The first section examines the strength of Morocco’s links to 
both the United States and the European Union across their six catego-
ries of connection. The second section determines how much leverage 
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Washington and Brussels have over Rabat, and whether it has the backing 
of a Black Knight patron. The third section measures the regime’s organi-
sational power, whether it has the support of a ruling party, the scope and 
cohesion of its coercive forces and the amount of discretionary control 
the government exercises over the economy. And the final section charts 
the regime’s origins and developments, paying particular attention to the 
period from 2005 onwards.
Linkage
Morocco has strong links to the United States and European Union across 
all six categories of connection. Both the number and quality of these ties 
have increased markedly under King Mohammed VI. Since his accession 
to the throne on 23 July 1999, the country has enthusiastically joined the 
same policy frameworks as Tunisia and Algeria, including the MEPI, the 
BMENA, the EMP, the UfM, the ENP and the PfDSP. In addition, it has 
secured other recognitions not extended to its near neighbours. It partici-
pates in the US-sponsored Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).8 
It has signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Washington. And its 
relations with the European Union have been granted Advanced Status by 
Brussels.
Morocco is one of Washington’s oldest and closest allies in the region 
and a major recipient of US aid and development funding.9 Between 2009 
and 2015, it was awarded $232.11 million in financial assistance and 
$49.23 million in FMF credits. While this was less than that which was 
given to Tunisia over the same period ($424.6 million and $142.17 million 
respectively), it was substantially more than what was granted to either 
Algeria ($43.23 million and nothing) or Mauritania ($43.93 million and 
nothing).10 Moreover, between August 2007 and September 2013, Rabat 
was awarded $649.37 million in MCC funding which no other Maghreb 
country received or was eligible to claim.11 It is currently negotiating a 
second tranche of MCC investment.12
Another notable feature of Washington’s aid and development assis-
tance to Rabat is its focus. Since 2009, Morocco has been provided with 
significantly less security-related funding than Tunisia. While 41.5 per 
cent of the financial assistance it was granted over this period was set aside 
for Peace and Security projects, 57.93 per cent of that awarded to Tunisia 
was.13 Moreover, Tunis was given nearly three times as much FMF credit 
as Rabat. Not only was the amount of security aid granted to Morocco 
less than that provided to its neighbour in absolute terms but this funding 
also comprised a much smaller portion of the total assistance it was given. 
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From an aid and development perspective, therefore, security concerns 
are less central to the United States’ relations with Morocco than they are 
with Tunisia.
Morocco enjoys preferential trade relations with the United States com-
pared to its neighbours. Rabat and Washington signed an FTA on 15 June 
2004 and it came into force on 1 January 2006. Once it did, 95 per cent of 
bilateral trade became duty free,14 with all remaining tariffs on US exports 
to Morocco to be phased out by 2024.15 The agreement also regulates ‘all 
forms of investment . . . including enterprises, debt, concessions, contracts 
and intellectual property’. And it allows investors from both countries to 
operate on largely equal footings with their local counterparts. No other 
North African country has signed an FTA. Its political and economic 
importance elevates Morocco’s relationship with the United States ‘to an 
altogether different level’.16
Like Tunisia, Morocco has consistently and energetically pursued 
closer relations with the European Union. It has continued to do so even 
after King Hassan II’s ambition of acceding to the community was dashed 
by the European Council in 1987.17 It has joined each policy framework 
at the earliest opportunity. It signed its association agreement just three 
months after the EMP was launched.18 Similarly, it concluded its action 
plan scarcely seven months after the ENP was established.19 In recognition 
of the strength of its commitment, Brussels upgraded Morocco’s relation-
ship with the EU to Advanced Status on 13 October 2008.20 It is still the 
only North African partner state to receive this designation.
The European Union has also rewarded Morocco’s enthusiasm with 
high levels of funding. The country has received more MEDA I (€660 
million) and MEDA II (€980.1 million) investment than any of its 
neighbours, and Tunisia (€428 million and €517.6 million) and Algeria 
(€164 million and €338.8 million) combined (€592 million and €856.4 
million).21 Between 1996 and 2013, it was granted loans totalling €887 
million by the EIB.22 Between 2007 and 2010, it was given €654 million 
in development funding by the ENPI. Between 2011 and 2013, it was 
awarded a further €580.5 million by the ENPI.23 And, between 2012 and 
2013, it was granted €115 million in emergency assistance under the 
SPRING programme.24 Since 2007, it has received more EU aid than any 
other North African country.25
Many of these intergovernmental accords and initiatives have impor-
tant economic dimensions and implications. Since King Mohammed’s 
accession to the throne, Brussels and Washington have been far keener 
to strengthen their economic relations with Morocco than they have to 
pressurise its ruling ‘elite to implement meaningful political reform’.26 
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Little wonder that, by 2013, the European Union and the United States 
were the country’s top two commercial partners. Like Tunisia and Algeria, 
Morocco does more trade with the European Union (53.6 per cent) than 
the rest of the world combined. And, while clearly not on the same scale 
(6.4 per cent),27 its trade with the United States has steadily increased in 
value over the past twenty years.
Between 1995 and 1999, the annual average value of Morocco’s 
exports to the United States was $188.29 million.28 Between 2000 and 
2004, that amount jumped to $280.8 million.29 Then, between 2005 and 
2009,30 it rose again to $422.54 million before more than doubling to 
$861.1 million between 2010 and 2012.31 The value of the country’s 
imports from the United States has also increased significantly over this 
period. Between 1995 and 1999, their annual average value was $606.94 
million.32 Between 2000 and 2004,33 that amount fell slightly to $575.19 
million before tripling to $1.62 billion between 2005 and 2009.34 And, 
most recently, between 2010 and 2012, it rose to $1.79 billion.35 Tellingly, 
the most dramatic increases occurred shortly after the inauguration of the 
FTA in January 2006.
These rises have been mirrored by similar increases in the amount 
of FDI in the country. Between 1995 and 1999, Morocco attracted an 
average of $373.77 million of investment each year.36 Between 2000 and 
2004, that amount nearly doubled to $708.69 million.37 Then, between 
2005 and 2009, it more than tripled to $2.27 billion,38 before rising 
again to $2.49 billion between 2010 and 2013.39 And these figures do 
not include the millions of dollars in remittance payments made by the 
members of the country’s extensive diaspora. There are currently 4.5 
million Moroccan citizens living abroad.40 Most are based in Europe 
(85 per cent),41 with the largest communities in France (660,000), 
Spain (547,000), Italy (379,000), Belgium (285,000), the Netherlands 
(278,000) and Germany (130,000).42 Between 1995 and 1999, their 
remittances were worth an average of $1.99 billion a year. Between 2000 
and 2004, that amount climbed to $3.22 billion. Then, between 2005 
and 2009, it nearly doubled to $5.98 billion, before rising again to $6.76 
billion between 2010 and 2013.43
Like its Tunisian and Algerian equivalents, Morocco’s diaspora also 
plays an important social role. And this cross-border flow of people is aug-
mented by the tens of thousands of (mostly Western) tourists who travel 
to the country each year. Unlike Tunisia, Morocco did not experience any 
reductions in visitor numbers during the Arab Spring. On the contrary, 
there were small year-on-year increases throughout this period, from 9.28 
million in 2010, to 9.34 million in 2011, to 9.37 million in 2012, to 10.04 
Democratisation in the Maghreb
150
million in 2013.44 Clearly, these rises were not as great as those over the 
previous five years (from 5.84 million in 2005 to 8.34 million in 2009) 
but that there were any at all is telling. Firstly, because it offers additional 
insight into international – in this case public – attitudes towards what was 
happening in the Maghreb. While European travellers clearly had some 
concerns, they still viewed Morocco as more stable than Tunisia which 
experienced a big drop in visitor numbers over this period. And, secondly, 
this perception had a material consequence. When assessed in terms of 
tourist numbers, Morocco was less affected by the Arab Spring than its 
near neighbour.
A significant number of the millions of Moroccans living and working 
in the West are students. In the 2013/ 2014 academic year, there were 
33,899 Moroccans enrolled at French universities alone. In addition, more 
Moroccan students have registered at French universities in each of the 
last ten academic years than any other foreign nationality.45 Crucially, 
the vast majority of those who study in France, Spain and elsewhere in 
the West make their own arrangements to do so. Only a very small minor-
ity participate in one or other of the official exchange programmes run by 
Washington and Brussels, such as the US State Department’s Kennedy–
Lugar Youth Exchange and Study (YES) initiative,46 and the European 
Union’s Tempus and Erasmus Mundus schemes.47 Since 2004 – the year 
the YES programme was extended to Morocco – less than 310 people have 
participated in them.48
Most of those who study in the West, therefore, are from well-to-do 
backgrounds. And, just as it is for their Tunisian and Algerian peers, 
spending a little time at a European or North American college or uni-
versity is now an important rite of passage for many affluent young 
Moroccans. By virtue of the educations they receive and the qualifications 
they earn there, as well as having the sorts of socio-economic backgrounds 
that allow them to study abroad in the first instance, many of those who 
return home are well placed to secure gainful employment in either the 
public or private sectors. As a result, Morocco’s strong technocratic links 
to North America and, in particular, to Europe are maintained.
The cross-border circulation of news these transnational populations 
both encourage and facilitate is enhanced by Morocco’s much-improved 
and rapidly developing information links to the United States and Europe. 
Like its neighbours, the country has experienced an explosion in Internet 
and mobile phone use over the past decade. In 2000 just 0.7 per cent of 
the population had access to the World Wide Web. By 2005 this figure 
had leapt to 15.1 per cent. By 2010, it had more than tripled to 52 per 
cent. And, by 2013, it had risen again to 56 per cent.49 And the increase in 
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mobile phone subscriptions over this period has arguably been even more 
dramatic. In 2000 just 8 per cent of the populace had a contract. By 2005, 
this figure had soared to 41 per cent. By 2010, it had jumped again to 101 
per cent. And, by 2013, it had risen still further to 129 per cent.50
These expansions mean that more ordinary Moroccans are better 
equipped than ever before to access additional information and alternative 
viewpoints on events and developments in their country. No longer must 
they rely exclusively on local and state-run news providers to learn about 
what has been happening. No longer must they content themselves with 
selected and officially sanctioned opinions and explanations. Through 
their improved links to friends, relations, contacts and media sources 
elsewhere they can find out better what is happening and decide for them-
selves what it means. And this includes questioning and challenging the 
regime’s policies, actions and answers.
The existence of these large, mobile, cross-border populations has 
encouraged the proliferation of transnational civil society groups and net-
works. The European Union continues to make financial support available 
to a range of bodies and projects through the ENPI, CSF and other schemes. 
Especially strong ties have been forged between human rights groups. The 
Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (Association Démocratique 
des Femmes du Maroc, ADFM), Moroccan Human Rights Association 
(Association Marocaine de Driots Humains, AMDH), Moroccan Human 
Rights Organisation (Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains, OMDH) 
and Espace Associatif all belong to the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights 
Network (Réseau Euro-Méditerranéen des Driots de l’Homme, EMDH) 
which was established under the terms of the Barcelona Declaration,51 and 
is funded by the European Commission and individual European Union 
member-state governments (Denmark and Sweden).52
Leverage
Despite these strong links, the West’s leverage over Morocco is only low 
because the country meets at least one of Levitsky and Way’s three criteria 
for determining a regime’s ability to withstand outside influence. More 
specifically, it has a large economy of $107 billion.53 So, even though 
it is not a major oil producer, does not possess or have access to nuclear 
weapons and is not supported by a Black Knight patron, it still has the 
economic wherewithal to cope with any democratising pressure put on it 
by the United States and European Union.
Crucially, though, this assessment, based on a fair and accurate appli-
cation of Levitsky and Way’s conditions, does not deny or preclude the 
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West’s ability to put significant pressure on Morocco. Rabat’s sustained 
determination to forge ever-closer relations with the United States and 
European Union has led it to join a range of policy frameworks that grant 
Washington and Brussels the authority to require it to modify its political 
behaviour. Through the MEPI, the BMENA, the FTA, the MCC, the EMP, 
the UfM, the ENP and the PfDSP, the West has the means to make some 
searching demands of the Moroccan regime. Yet, as great as its authority 
is, it still has only low leverage over the kingdom because Rabat’s capac-
ity both to refuse and to deal with any subsequent consequences is even 
greater. Furthermore, and just as importantly, the West has long shown a 
strong disinclination to bring as much pressure to bear on the country as it 
could. It has effectively abrogated, at least in part, its ability to hold Rabat 
to account.
Indeed, Western governments have consistently struggled to make 
more effective use of what leverage they do possess. The main cause of 
their failure is the same as that which colours and shapes their relations 
with Tunisia and Algeria – their profound fear that any serious instability 
in the region will soon spread to their own populations and territories. This 
anxiety makes them reluctant to do or say anything that might undermine 
those leaders and regimes which, they believe, are helping to maintain 
stability. Their policies towards Morocco, therefore, are marked by 
several inconsistencies. One of the most significant is the tension between 
their professed political expectations for the kingdom and the amount of 
undemocratic behaviour they are prepared to tolerate.
While this discrepancy predates King Mohammed’s accession to the 
throne, it has been strengthened and entrenched throughout his reign, in 
large measure because of Western governments’ eagerness to view him 
as a modernising and liberalising force. Their enthusiasm was born of a 
powerful collective desire to draw a line under the abusive and authoritar-
ian rule of his father, Hassan II. They very much hoped that the youth-
ful and westernised Mohammed would help strengthen democracy and 
human rights in Morocco and its neighbours. Their craving for stability 
was buttressed by a hunger to have the new king succeed. By extension, 
their reluctance to do anything which might destabilise this important ally 
or weaken its ability to act as a steadying influence in the region has been 
fortified by their determination to avoid undermining or alienating King 
Mohammed.
To a large extent, of course, these ambitions are complementary to the 
point of being indistinguishable. Symbolically, and in many substantive 
ways as well, Morocco and the monarchy are the same. To be an ally of 
one is to back the other. To put pressure on one is to compel the other. 
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To reform one is to change the other. Since Mohammed’s accession to 
the throne, therefore, Western governments have adopted an ‘ “applause 
policy’”.54 This approach has at least three interconnected elements. The 
first is to shower the palace and regime with praise. Over the years, Western 
governments have been quick to commend Rabat for those reforms and 
initiatives of which they approve and appear to justify the high level of 
support they show it. King Mohammed’s establishment of the Equity and 
Reconciliation Committee (Instance Equité et Réconciliation, IER) to 
investigate human rights abuses during the so-called Years of Lead, revi-
sion of the Family Code (the Mudawana) and reinforcement of women’s 
rights, easing of some of the restrictions on political parties and the press, 
and willingness to allow international election monitors to oversee the 
2007 parliamentary vote have all been lavishly extolled.55
The second part is to refrain from castigating Rabat too heavily for 
acting against democracy, backsliding on its promises, or not consolidat-
ing or extending those democratic reforms it has introduced already.56 
What criticisms of the regime Western governments have been prepared 
to make have either been muttered sotto voce, made with heavy caveat, 
or offset by encouragement. And the third part of their approach is to 
evaluate the regime’s actions and progress in relative terms. Rather than 
judge its behaviour against fixed and predetermined criteria, they compare 
it backwards and sideways with that of earlier and neighbouring govern-
ments. When measured against that of King Hassan II, the current order 
appears far more enlightened. When compared with their Algerian and 
Mauritanian counterparts, the Moroccan elite seems more willing to work 
with international partners.
By adopting this policy, the West is predisposed to take a favourable 
view of Morocco’s political development. In so doing, it has only increased 
the size of the challenge confronting the country’s pro- democracy and 
human rights campaigners. For, to achieve change, they have to confront 
and try to reform a regime that enjoys the West’s backing.57 Moreover, by 
embracing this policy, Western governments have further compromised 
their ability to put pressure on Rabat. For, in perceiving and portraying 
the country in this way, they have not only effectively foresworn taking 
more punitive actions against the regime but rendered the application of 
any such measures both irrational and unfair. How can they punish that 
which they praise? 
Paradoxically, and despite their solemn pledges to be more supportive 
of popular demands for greater democracy, the Arab Spring has only made 
Western governments more reluctant to do anything that might weaken or 
unsettle the Moroccan regime; and this includes pushing Rabat harder to 
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reform and liberalise its political structures and processes. The primary 
triggers of this disinclination are the same today as they were before. In 
the years leading up to the Arab Spring, Western governments grew to 
value ‘Morocco’s stabilizing influence in the region’ very highly, to the 
extent, that they did not want to jeopardise it ‘for the sake of “optimizing” 
Moroccan democratic standards’. With political Islam seemingly on the 
rise across North Africa, Western governments looked to the country for 
‘positive regional spill-over’, to be a calm and settling influence, to show 
its neighbours how to integrate peaceably and effectively manage Islamist 
parties, groups and societies.58
And the same is also true today. While religious organisations played 
only marginal roles in launching the Arab Spring protests, they have 
since reaped significant political benefits.59 Ennahda and the Justice and 
Development Party (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) won 
the Tunisian and Moroccan parliamentary elections in 2011. And the 
Green Alliance of Algeria (Alliance de l’Algérie, AAV) came third in the 
Algerian National Assembly election in 2012.60 Additionally, and more 
importantly for the West, violent Islamist factions continue to exploit and 
exacerbate the instability created by the Arab Spring. Libya is wracked by 
civil war and has become a safe haven for Islamic State fighters. Tunisia 
has suffered several devastating terror attacks and is struggling to cope 
with the twin threats of IS and the resurgent AQIM. And Algeria, which 
has long been plagued by Islamist terrorism, has been forced to strengthen 
security along its eastern and southern borders.
Like Algeria, Morocco emerged from the Arab Spring fundamentally 
unaltered. Despite the protests, riots and government reforms, power 
continues to be distributed along much the same lines as before. Decisive 
authority is still vested in the monarchy. The old order has survived 
largely intact. That it has is what now recommends the country to the West 
as a key regional partner. Or rather, it helps reaffirm the kingdom’s impor-
tance as a vital source of stability in this unsettled region. Morocco is one 
of a diminished number of countries able to play this role just when it is 
needed most. Washington, Brussels and individual European governments 
still look to Rabat to project stability. They remain, therefore, as reluctant 
as ever to do anything – including ‘ “optimizing” Moroccan democratic 
standards’ – that might lessen its ability to play this part.
A second key constraint on the West’s ability to put more democratis-
ing pressure on Morocco is the failure of its institutions and governments 
to co-ordinate better their policies towards the kingdom. Clearly, they 
agree on a great deal. Both the United States and the European Union are 
keen to strengthen their relations with the country, to the extent that each 
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has concluded a special arrangement with Rabat: an FTA and Advanced 
Status respectively. And, of course, the European Union’s position 
broadly reflects that of its member states. When taken together, most 
Western countries have the same goals in and for Morocco.
Yet divergences still persist. Some are almost entirely unavoidable. As 
Mouhib notes, the European Union’s democracy-promotion efforts are 
less a coherent strategy and more a ‘complex “political process” ’.61 This 
means that disagreements and deviations between the EU’s organs and 
institutions are virtually inevitable. So it was in 2011 that the European 
Parliament ‘questioned whether the financial and logistic assistance’ the 
European Union provided Morocco and other southern Mediterranean 
partner states did enough to encourage the industrialisation that it deemed 
essential to promoting long-term growth in productivity and protecting 
their economies from the sorts of ‘exogenous shocks’ that commonly 
affect ‘global agricultural and commodity markets’. And again in 2012, 
the European Parliament identified ‘ “inconsistencies” in the EU’s trade 
agreements’ with the partner states that, it argued, prevented them from 
using ‘trade barriers . . . to successfully promote infant industries’.62
Other divergences are perhaps less certain in that they are not structural, 
are not rooted in the EU’s institutional make-up. Nevertheless, they are 
highly probable because they are geopolitical and exist between member 
states, and member states and the European Commission. These devia-
tions result from national capitals taking different policy lines from each 
other and from Brussels. Both for them and for Rabat, bilateral relations 
take precedence over working either through or with the commission. 
France, Italy and Spain each looks to secure its own interests first before 
conforming to the position and approach adopted and set out by Brussels. 
Equally, ‘the message from Paris, Rome and Madrid . . . remains far more 
significant because of their role as . . . security partners and exporters of 
defence equipment and training, than the EEAS’s requests to talk about 
political reform’.63
This prioritisation sustains at least two significant paradoxes. The 
first is the extent to which the EU’s policies towards its neighbours are 
decided by those member states most willing to deviate from them. It 
is now customary within the European Union for the members with the 
strongest, most immediate interests in a particular region to take the lead 
in formulating the bloc’s relations with it. Northern European countries, 
therefore, ‘looking more to the East than to the South’, often let France 
and Spain shape ‘Europe’s relations with Morocco’.64 This arrangement 
helps explain the EU’s continuing reticence to press Rabat harder to 
democratise because its Mediterranean members remain reluctant to push 
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‘for [greater] political change’.65 And it also helps explain why the French 
and Spanish governments still prefer to work bilaterally with Morocco and 
the Maghreb’s other countries than through the European Union.66 For, 
even though the EU’s policy towards the region reflects those countries’ 
interests more closely than those of other member states, it still does not 
capture them precisely enough. As a result, both Paris and Madrid look to 
advance them by other means outside the European Union.
The second paradox is the extent to which, in so doing, the French 
and Spanish governments are encouraging their Moroccan counterpart to 
respond in kind, to prioritise dealing directly with them above working 
with and through Brussels. Clearly this is inevitable in those policy areas 
pertaining only or largely to themselves, to bilateral French–Moroccan 
and Spanish–Moroccan issues. Yet it is also encouraged by Northern 
Europe’s deferment. For such is the French and Spanish governments’ 
influence on European policy towards Morocco and the Maghreb that 
Rabat is well advised actively to engage with them. Brussels might declare 
what European Union policy is but its content, direction and tenor are 
mainly decided elsewhere, in Paris and Madrid.
Organisational Power
The Moroccan regime has high organisational power although its capacity 
varies across the three subdimensions and does not neatly conform to all 
aspects of Levitsky and Way’s model. The mainstay of its strength is its 
large, well-funded and experienced armed and security forces. They have 
a meaningful and effective presence across much of the country, including 
the Western Sahara, and strong cohesion based, in part, on non-material 
ties. The regime does not incorporate or rely on a single ruling party but, 
instead, uses and controls several through its policy of political fragmen-
tation. Its strength in this area, however, is still medium as these groups 
are all national forces, and its ability to influence the country’s political 
processes remains considerable. Indeed, the only subdimension in which 
its organisational power is low is economic. Largely because of its con-
clusion of an FTA with the United States, it does not, unlike its Algerian 
counterpart, exercise decisive control over any key sectors so has less 
direct influence over the broader economy.
Over the past two decades, government investment in the military has 
remained steady. Between 1995 and 1999, the regime spent an average of 
3.5 per cent annually of the country’s GDP on the armed forces. Between 
2000 and 2009, this allocation fell slightly to 3.3 per cent. Then, between 
2010 and 2014, it rose a little to 3.6 percent.67 This means that, in real 
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terms, government spending on the military increased year on year almost 
without exception,68 to the extent that, by 2014, the regime was spending 
nearly twice as much on defence ($4 billion) as it had been a decade earlier 
($2.4 billion).69
The regime’s sustained investment in the armed and security forces has 
enabled them to build up a wide and deep presence in the country. The 
military alone comprises 175,000 soldiers, 7,800 sailors, 13,000 air force 
personnel, 20,000 gendarmes, and 30,000 auxiliaries covering two zones, 
northern and southern.70 This level of investment, number of troops and 
their disposition continue to be driven and justified by the existence and 
activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra 
and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y 
Río de Oro, Polisario) and, increasingly since the start of the new millen-
nium, the threat from Islamist terror groups, such as Salafia Jihadia (which 
carried out the 2003 Casablanca bombings) and AQIM.
The broad scope of Morocco’s armed and security forces is confirmed 
by their ability to undertake low-intensity operations. While they do not 
carry out as many such actions as they once did or as their Algerian coun-
terparts still do, they continue to harass, intimidate and persecute critics 
and opponents of the regime. Independent journalists, dissident intellec-
tuals, and civil and human rights activists, in particular, are subjected to 
various forms of unpleasant and unsettling treatment as punishment for 
what they have done or are doing, and to try to make them desist.71
The security apparatus also has high cohesion based on non-material 
ties. Since achieving independence, Morocco’s armed forces have fought 
and won two short wars against Algeria.72 And, since 1973, they have 
waged a broadly successful counterinsurgency campaign against the 
Polisario. Its senior officers, therefore, have extensive experience of 
fighting and winning military campaigns. Moreover, they have proven 
their commitment to the regime and invested heavily in its survival. They 
not only know what to do to protect it, including how to carry out high- 
intensity operations, but, in defending it thus far, they have effectively 
committed themselves to doing so again in the future. For the sake of pro-
fessional and personal consistency, these knowledgeable and experienced 
officers are bound to the status quo.
Just as the broad scope of the country’s security apparatus is confirmed 
by its ability to conduct low-intensity operations, so its strong cohesion is 
demonstrated by its capacity to undertake high-intensity ones. Between 
January and September 2011 and again, albeit less frequently, during 
the summer of 2012, the country experienced numerous protests and the 
occasional riot.73 Many of these demonstrations were inspired by what 
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was taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Algeria. Quite deliberately, 
especially following the establishment of the February 20th Movement 
(Mouvement du 20 Février, MVF), they were presented as the Moroccan 
phase of the Arab Spring,74 to the extent that this was how they were 
quickly seen and understood domestically and internationally. That many 
of those who protested demanded economic, rather than political, reforms 
does not invalidate this perception. For the Arab Spring, in Morocco and 
elsewhere, was as much about unemployment, falling living standards and 
the absence of opportunity as it was about ousting authoritarian govern-
ments and winning greater political freedoms. Indeed, these goals were 
often viewed as complementary if not inextricably interlinked.
Yet, regardless of what was actually being demanded, the regime 
responded with force to a significant number of demonstrations.75 Most of 
the occasions on which it did occurred in late February and early March, 
May and early June, and mid July and early August 2011.76 Of course, this 
was never the sum of the regime’s response. It took a range of additional 
political, economic and other measures concomitantly. Nevertheless, 
both the government and security apparatus were willing and able to use 
violence to break up rallies and marches. And, even though their actions 
prompted further, retaliatory demonstrations and ‘made protestors more 
determined to press for’ greater democracy, the regime and armed and 
security forces still had the resolve and ability to carry out these high-
intensity coercive operations.77
One notable way in which the regime does not easily conform to Levitsky 
and Way’s model is in party strength. To be consistent, this must be recorded 
as medium in as much that, even though the regime is not aided and abetted 
by a single ruling party, it has the loyal backing of the country’s main 
groups, including those that won the most seats in the 2011 parliamentary 
election – the PJD (107), the Istiqlal (Hizb al-Istiqlal/ Parti d’Independence) 
(sixty), the National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement National des 
Indépendants, RNI) (fifty-two), the Authenticity and Modernity Party 
(Parti Authenticité et Modernité, PAM) (forty-seven), the Socialist Union 
of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste de Forces Populaires, USFP) (thirty-
nine), the Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire, MP) (thirty-two), 
the Constitutional Union (Union Constitutionelle, UC) (twenty-three) and 
the Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du Progès et du Socialisme, 
PPS) (eighteen).78 As Morocco’s largest and most electorally successful 
parties, they have each achieved the presence and penetration expected of 
national forces. The Istiqlal fielded candidates in all 395 constituencies, the 
PJD and USFP in 393, the PPS in 386, the RNI in 381, the MP in 377, the 
PAM in 365, and the UC in 340. And the government which was formed 
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on the basis of this election result includes ministers belonging to the PJD, 
Istiqlal, MP and PPS.
Yet, even so, the regime does not depend on any of these parties as 
much as Ben Ali did on the RCD. That this is so is a consequence of the 
regime’s ‘policy of political fragmentation’.79 Quite deliberately, King 
Mohammed, like his father before him, has foresworn relying too heavily 
on any one party. His objective is clear: to protect his own authority and 
influence by limiting that of any and all potential rivals. In this he dem-
onstrates a zero-sum understanding of power. He hopes that, by contain-
ing and weakening that of his competitors – current and future – he can 
better defend and safeguard his position. The policy of fragmentation has 
several parts. One is the regime’s tacit and explicit encouragement of party 
formation.
Since the mid 1990s, a succession of new parties has been established. 
No part of the political spectrum has been left unaffected. In 1982 the 
National Democratic Party (Parti National Démocrate, PND) broke away 
from the RNI. In 1991 the National Popular Movement (Mouvement 
National Populaire, MNP) broke away from the MP. In 1996 the Socialist 
Democratic Party (Parti Socialiste Démocratique, PSD) broke away from 
the Organisation of Democratic and Popular Action (Organisation de 
l’Action Démocratique et Populaire, OADP). In 1997 the Democratic 
Forces Front (Front de Forces Démocratiques, FFD) broke away from the 
PPS. In 2001 the Reform and Development Party (Parti de la Reforme et 
du Développement, PRD) broke away from the RNI. And, more recently 
in 2006, the Moroccan Union for Democracy (Union Marocaine pour la 
Démocratie, UMD) broke away from the UC.80
A few parties – including the RNI, the UC and the PAM – were 
founded by friends and allies of the king to help defend the palace’s inter-
ests in parliament and the electoral sphere.81 The PAM, for example, was 
established specifically to try to counter the growing popularity of the 
PJD whose ambitions and loyalty to the regime at that time were still not 
wholly trusted by the monarchy. In so doing, by allowing and encourag-
ing the creation of new parties, the regime weakened those that existed 
already. Some, such as the RNI, the MP, the OADP, the PPS and the UC, 
have lost leaders, members, resources and voters directly to one or other 
of the parties that have been created. Yet, even those which have not had 
factions break away from them, must now compete on a more congested 
and competitive playing field.
Another facet of this policy is the high degree of consistency with which 
the monarchy treats many of the country’s parties. The palace ‘believes 
that it does not have permanent enemies, only political opponents’.82 Nor 
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does it seem to accept that it has any perpetual allies, just loyal subjects. 
While those groups which have shown it the most devotion over the years 
have undoubtedly accrued the greatest benefits, including being invited to 
contribute ministers to the largest number of governments, none has been 
allowed to assume the same position as the RCD. And, conversely, a few 
of the parties, not founded by palace stalwarts or which were initially a 
little more critical of the king, have been permitted to serve in govern-
ments provided they first accept the regime’s rules and restrictions. The 
palace’s actions were not wholly (or even mainly) motivated by a desire 
for fairness, a deep-seated belief that all groups should be treated the same. 
Rather, and as before, they were prompted by a careful political calcula-
tion. While, of course, the palace demands and rewards loyalty, it no more 
wants to be beholden to its friends than it does to its opponents. It opens 
its arms to many to avoid having to embrace a few. Alternance is both the 
doctrine and process by which this part of the policy is put into practice.
Indeed, and like their counterparts in Ben Ali’s Tunisia and Bouteflika’s 
Algeria, Morocco’s political parties must accept and operate within 
certain parameters if they want to participate in the political process. The 
most important of these are the centrality of the monarchy and Islam to 
public life and the inviolability of the country’s borders.83 Crucially, these 
restrictions confirm both the purpose and existence of competitive authori-
tarianism in the country. Political parties can be established. Elections are 
held. Competing groups are permitted to take part in them. Yet, to do so, 
they must first accept, without question or caveat, the monarch’s powers 
and prerogatives, Islam’s role, and the country’s claim to, and government 
of, the Western Sahara.
These conditions differ from the stipulations contained within Ben 
Ali’s National Pact in at least two important ways: in what they emphasise 
and the level of dogmatism with which they are asserted. Nevertheless, 
their overall function is broadly similar. One of their shared goals is to 
fortify the powers and position of the head of state. And another is to do 
so forcibly by constraining the country’s political imagination. Again, the 
National Pact is more subtle because it at least seems to invite, rather than 
compel, compliance. Yet, like the Moroccan conditions, it discouraged 
certain ideas and ways of thinking, ruled out particular possibilities and 
refused to countenance various reforms and changes.
One of the parties that has had to make the most compromises under 
Mohammed VI is the PJD. Over the past decade and a half, it has had to 
prove its loyalty to the crown to a greater extent than most of its rivals, 
and, arguably, the evidence as to its alleged perfidy and wrongdoing 
really warranted. Founded in 1997, it was initially willing to challenge 
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the new king over issues of policy to the extent that it helped orchestrate 
and lead the successful campaign to dissuade him from relaxing the 
Mudawana when he first proposed reforming the code. Its readiness and 
ability to continue doing so, however, were severely curtailed as a result 
of the 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings. Even though it was in no way 
involved in these attacks and despite its fierce and repeated denunciations 
of those who carried them out, it was placed under enormous suspicion 
and pressure. Powerful and popular arguments were made for it to be 
outlawed.
Yet, regardless of the injustice of much of what it was subjected to, 
the PJD did not resist or even strongly object to the treatment it received. 
Rather, it set about trying to rehabilitate its reputation by adopting a 
policy of appeasement and conciliation. While it continued to protest its 
innocence, it tried to ingratiate itself with both the palace and the public 
by humbly acquiescing to whatever unique and arbitrary constraints the 
regime put upon it, and by supporting most of the government’s major 
policy initiatives to the extent that, when, in the autumn of 2003, the king 
announced his intention to reconsider his earlier decision not to relax the 
Mudawana, it not only encouraged him to do so but supported the changes 
he eventually made to the code. And, to avoid fuelling popular concerns 
of a possible Islamist takeover, it agreed to field candidates in just 18 per 
cent of the country’s constituencies in the 2003 local elections.84 Nor did 
it seriously challenge either the gerrymandering or seat allocation of the 
2007 parliamentary ballot even though these measures prevented it from 
becoming the largest party in the House of Representatives despite it 
winning the greatest share of the vote.
Under King Mohammed VI, the regime has successfully tamed much 
of the mainstream opposition. Indeed, to become part of it, to be granted 
official recognition, allowed to participate in elections, permitted to serve 
in government, an organisation must first accept the regime’s rules. Yet, 
not all groups are prepared to. Some reject the current political order and 
refuse to comply. One of the largest and best-established groups to do so is 
the Justice and Benevolence Association (Justice et Bienfaisance/ Al-Adl 
Wal-Ihsan, AWI). Founded by Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine in 1987 and 
led since his death in 2012 by Mohammed Abbadi, the AWI is a Sufi-
influenced Islamist association. Its programme – which it both abides by 
and applies to everyone else – centres on three rejections: using ‘violent 
methods’, engaging in ‘clandestine activity’, and relying on foreign help 
‘including . . . funding’.85
On this basis, the AWI rejects parliamentary democracy as un-Islamic 
and the king’s claim to be Commander of the Faithful.86 It also calls for the 
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‘weakening or abolition of . . . [the] monarchy’ and for government ‘dic-
tated by Islamic law’.87 These views and objectives not only led to Yassine 
being placed under house arrest for over a decade and the sustained harass-
ment of some of his supporters but also resulted in the group being banned 
and its ‘requests to form a political party systematically’ turned down.88 
And, even though King Mohammed treats it a little more leniently than 
his father did, he still refuses to legalise it.89 By these means, the regime 
has been able to manage and contain the opposition posed by the AWI 
and other non-mainstream groups. Perhaps more crucially, though, the 
AWI is precisely the sort of organisation that drives the regime to practise 
 competitive authoritarianism.
Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Morocco’s transition to competitive authoritarianism was protracted. It 
began late in the reign of King Hassan II but was not concluded (achieved 
rather than finished) until after Mohammed VI had ascended to the throne. 
Under Hassan, the regime was, for the main part, stridently authoritar-
ian: reluctant to compromise, violent, a serial human rights abuser, to the 
extent that much of his reign overlaps with the so-called years of lead, 
an evocative depiction of a dark and difficult period in Morocco’s recent 
past that falls entirely within his tenure.90 In an effort to rehabilitate his 
regime’s reputation and appease domestic sentiment, Hassan latterly 
embraced the concept and process of alternance. A distinctly Moroccan 
approach to democracy, it remains a programme of reforms intended and 
designed ‘to allow the formation of governments based on any coalition of 
parties’, centre left as well as ‘loyalist right-wing’.91
The country’s first alternance election was held in November 1997 for 
the House of Representatives. It was won by the left-of-centre USFP with 
fifty-seven seats.92 The party’s leader, Abderrahmane Youssoufi, was duly 
invited by King Hassan to serve as his prime minister. On 23 July 1999, 
King Hassan died and was succeeded by his son, Mohammed VI. The 
new king embraced and consolidated the alternance reforms introduced 
by his father. In September 2002, Morocco staged its second alternance 
 election, also for the House of Representatives. Even though the USFP 
won the most seats again (fifty),93 King Mohammed asked the Minister 
of the Interior, Driss Jettou, who had stood as an independent, to become 
prime minister. The next two parliamentary elections (2007 and 2011) 
were won by the Istiqlal and PJD with 52 and 107 seats respectively. 
The leader of each – Abbas El Fassi and Abdelilah Benkirane – was 
 subsequently invited by the king to head the government.94
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The quality of these votes has gradually improved with each one 
that has passed.95 The 2007 vote was the first that international elec-
tion observers were allowed to monitor. They duly described it as ‘the 
most transparent in Moroccan history’. It also earned warm words from 
numerous Western governments and officials. The European Union’s 
High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, said that it con-
firmed ‘Morocco’s political maturity’. The Portuguese presidency of the 
European Council described the result as ‘testament to Morocco’s com-
mitment to the reform process’. And Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Miguel Angel Moratinos, even went so far as to proffer a positive inter-
pretation of the low voter turnout, arguing that it provided ‘proof that the 
elections were totally free’.96
International praise for the 2011 parliamentary election has been 
similarly fulsome. It was another important vote as it was the first held 
since the Arab Spring had begun. As such, it not only formed part of the 
regime’s response to the protests but was conducted in accordance with 
the new constitution that had been approved by referendum just a few 
months earlier.97 In response to the new constitution and election – the 
last held – France’s president, Nicholas Sarkozy, commended the king for 
showing and taking ‘the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern 
transformation of Moroccan institutions and society’.98 The European 
Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(FASP), Catherine Ashton, and Commissioner, Stefan Fule, similarly 
pronounced that the constitutional reforms the palace had instigated and 
introduced represented ‘a significant response to the legitimate aspirations 
of the Moroccan people’ and were in keeping ‘with Morocco’s Advanced 
Status with the EU’.99 And, speaking at the Opening Plenary of the US–
Morocco Strategic Dialogue in September 2012, US Secretary of State, 
Hillary Rodham Clinton, declared that Washington looked ‘to Morocco 
to be a leader and a model’ before commending the palace and regime for 
their ‘efforts to stay ahead’ of the ‘remarkable changes taking place across 
North Africa’ by ‘holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected 
parliament, [and] taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects 
the will of the people’.100
Yet, despite these improvements and this praise, the parliamentary 
elections held under King Mohammed VI have not been totally free and 
fair. The regime still practises gerrymandering to disadvantage and limit 
the gains made by parties it wishes to constrain. On 22 February 2007, 
the Council of Ministers (Conseil des Ministres, CM) ‘passed a new seat 
distribution requirement’, the purpose of which was ‘to limit the repre-
sentation of the party that was augured as victor . . . : the PJD’.101 Despite 
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winning the largest share of the vote in the 2007 House of Representatives 
election (10.9 per cent), the PJD received only the second highest number 
of seats (forty-six) in the chamber. The highest number (fifty-two) was 
secured by the second-placed Istiqlal (10.7 per cent) whose leader, Abbas 
El Fassi, was subsequently invited to become head of the new govern-
ment.102 The regime deliberately manipulated the country’s constituency 
boundaries to prevent the PJD from taking power.103
Another enduring problem is the inability of journalists and news 
outlets to investigate and report openly and free from fear on events and 
individuals. Even though the 1996 constitution guarantees freedom of 
expression (Article 9b) and the 2011 version expression, creation, pub-
lication, presentation (Article 25) and the press (Article 28), the regime 
continues to harass, intimidate and persecute reporters, editors, bloggers 
and outlets.104 Indeed, so numerous and serious have been the abuses 
perpetrated by the government that Morocco was ranked 130th (out of 
180 countries) in the Reporters Without Borders’ 2015 Press Freedom 
Index,105 the lowest place of any of the book’s four case studies.
Journalists, like opposition parties and politicians, are compelled to 
operate within fixed and inflexible parameters. Certain topics and issues 
are strictly off-limits upon pain of prosecution and/ or extra-legal intimida-
tion. Saying or writing anything critical of the monarch or causing him 
embarrassment, no matter how slight or justified, are completely forbid-
den. Querying either Islam’s role within Moroccan society or the palace’s 
interpretation of a particular religious matter is considered blasphemous 
and also outlawed. Questioning the country’s territorial integrity, includ-
ing the legitimacy of its claim to sovereignty over the Western Sahara or 
manner of its government of the region, is similarly prohibited. Journalists, 
editors and bloggers are routinely arrested for discussing, even briefly and 
seemingly benignly, these proscribed subjects.106
In October 2014, the Ministry of Communication belatedly responded 
to promises the regime had made during the 2011 constitutional referen-
dum by announcing its intention to introduce three new media bills on 
the freedom of the press, the rights and responsibilities of journalists, and 
the remit and powers of the National Press Council (Conseil National de 
la Presse, CNP).107 While these laws promised to help liberate the coun-
try’s news outlets from official interference and better protect reporters 
from prosecution and persecution, they still fell a long way short of what 
domestic and international campaigners had hoped for.
The substantive constraints in which Morocco’s news outlets have 
always had to work remain in place. The old prohibitions on criticising, or 
even discussing, the king, Western Sahara and Islam endure. Censorship 
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continues to be practised. The government retains the right to appoint 
the heads of the country’s television and radio stations. And, along with 
the prime minister and the presidents of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, it selects all eight members of the High Authority for 
Audio-Visual Communication (Haute Autorité de la Communication 
Audiovisuelle, HACA), the body which both licenses and monitors the 
output of these stations.108 Not only is the regime actively checking up 
on channels to make sure their programmes do not show or say anything 
of which it disapproves but it also has the capacity to revoke the official 
permissions they need to broadcast whenever it wants. And it can do the 
same to foreign-domiciled agencies operating in the country.
In 2010, it rescinded the accreditation of all journalists working for the 
Qatari-based news channel Al Jazeera, forcing the company’s in-country 
office to remain closed until April 2013. And, in 2012, it twice banned the 
Spanish newspaper El País for publishing material it thought denigrated 
the monarchy.109 Indeed, both the print and online media are subject to 
similar restrictions. The regime uses its control of advertising revenue 
and subsidies to put economic and financial pressure on independent news 
outlets. And, from time to time, it blocks access to online platforms – 
including websites, discussion forums, Instagram and parts of Skype – that 
are used to register and express criticism of the regime.110
As well as targeting media outlets, the regime actively and aggressively 
pursues individual journalists, editors and bloggers. It habitually brings 
defamation and other trumped-up charges – including for terrorism-
related offences – against those who cross it.111 Its purpose in doing so 
is always to punish, silence and discredit those who say anything it does 
not like, and to try to deter others from pursuing similar lines of enquiry. 
Its agents – police officers, soldiers and security services personnel – also 
occasionally attack and physically intimidate journalists. By these means, 
the regime has perpetuated the culture of self-censorship in which journal-
ists and news outlets have long been forced to live, work and operate.112 
So, even though elections are held regularly and their conduct is often 
praised by foreign governments, Morocco’s political playing field is far 
from level.
Moreover, and more importantly, these elections do not affect the 
established balance of power within the country’s political order. The king 
still sits squarely at the heart of public life. He performs three essential 
roles, meaning that his position is thrice protected. The first is spiritual. 
He claims direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad and has the title 
Commander of the Faithful (Amir al Mouminine).113 He is Morocco’s 
most senior religious figure and leader of its Muslims. The second is 
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political. He is head of the Moroccan state, its executive. And the third is 
legislative with a strong social element. Stemming from ‘the long history 
of tribal arbitration that the Sultans used to perform’, he is the coun-
try’s mediator-in-chief, its foremost peacemaker, the bringer together of 
 quarrelling parties, the settler of major disputes.114
In addition to affirming and protecting the king’s position within public 
life, these roles are mutually reinforcing. As Commander of the Faithful, 
both his person and his word are touched by the divine, invested with 
sacred significance. At the very least, this sanctity informs and colours the 
cultural context in which he performs his other functions. He discharges 
his political and legislative responsibilities against this backdrop, making 
it even harder for his interlocutors and adversaries to disagree with or 
oppose him. All his pronouncements and judgements bear the unmistak-
able scent of infallibility. Thus, his political and legislative powers are 
enhanced.115
His role as the country’s ultimate arbiter also offers significant subsidi-
ary benefits. Most notably, it grants him great manoeuvrability, enables 
him to remain above the political fray, to evade censure and criticism, yet 
still dominate proceedings and actors. So it is that he can ‘attack reformers 
and still present himself as their champion’, and ‘redirect any responsibil-
ity or accountability to the cabinet, its ministers, and the prime minister 
while maintaining his . . . power over’ them.116 Finally, as head of state, 
he can occupy, monitor and greatly influence the country’s political space 
in order to prevent and stymie any challenges to, or debates about, his 
other roles: whether the state and religion should be disestablished; and 
what involvement, if any, the monarchy should have in discussions and 
 disagreements in which it has clear interests and strong preferences.
In response to the Arab Spring, some of the king’s rights and powers 
have been clipped a little. Whereas Article 24 of the 1996 constitution – 
which was in force when the protests broke out – allowed him to appoint 
whomever he pleased as prime minister and to the cabinet irrespective of 
the outcome of any election,117 Article 47 of the new 2011 constitution 
requires him to fill these positions from the ranks of the party that won the 
most votes (arrivé en tête des élections).118 And, unlike before when there 
were no ‘significant constitutional restrictions’ on the king’s ability to 
dispense with individual members of the cabinet, the government (Article 
24, 1996) or parliament (Article 27, 1996),119 now he must at least talk to 
the prime minister (après consultation du Chef du Gouvernement) before 
acting (Article 47, 2011).120
Indeed, the extension and fortification of the premier’s rights and 
responsibilities are arguably the most significant series of changes 
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contained within the 2011 constitution. And it represents a very Moroccan 
response to the Arab Spring and the resultant clamour for political lib-
eralisation. For, rather than rescind and reallocate any of the monarch’s 
more notable powers, he is required – politely requested and encouraged 
in many instances – to share them with the prime minister. Changes are 
made, the king’s prerogatives are curtailed and those of the people’s 
elected representatives are enhanced but without inflicting any great 
loss of face on him or, more importantly, fundamentally weakening his 
 position within the country’s political order.
Indeed, these reforms are something of a trompe l’œil because they 
look more significant than they actually are. Save for one or two genuine 
limitations and alterations, the king’s powers are largely the same as they 
were before. Moreover, the 2011 constitution preserves his three main 
roles – spiritual, political and legislative – and, in so doing, reaffirms his 
centrality to Moroccan public life.
He still presides over the Council of Ministers, Morocco’s most 
important policy-formulating body with responsibility for – among other 
things – setting the legislative agenda, amending the constitution, over-
seeing the national budget, assessing all bills related to the armed forces, 
granting amnesties, declaring war, and appointing the head of the Bank 
Al-Maghrib, ambassadors, regional governors (walis) and the leaders of 
various other strategic establishments and enterprises (Article 48). He still 
presides over the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Conseil Supérieur du 
Pouvoir Judiciaire, CSPJ) and appoints – by royal decree – all the coun-
try’s judges and magistrates (Articles 56 and 57). He is still the Supreme 
Head of the Royal Armed Forces (Chef Suprême des Forces Armées 
Royales, CSFAR) (Article 53). He still presides over the Superior Council 
of the Ulema (Conseil Supérieur des Oulémas, CSO), the only body 
empowered to comment on those religious matters he asks it to consider 
(Article 41). He is still Commander of the Faithful (Article 41), head of 
state, its supreme representative, guarantor of its permanence and conti-
nuity and supreme arbiter between its institutions, and the symbol of the 
nation’s unity (Article 42). He appoints six of the Constitutional Court’s 
(Cour Constitutionelle, CC) twelve members including its president 
(Article 130). And he now presides over the recently created Superior 
Council of Security (Conseil Supérieur de Sécurité, CSS) which over-
sees both the country’s security and management of any crises that arise 
(Article 54).121
Despite King Mohammed’s rejection of some of his father’s more 
authoritarian ways and the constitutional reforms that were introduced 
to appease the Arab Spring protestors, the monarch’s powers remain 
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extensive and, in many instances, decisive. Yet, for all that, democratic 
institutions exist, procedures and processes are adhered to, and preten-
sions are maintained. The king may be unwilling to relinquish his pre-
rogatives but he is still prepared to allow some democracy to take place 
and does not want to be thought of as authoritarian. Multiparty legislative 
elections and other votes, therefore, are regularly held.
Conclusions
Morocco presents a difficult and challenging case, not least because it 
appears to defy Levitsky and Way’s model. They, in fact, reject it as a pos-
sible country study on the grounds that too much power is invested in its 
unelected executive. As a result, political life is subject to ‘dynamics not 
found under competitive authoritarianism’.122 Their charge is not without 
merit. The king’s powers are great and he does not have to make many 
of the disparate, desperate calculations that so perplex and preoccupy his 
presidential peers. He never has to submit to the vote. His position is not 
up for regular renegotiation (even if the terms of the debate are heavily 
loaded and the outcome little in doubt). The institution of the monarchy is 
as secure as he is within it.
Yet he cannot escape the ballot entirely. While descriptions of him as 
‘constitutional’ are certainly misplaced – since his powers fundamentally 
exceed those of most other,123 similarly titled royal heads of state – the 
conduct and outcome of elections, especially national ones, still matter 
enormously to him,124 for they not only affect the international standing 
of his regime but also determine the level of domestic influence attained 
by groups and parties seeking to curtail his power and authority. While 
the institution of the monarchy may well be free from any real danger, 
the king wants more. His ambition is not limited to simply defending the 
throne’s existence. He wants to preserve its substantive powers, to avoid 
becoming a largely ceremonial figure, being reduced to the role of well-
bred ribbon cutter.
This desire is the primary cause of Morocco’s competitive authoritari-
anism. The regime holds regular elections because it feels that it must. It 
is sensitive to international opinion, to maintaining and strengthening its 
good relations with the West. Partly as a result, it is willing to address 
some domestic demands for democratic rights and civil liberties. Yet it 
remains determined to defend the monarchy’s substantive powers. As 
a result, it organises elections that are neither free nor fair, and tilts the 
political playing field decisively in its own favour. The Moroccan regime 
is competitive authoritarian because it believes that its existence depends 
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on preserving this deeply imperfect and weighted democratic process. 
The Moroccan regime is competitive authoritarian because it manipulates 
democracy to prevent groups and parties that want to constitutionalise the 
monarchy from extending their influence.
In this way, Morocco makes a valuable addition to the pantheon of 
competitive authoritarian case studies for it shows that, with a little care, 
Levitsky and Way’s model can be applied to regimes in which unelected 
executives hold power. It also offers a clear exposition of leverage, par-
ticularly the interplay between pressure and resistance. The United States, 
European Union and various European countries have enormous influence 
over Morocco. Over the past twenty years, it has enthusiastically joined a 
succession of policy frameworks that have granted Washington, Brussels, 
Paris and Madrid both the right and the means to ask and compel Rabat to 
change its political and economic behaviour. Yet, despite these means, the 
West still has only low leverage over Morocco, in part because Western 
governments have shown themselves reluctant and unable to press the 
country too hard or to co-ordinate better their actions with one another. 
Primarily, though, it is because Morocco has a large economy. And, as a 
result, it has the economic means to withstand and mitigate whatever pres-
sure the West is willing and able to bring to bear.
The Moroccan regime also makes an important addendum to the 
dimension of organisational power. Rather than nurture a single party to 
the point of overbearing dominance – as did Ben Ali with the RCD – it has 
cultivated numerous groups. In so doing, by dispersing limited amounts of 
power and prestige more widely across the political system, it has avoided 
becoming overly reliant on any one party. This means that no group can 
easily accrue sufficient influence and resources either to dominate its rivals 
or, more crucially, put real pressure on the palace. Moreover, because 
parties are compelled to compete for what opportunities and means 
there are, the regime is better able to play them off against each other, 
make them scrap among themselves rather than challenge its authority. 
This strategy was also employed – albeit less widely and explicitly – by 
President Bouteflika. That the Moroccan and Algerian regimes should 
do so – the two examined by this book in which unelected institutions 
(the monarchy and military) wield extensive political power – is telling, 
for, seemingly, the presence of these institutions at least partially liber-
ates these countries’ political leaders from having to establish, develop 
and rely upon ruling parties. They can afford to forgo such organisations 
and, as a result, manage and control their respective political systems in 
 different ways from those outlined by Levitsky and Way.
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Mauritania presents a quite different explanatory challenge from Morocco. 
For, unlike its near neighbour, Nouakchott seems to offer a near textbook 
exposition of Levitsky and Way’s ideas and arguments, starting with their 
foundational observation that not all political transitions ‘lead to democ-
racy’.1 The country’s 2005 turn towards more liberal and open government 
proved to be short-lived and, over the course of the next couple of years, 
it steadily regressed into authoritarianism, albeit of a more competitive 
form. That the self-installed Military Council for Justice and Democracy 
(Le Conseil Militaire pour la Justice et la Démocratie, CMJD) felt obliged 
to launch this experiment at all was mainly due to the political and eco-
nomic pressure Western governments were beginning to put on them for 
having ousted their long-time ally, President Maayouya Ould Sidi Ahmed 
Taya. Anxious to avoid the imposition of any further sanctions, the CMJD 
quickly sought to mollify the West. On this occasion, therefore, the threat 
of further Western pressure succeeded in altering the regime’s behaviour, 
in making it democratise, in creating the political opening.
Yet the speed with which this opportunity passed continues to raise 
difficult questions about the true extent of the West’s support for this 
democratic turn and leverage over the regime. Western governments may 
have been pleasantly surprised by the course of events but their optimism 
has proved insufficient to sustain the country’s experiment with democ-
racy. This, by extension, generates doubts about how much influence 
they actually have over Nouakchott because they have failed to discipline 
subsequent governments into respecting and consolidating these earlier 
reforms. Why, if they have been able to make the regime democratise 
once, have they not done so again? Is this failure due to disinterest, 
 incompetence or inability? 
Then there were the causes of the West’s ire, of the irritation and 
anger which prompted the regime to make these changes. While Western 
governments welcomed Nouakchott’s democratic turn, their pleasure 
stemmed, at least in part, from their surprise. They did not expect it to 
respond in this way. Nor, crucially, did they demand that it do so. On the 
contrary, the regime took the initiative by introducing reforms calculated 
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to appeal to Western sensibilities and prevent the imposition of any further 
sanctions. It felt compelled to do so because of the West’s reaction to the 
removal of President Taya. So, while Western governments might have 
successfully disciplined Nouakchott into becoming more democratic, they 
did not instigate the reform process and initially demanded the reinstate-
ment of a fairly authoritarian leader who had held power continuously 
for more than two decades.2 The West’s leverage over the regime might 
have been medium but its democratic intent – to begin with at least – was 
decidedly low.
For Desha Girod and Meir Walters, the West’s initial disinterest in 
Mauritania’s democratic turn exposes an important explanatory blind 
spot within the transition literature and Levitsky and Way’s model. They 
contend that the country’s experiences defy at least two of the literature’s 
key conventions. The first, which Levitsky and Way express and, there-
fore, reinforce, holds ‘that Western strategic interests in states with crucial 
natural resources . . . or vital security ties . . . trump democracy promotion 
efforts’.3 Mauritania is just such a country. Its generous deposits of iron 
ore and oil and established role as a bulwark against illegal migration to 
Europe and Islamist terrorism within North Africa make it an important 
regional partner for the West.4
And the second is that low levels and slow rates of modernisation often 
mean that there is little domestic pressure for greater democratisation.5 
Girod and Walters point to the high incidence of poverty in the country as 
one important indicator of its underdevelopment. In addition, they observe 
that successive regimes have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to 
ignore popular demands, such as breaking ‘diplomatic ties with Israel’.6 
So, even if domestic pressure for democratisation was stronger, there are 
still no guarantees that those in power would respond in kind. On this 
basis, Girod and Walters conclude, Mauritania’s democratic turn seems 
to defy conventional wisdom and, in so doing, pose a serious problem for 
Levitsky and Way’s model.
But what of the turn’s brevity? Within just a few years, many of the 
democratising reforms which had been introduced had either fallen into 
abeyance or been undone. Certainly, the promise the country seemed to 
show in 2007 has not been maintained or replicated. And, more funda-
mentally, what of Levitsky and Way’s emphasis that ‘Western powers 
have exerted little democratizing pressure on major energy producers . . . 
or states that are deemed strategically important’ (emphasis added)? 7 The 
active element in this observation is crucial for, while Western govern-
ments might not always press for greater political liberalisation if they 
deem the potential risks and losses too high, that does not mean they will 
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try to stop such transitions from happening without them or oppose those 
that succeed. On the contrary, Mauritania’s turn shows that the West is 
only too willing to accept serendipitous democratic turns.
Girod and Walters, therefore, are only partly right. While the West’s 
strategic interests in Mauritania remain a critical influence on its politi-
cal development, they do not invalidate Levitsky and Way’s model, 
render it unable to explain what is happening there. On the contrary, 
and as this chapter shows, the country closely conforms to their thesis. 
Crucially, the United States and European Union have only medium 
linkage to Mauritania. This means that, despite their medium leverage 
over Nouakchott and occasional application of significant liberalising 
pressure, they do not consistently press the regime to democratise and are 
often satisfied if it holds ‘minimally acceptable elections’.8 As a result, 
the regime’s medium organisational power is sufficient to maintain the 
country’s competitive authoritarian order and prevent the onset of unsta-
ble authoritarianism, a sometime consequence for states with less capable 
governments.9
Like Morocco and Algeria, Mauritania both entered and emerged from 
the Arab Spring competitive authoritarian. Unlike its near neighbours, 
however, it did so for different reasons. Whereas Rabat and Algiers had 
sufficient organisational power to resist whatever democratising pressure 
local protestors and the West could put on them, Nouakchott benefited 
from Western inattention born of its weaker links. Moreover, Mauritania’s 
transition to competitive authoritarianism started from a different point 
on the political compass. Unlike its neighbours, the Mauritanian regime 
became less, not more, democratic, discarding or compromising the liber-
alising reforms that had recently been introduced rather than offering new 
(albeit severely constrained) electoral opportunities.
To sustain this analysis and facilitate Mauritania’s comparison with 
its near neighbours, this chapter is structured along the same lines as 
each of Levitsky and Way’s original cases and this book’s other country 
studies. The first examines the strength of Mauritania’s economic, inter-
governmental, technocratic, social, information and civil society links to 
the United States and the European Union. The second section begins by 
assessing the extent of the West’s leverage over Nouakchott before con-
sidering the lasting effects of the Black Knight patronage the regime once 
received. The third section then measures the regime’s organisational 
strength, the scope and cohesion of both its security apparatus and ruling 
party, and how much control it exercises over the country’s economy. 





Overall, Mauritania has medium links to the United States and the 
European Union. It has stronger connections in some categories (intergov-
ernmental and economic) than in others (technocratic, social, information 
and civil society). Moreover, its ties to the US and EU have grown both 
in number and quality over the past twenty years. Since the rapid and irre-
trievable decline of its Black Knight patron (Iraq) in the early 1990s, suc-
cessive regimes have consistently sought closer relations with the West. 
Nevertheless, its connections to the United States and European Union are 
not as numerous and robust as those of its northern neighbours, including 
Algeria, the other case study with medium-strength links.
Like Tunisia and Morocco, Mauritania is a member of the MEPI, the 
BMENA and the UfM. And, unlike any of its neighbours, it is a core par-
ticipant – along with Mali and Niger – in the European Union’s Strategy 
for Security and Development in the Sahel (SSDS). Launched in March 
2011, the SSDS’s longer-term goals include ‘enhancing political stability, 
security, good governance, social cohesion . . . economic and education 
opportunities’ in the region’s countries so that they might ‘prosper and no 
longer be . . . potential safe haven[s] for AQIM and criminal networks’.10 
And, like Morocco, it was admitted to the Millennium Corporation 
Challenge in 2007.11
Since the United States and European Union relaunched their respec-
tive aid programmes to the country – after suspending them in retaliation 
for the military’s overthrow of President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi 
in August 2008 – Mauritania has been granted significant amounts of 
development and other support. Between 2009 and 2015, it was awarded 
$43.93 million in financial assistance by the United States, more than 
Algeria (which received $43.23 million over the same period) and more 
per capita than Morocco.12 And, between 2010 and 2013,13 it was given 
€209.3 million by the EU under the tenth European Development Fund 
(EDF).14 Some of this money (€22 million) was disbursed as part of the 
SSDS to which was added a further €1.2 million by the Instrument for 
Stability (IfS).15
Nevertheless, Mauritania has still not entered into as many agreements 
with the West as Tunisia, Morocco or even Algeria. It was expelled from 
the MCC as a consequence of the 2008 coup d’état.16 It has not signed any 
sort of free trade agreement with the United States. It does not receive any 
Foreign Military Financing credits from Washington. It has not joined the 
EMP, the ENP or the PfDSP. It has not concluded an association agree-
ment or an action plan with the European Union. And it has not been given 
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any MEDA I or II or SPRING funding. Its relations with the United States 
and the European Union, therefore, are conducted outside most of the 
policy frameworks to which its neighbours belong.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this difference is reflected in Mauritania’s 
economic relations with the West. Like its neighbours, its commercial 
links to the United States and European Union are important and improv-
ing. Between 2004 and 2014, the total value of its trade with the EU more 
than doubled from €734 million to €1.6 billion.17 And, while starting from 
a much lower level, its trade with the US has grown at an even faster 
rate. Between 2000 and 2004, the annual average value of the country’s 
exports to the United States was just $122,010.18 Between 2005 and 2009, 
that amount fell even lower to $82,521.19 Then, between 2010 and 2014, 
it leapt to $5.52 million.20 And the value of the country’s imports from 
the United States has also grown exponentially over this period. Between 
2000 and 2004, their annual average value was $30.79 million.21 Between 
2005 and 2009, that amount more than doubled to $75.89 million.22 And, 
between 2010 and 2014, it nearly quadrupled again to $275.2 million.23
This growth has been mirrored by similar increases in the amount 
of FDI in the country. Between 1995 and 1999, Mauritania attracted an 
average of $36.95 million of investment a year.24 Between 2000 and 2004, 
that amount soared to $135.53 million.25 Then, between 2005 and 2009,26 
it more than doubled again to $289.55 million before leaping to $807.84 
million between 2010 and 2013.27 Just as they are to Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco, therefore, the European Union and United States are two of 
Mauritania’s most important economic collaborators. Yet neither of them 
dominates commercial activity with the country to quite the same extent 
that the European Union does with Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. While 
Mauritania might import more goods from Europe than anywhere else 
(37.6 per cent), its biggest export market, by some margin, is China (45.3 
per cent). So, even though the EU is Nouakchott’s top trading partner, 
China is its close second (30.7 per cent).28 Mauritania’s economic links to 
the West may be strong but they are not as strong as those of each of its 
northern neighbours.
This comparative difference is mirrored in the global distribution of the 
country’s diaspora. As of 2012, there were 198,307 Mauritanians living 
and working abroad out of a total population of 3.77 million.29 And like 
the hundreds of thousands of Tunisians, Algerians and Moroccans who do 
the same, they continue to make vital economic, political and social contri-
butions back home. In 2006, they remitted $103 million which amounted 
to 3.9 percent of the country’s total GDP.30 And, in accordance with Article 
47 of the constitution, they elect three of the Senate’s 56 members.31
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A significant number of these migrants are based in the West, mainly 
in France (13,699) and Spain (10,821). Nevertheless, the vast majority 
(145,000) live elsewhere in Africa. So, while Mauritania may have a large 
diaspora like its neighbours, most of its expatriates do not reside in Europe 
and North America. This difference both reflects and reinforces the coun-
try’s weaker links to the United States and the European Union compared 
to those of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Fewer Mauritanians live in the 
United States and Europe because the country has not joined several key 
Western policy frameworks. As a result, the country’s human connec-
tion to the West is not as strong. And this bond has been undermined still 
further of late by the fall in tourist numbers caused by the ‘general threat 
from terrorism, including kidnapping’.32 Indeed, the famous Paris–Dakar 
car rally has not been staged in the country (or even Africa) since 2007.33
With fewer of its nationals living and working in the United States 
and European Union, Mauritania’s technocratic links to the West are also 
weaker than those of its northern neighbours. Both in total and proportion-
ally, not as many Mauritanians are learning and acquiring the attitudes and 
skills that will encourage them to remain emotionally and intellectually 
connected to where they studied, and diffuse democracy when they return 
home. And, of those who are based in Europe and North America, very 
few are students. Indeed, most are ‘men . . . with a low level of  education 
. . . employed in low skilled occupations, including elementary jobs . . . 
[such] as service workers . . . shop and market sales workers . . . craft 
and related trades workers . . . and . . . plant and machine operators and 
assemblers’.34
Mauritanians also have weaker information links to the West than other 
Maghreb populations. While the country has experienced some growth in 
Internet and mobile phone use over the past fifteen years, this increase has 
not been as rapid or widespread as that of its neighbours. In 2000, just 0.2 
per cent of its inhabitants had access to the World Wide Web, a smaller 
proportion than that of Tunisia (2.8 percent), Algeria (0.5 per cent) and 
Morocco (0.7 per cent). By 2005, this figure had crept up to 0.7 per cent 
before rising more quickly to 4 per cent by 2010, and 6.2 per cent by 2013. 
By then, however, the gap in access between Mauritania and its neigh-
bours had grown into a chasm, with 43.8 per cent of Tunisians, 16.5 per 
cent of Algerians and 56 per cent of Moroccans able to go online.35
And, while the spread in mobile phone use across the Maghreb has 
been more consistent, Mauritania still lags a little behind most of its neigh-
bours. In 2000, the number of people subscribing to a cell phone service 
was roughly the same throughout the region; 1 per cent of Mauritanians 
and Tunisians, 8 per cent of Moroccans and virtually no Algerians. By 
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2005, 24 per cent of Mauritania’s populace had a contract, and then 77 per 
cent by 2010 and 103 per cent by 2013. This dramatic growth, though, was 
more than matched in most other countries, with subscription rates of 116 
per cent in Tunisia, 101 per cent in Algeria and 129 per cent in Morocco 
in 2013.36
Perhaps inevitably, with fewer of its nationals living in the West, 
Mauritania’s civil society links to the United States and European Union 
are not as numerous and strong as those of its neighbours. Moreover, 
because it does not belong to the EMP, the ENP or the PfDSP, and does 
not receive any MEDA or SPRING funding, its groups and organisations 
are not eligible to access certain sources of EU money, most notably the 
CSF. Of course, there are organisations in Europe and North America that 
cater to parts of this smaller, cross-border population, and West-based net-
works that collaborate with local, Mauritanian partners but not nearly as 
many as work with Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan émigrés, groups and 
bodies. Indeed, and tellingly, Mauritania is the only Maghreb country that 
is not part of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network.37
Leverage
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in the light of these weaker links, the West’s 
leverage over Mauritania is middling rather than high. With a GDP of 
just $5.061 billion, the country has neither a large nor medium-sized 
economy.38 Pumping only 6,000 barrels of crude oil a day during the 
course of an average year, it is not a major or intermediate oil producer.39 
It does not possess, or have easy access to, nuclear weapons. And, without 
the backing of a Black Knight patron, it is not well placed to resist what-
ever democratising pressure the West might put on it. Indeed, the only 
one of Levitsky and Way’s criteria the country satisfies, is the persistence 
of ‘a major security-related foreign-policy issue for the United States’ 
and European Union within its territory.40 This alone reduces the West’s 
 leverage from high to medium.
In actual fact, Mauritania is vital to at least two such issues. The first 
is the same as that which continues to mark the West’s relations with the 
region’s other countries: the existence and activities of Islamist terror 
groups within and across its borders. Between October 2004 and January 
2010, at least thirteen serious attacks were carried out there, mainly by 
AQIM.41 The high number of incidents – which included shootings, bomb-
ings and abductions – and the inability of Mauritania’s armed and security 
forces adequately to protect the country’s territory and resources,42 have 
prompted the United States, the European Union and individual European 
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governments to provide Nouakchott with significant security-related assis-
tance. It is a member of the US-sponsored Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP), the UN-recognised Middle East and North Africa 
Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), and the EU–Arab Maghreb 
Union’s 5 + 5 Initiative.43 Through these programmes, its armed and 
 security forces have been provided with money, equipment and training.
And the second security-related foreign-policy issue is migration, 
and Mauritania’s dual role as ‘receiver of “returned” migrants from 
Europe and . . . as “returner” of sub-Saharan migrants who may attempt to 
proceed’ there.44 Again, the importance of these functions has increased 
markedly as a result of the Arab Spring. As one of the region’s less-
affected countries, Mauritania is still in a position to play these parts in a 
way in which Libya no longer easily can. Moreover, the instability which 
was generated by the Arab Spring, along with that caused by the civil war 
in Mali and the ongoing unrest in northern Nigeria and elsewhere, have led 
to an increase in the number of people trying to enter Europe by irregular 
means. Partly as a result, and because of the vast and still unfolding human 
tragedy in Syria and northern Iraq, European Union governments and 
 citizenries are now acutely sensitive to the issue of migration.
The centrality of these issues to the West’s relationship with Mauritania 
does not mean that the dangers posed by the country are significantly 
greater than those presented by its neighbours. Rather, the United States’ 
and European Union’s dealings with it are not as deep and diverse as their 
interactions with Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. These issues, therefore, 
only appear more important in Mauritania’s case because its links to the 
United States and European Union are fewer and weaker.
Moreover, the United States and European Union have been far more 
willing to use their leverage over Mauritania than they have over Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco. Of course, their influence over Algiers and Rabat 
is only low. Yet, even so, they have consistently refrained from pressing 
either of these regimes as hard as they could. And they certainly did not 
maximise their high leverage over Ben Ali. Nouakchott, in contrast, has 
been repeatedly disciplined, with Washington and Brussels (and other 
Western governments) suspending their aid programmes to the country 
after both the 2005 and 2008 coups d’état. And, in response to the HCE’s 
overthrow of President Abdallahi, it was expelled from the MCC and 
barred from receiving any Foreign Military Financing credits.45
Mauritania’s ability and willingness to withstand and resist Western 
pressure are further complicated by the Black Knight patronage it used 
to receive from Libya, Syria and, in particular, Iraq.46 Or, perhaps more 
accurately, given the United States’ and European Union’s sustained 
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disinclination to try to make Nouakchott democratise, its relationship 
with the West is still affected by the now long-ended support it received 
from Damascus, Tripoli and Baghdad. This patronage did not last for very 
long – a few years in the early 1990s – and was not especially expansive 
in form, mainly military equipment and some financial assistance and dip-
lomatic support. And, at least some of what was provided was ‘driven by 
status rivalries’ as Libya and Syria sought to match Iraq’s beneficence and 
reinforce their own claims to be leading Arab powers.47
Nevertheless, this patronage has profoundly affected both Mauritania’s 
relations with the West and political development over the past two 
decades. First, it helped establish Nouakchott’s dependence on outside 
help. Since then, the regime has remained reliant on (mainly Western) 
donor assistance, and on international financial and technical support 
to launch and sustain many of the country’s most ambitious develop-
ment programmes.48 Second, it antagonised the West. While Taya was 
mindful not to accede to all Saddam Hussein’s requests and offers – which 
included allowing the Iraqi army to test fire surface-to-air missiles in the 
Mauritanian Sahara and provide the members of his personal bodyguard 
– he was still sufficiently friendly towards Baghdad to anger and alienate 
Western governments;49 hardly surprising given that they went to war with 
Iraq in January 1991. And third, it has, as a result of these other effects, 
led Nouakchott to adopt a policy of appeasement towards the West. Taya 
and his successors have anxiously sought to repair and strengthen their 
relations with the United States and Europe, not least because they have 
needed to find new sources of development assistance to make up for 
that which Iraq stopped providing. To the extent that Taya was even pre-
pared to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, an act that was deeply 
unpopular at home and led most of the country’s Arab donors promptly to 
withdraw their support to Nouakchott.
Indeed, perhaps the most significant long-term consequence of the 
Black Knight patronage Mauritania received from Libya, Syria and 
Iraq, certainly the most paradoxical, has been the inexorable growth in 
Nouakchott’s dependence on the West. To the extent that the regime is 
now acutely sensitive to Western opinions and attitudes, and eager and 
committed, through the weight of past compromises, current obligations 
and near-future ambitions, to satisfy them. As a result of once accepting 
help from Saddam Hussein, the country has felt obliged to try to win and 
retain the West’s support by means of sustained supplication. As a result 
of this strategy, Mauritania no longer has or wants the backing of (another) 
Black Knight patron.
Yet the United States’ and European Union’s disciplining of Mauritania 
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– the exercise of their leverage – is also marked by several inconsistencies. 
These tensions lie less between the US and EU, whose ‘relationship . . . 
has been described as . . . one of “cooperation and division of labour” ’, 
and more in the countermeasures they have taken against the regime and 
continue to enforce.50 In response to the 2008 coup, Washington refused 
to grant Nouakchott any FMF credits. This prohibition was aimed directly 
at the military – at least part of which was responsible for the overthrow 
of President Abdallahi – and is still in force today. Yet, at the same time, 
Mauritania was allowed to remain in the TSCTP and became one of the 
‘core Sahelian states and . . . focus of’ the EU’s SSDS which was launched 
soon thereafter.51 The tension, therefore, derives from Western govern-
ments’ willingness to punish the regime and desire to make sure it can 
still effectively combat their common enemies: the Islamist terrorists. 
Furthermore, these inconsistencies do not seem to have greatly impaired 
their ability to discipline Nouakchott.
Organisational Power
Unlike any of the other regimes examined here, Nouakchott has only 
medium-low organisational power. Even though it continues to exer-
cise a fair degree of control over the country’s economy, its coercive 
apparatus and ruling party both have middling scope and low cohesion. 
Paradoxically, some of the greatest constraints on the armed and security 
forces are of their own making, the result of their prolonged involvement 
in Mauritanian politics. Six of the country’s nine heads of state since inde-
pendence have been either serving or recently retired army officers. And, 
to date, military-led coups d’état have brought more administrations to 
an end than any other process. Not one of the country’s leaders has been 
voted out of office by the electorate.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the backgrounds of so many heads of 
state and the ways in which they acquired power, which gave them a keen 
appreciation of the military’s political import and the need to keep its 
officers and personnel onside, government investment in the armed forces 
over the past two decades has increased steadily. Between 1995 and 1999, 
the regime spent each year an average of 2.4 per cent of the country’s 
GDP on the armed forces. Between 2000 and 2004, this allocation rose 
markedly to 3.4 per cent before falling slightly to 3.3 per cent between 
2005 and 2009. And, between 2010 and 2014, it climbed again to 3.9 per 
cent. This means that, in real terms, government spending on defence over 
this period has quadrupled from $37.3 million in 1995 to $150.3 million 
in 2014.52 This funding supports a military of 15,850 soldiers, sailors and 
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airmen,53 and five thousand gendarmes and National Guards, one of the 
largest per capita forces in the region.54
This investment, and the financial and other assistance provided by the 
United States and Europe, ensure that Mauritania’s armed and security 
forces are able to conduct low-intensity operations in most of the coun-
try’s urban centres. In the months immediately following both the 2008 
coup d’état and the start of the Arab Spring, they successfully contained 
and dispersed many of the protests and rallies staged in Nouakchott, 
Maghama, Zouerate and elsewhere. They also occasionally arrest and 
harass journalists and opposition figures.55 Nevertheless, they still strug-
gle to maintain an effective presence outside the main towns and cities. 
Much of their equipment is outdated while a lack of air transport means 
they cannot easily monitor and police large swathes of the country’s vast 
territory.56 The seriousness of these limitations is confirmed by both the 
number of terror attacks carried out over the past decade and the level of 
support being provided by the West.
This investment is also insufficient to counteract the huge damage the 
military’s repeated interventions in the political process has caused its 
cohesion. These coups have not only established and reinforced a prec-
edent that normalises and legitimises the seizure of power but has also 
helped factionalise the armed forces. Four of the six coups d’état which 
have been carried out since independence were launched by army offic-
ers against other army officers who had themselves seized power. And 
even though Colonel Vall came to support Abdel Aziz’s intervention, 
the HCE’s removal of Abdallahi was an at least partial repudiation of the 
CMJD’s efforts and legacy.
The debilitating effect of political power on the armed forces’ unity is 
exacerbated by the absence of any significant non-material ties. Unlike 
its Algerian and Moroccan counterparts, the Mauritanian military does 
not have any recent glorious campaigns upon which to build an esprit de 
corps: quite the reverse, in fact, since it was defeated by Polisario,57 and its 
recent successes against AQIM are largely the result of the extensive and 
sustained help it has been given by the West.58
The party set-up in Mauritania is also different from those in Algeria, 
Morocco and Ben Ali’s Tunisia. Unlike Algiers and Rabat, Nouakchott is 
supported by a more conventional ruling party: the Union for the Republic 
(Union pour la République, UR). The UR commands a small majority in 
the National Assembly which is augmented by the other members of the 
ruling coalition. Together they control 75 per cent of the seats giving the 
regime considerable influence over what parliament ponders, proposes 
and promulgates. Yet, unlike Ben Ali’s RCD, the UR has far less influence 
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over the rest of the political system. It does not have a mass membership 
so cannot easily mobilise large portions of the population. It is not particu-
larly popular in some parts of the country, most notably the south. And it 
must compete – for candidates, members and voters – with other, older, 
better-established groups. Its lack of deeper and wider roots reflects its 
origins, for it was established only in 2009 to help Abdel Aziz compete 
in the presidential election. It remains, therefore, a top-down creation, an 
electoral vessel, a means by which the regime can influence the National 
Assembly more effectively.
Despite the regime’s reduced coercive capacity and lesser party 
strength, the ruling elite continues to exercise significant control over the 
country’s economy. Since President Taya launched his strategy to repo-
sition Mauritania as an ally of the West, successive governments have, 
with fluctuating enthusiasm, introduced a range of liberalising reforms.59 
While these changes have helped to attract more foreign investment,60 
large parts of the economy remain unreconstructed. ‘Less formal state 
intervention’ has not led to ‘better state intervention or less informal state 
intervention’,61 to the extent that the country was ranked 176th (out of 
189  countries) in the World Bank’s 2015 Doing Business Index.62
This lack of fundamental reform is both a cause and an effect of the 
local elite’s continuing economic influence. It emerged from the 2008 
coup d’état mostly unchanged and with its interests largely intact. Indeed, 
its durability provides perhaps the clearest confirmation of the strength of 
its links to the new regime. Its members ‘control most of the sectors of 
the market economy, including transport, banking, telecommunications, 
food imports, and construction’. The ‘ “four-firm concentration ratio for 
the imports of wheat and sugar tops 90 percent” ’ while the ‘ “two firms 
[that] dominate . . . rice imports . . . [have] a combined market share of 
80 percent” ’.63 The regime also dominates, by means of the state-owned 
National Industrial and Mining Company (Société Nationale Industrielle 
et Minière, SNIM), the extractive industries sector which currently 
generates just over half (50.12 per cent) of the country’s total export 
earnings.64
The regime’s ability to control and influence the country’s politics is 
enhanced by the continuing disunity of its domestic rivals. Serious efforts 
have been made by opposition leaders in the wake of the 2008 coup d’état 
to co-ordinate better the activities of those groups hostile to Abdel Aziz’s 
takeover. A National Front for the Defence of Democracy (Front National 
Pour la Defénse de la Démocratie, FNDD) was quickly formed by four 
of the main opposition parties to defend both President Abdallahi’s claim 
to power and his person, and, subsequently, help set the conditions in 
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which the 2009 presidential election was conducted. Eleven parties then 
established the Coordination of Democratic Opposition (Coordination 
de l’Opposition Démocratique, COD) coalition which organised fairly 
successful boycotts of the 2013 parliamentary and 2014 presidential elec-
tions. And, just as they were in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, the Arab 
Spring protests in Mauritania soon came to be orchestrated by an umbrella 
body called the February 25th Movement (Mouvement du 25 Février, 
MVCF).
To date, these bodies have met with some success. The FNDD was able 
to wring a number of notable concessions out of the HCE over the conduct 
of the 2008 election and help ensure that no serious harm befell Abdallahi. 
The COD has not only held together but was able to undermine the legiti-
macy of the 2014 ballot by persuading thousands of Mauritanian voters 
not to participate. And the MVCF has sustained itself and, in so doing, 
become an important voice on youth issues. Yet, despite their individual 
and combined efforts, these coalitions have not stopped Abdel Aziz from 
strengthening his grip on power. Moreover, they have never commanded 
the support of all of the country’s opposition groups and parties.
For, in truth, the 2008 coup was not met with universal or consistent 
condemnation. Even though they initially refused to serve in the regime-
sponsored government, three of the largest opposition parties – the Rally 
of Democratic Forces (Regroupement des Forces Démocratiques, RFD) 
led by defeated 2007 presidential candidate, Ahmed Ould Daddah, 
the Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal (Parti Républicain 
Démocratique et Renouvellement, PRDR) headed by ex-CMJD chair, 
Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, and the Union for Democracy and Progress 
(Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès, UDP) founded and fronted by 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamdi Ould Mouknass – united to 
form the broadly pro-coup coalition called Mithaq El Wihda. Despite 
initially opposing the 2009 election, the FNDD duly participated and 
was represented by the leader of the Popular Alliance for Progress 
(Alliance Populaire Progressiste, APP), Messaoud Ould Boulkheir. One 
of the COD’s member organisations, the National Rally for Reform and 
Development (Tawassoul/ Rassemblement National pour la Réforme et le 
Développement, RNRD), broke the coalition’s boycott of the 2013 elec-
tion. And, even though it has a majority, Abdel Aziz’s UR is part of the 
Coalition of the Majority (Coalition des Partis de la Majorité, CPM) which 
together controls 110 (out of 147) seats.65 While genuine opposition to the 
regime still exists, Abdel Aziz has successfully drawn a range of groups 
and parties to his banner.
191
Mauritania
Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Competitive authoritarianism has been restored to Mauritania by President 
Abdel Aziz. The main system and style of government for much of the 
past twenty-five years, it had, immediately prior to his taking office, given 
way to more democratic processes and institutions. The first significant 
step in its introduction was taken by Colonel (as he was then) Taya on 12 
July 1991 when he held a referendum to secure popular approval for his 
new constitution. This generally liberal and encouraging document com-
mitted the state and government to respect and defend human rights, hold 
regular elections and allow the establishment of an unrestricted number 
of political parties.66 In accordance with its strictures, Colonel Taya held 
a succession of parliamentary (1992, 1996 and 2001) and presidential 
(1992, 1997 and 2003) elections, each one competed for by several parties.
Yet, contrary to the letter of the new constitution – if perhaps not the 
intention of its drafter – none was ever free and fair. In the 1992 leg-
islative ballot, Taya’s Democratic and Social Republican Party (Parti 
Républicaine Démocratique et Social, PRDS) secured 85 per cent of the 
seats with 67 per cent of the vote. The next best-placed party – the Rally 
for Democracy and Unity (Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et l’Unité, 
RDU) – returned just a single member of parliament. And the 1992 presi-
dential election, which resulted in a landslide victory for Taya, was marred 
by serious allegations of fraud as supporters of the Union of Democratic 
Forces (Union des Forces Démocratiques, UFD) were prevented from 
registering to vote, sometimes forcibly, by military personnel.67 Such out-
comes and patterns of behaviour were repeated throughout Taya’s time in 
office. While not quite as remarkable as the victories secured by the RCD 
and Ben Ali, the PRDS and Taya never took less than 67.6 (1996) or 62.7 
(1992) per cent of the vote respectively.68
On 3 August 2005, President Taya was ousted in a coup d’état. He 
was initially replaced by the CMJD led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed 
Vall. In an effort to appease the West, which was much aggrieved by 
Taya’s removal, the CMJD did what few expected it to do: strengthen the 
country’s democratic processes and institutions. For, by the time it struck, 
Mauritania had long grown used to such military interventions. The inde-
pendence years were studded with a succession of depositions, four in 
total with Taya’s the fifth. Each ousting was accompanied by similar justi-
fications: decisive action was needed to save the country which would, as 
a result, undergo a political renaissance. Yet, not once had an intercession 
led to democracy. The closest the country had come had been under Taya 
whose new constitution outlined a competitive multiparty system that was 
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never fully implemented. There were, in short, few precedents for what 
the CMJD did.
One of the council’s earliest reforms was to establish the Independent 
National Electoral Commission (Commission Electorale Nationale 
Indépendante, CENI) to organise and oversee all future ballots. Despite 
lacking sufficient trained personnel and much essential equipment, the 
commission’s creation marked a vital first step, a declaration of liberalis-
ing intent by the new regime and, more practically, a bulwark against the 
undemocratic influence of the Ministry of the Interior. Other reforms soon 
followed. Presidential term limits – two periods of no more than five years 
each – were introduced. The practice of transporting military personnel to 
vote in opposition constituencies was ended.69 Members of the CMJD and 
other military officers were barred from standing for election either in or 
out of uniform. And United Nations help organising fresh elections was 
formally requested.70
In accordance with these changes, local, parliamentary and presidential 
elections were staged in November and December 2006, and March 2007 
respectively. And, while not perfect – ‘the military’s chosen candidates 
. . . took over both the National Assembly and the presidency’ – they were 
still freer and fairer than any held before or since.71 The 2007 election 
was a landmark occasion for both country and region. It was the first time 
Mauritania elected a civilian – Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi – in an open 
and competitive vote. And it was the first time an Arab League member 
staged a free and fair executive election.72 So impressed were the United 
States and European Union by the CMJD’s reforms that they lifted the aid 
embargo they had imposed shortly after Taya’s removal.
On 6 August 2008, however, Mauritania’s democratic experiment 
came to a juddering halt when former CMJD member, Colonel Mohamed 
Ould Abdel Aziz, ousted President Abdallahi in yet another military-led 
coup d’état. The country’s retreat into competitive authoritarianism since 
then has been inexorable but erratic, mainly because Abdel Aziz cannot 
afford completely to ignore or totally undo all the liberalising reforms his 
predecessors introduced. Like every competitive authoritarian leader, he 
needs to maintain a degree of democracy to satisfy Western sensibilities, 
and he must also calm the significant domestic discontent that his actions 
provoked. Preserving some of what he inherited, therefore, has been 
one of the ways in which he has tried to persuade sceptical and agitated 
Mauritanians to come to terms with what he has done.
Power was initially invested in the High Council of State (Haut 
Conseil d’État, HCE) led by Abdel Aziz.73 Over the next ten months, the 
council engaged in protracted negotiations with the opposition, led by 
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the FNDD and the RFD, over the fate of Abdallahi and the staging of a 
new presidential election. These talks were finally concluded on 4 June 
2009 with the signature of the Dakar Accords. Under the terms of this 
agreement, the HCE relinquished power to a Transitional Government 
of National Unity (Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition, 
GUNT) on 27 June 2009 which was initially headed by Abdallahi who 
promptly resigned in order to allow the country’s political order to return 
to a more regular constitutional footing.74 The Transitional Government 
then remained in power to organise the presidential election before being 
 dissolved on election day (18 July 2009).75
By these means, Abdel Aziz hoped to appease his domestic opponents 
and Western governments, and reconcile them to what he had done. His 
willingness to negotiate with the FNDD and RFD was a key part of this 
strategy and, even though the HCE used some force against the protestors 
who took to the streets in the days and weeks immediately following the 
coup, it did not rely on coercion alone.76 And, by delegating responsibil-
ity for organising and conducting the 2009 presidential election to the 
Transitional Government, it was better able to present the vote as free and 
fair.
Indeed, the ballot was held under much the same terms as the 2008 
election. The CENI was again put in charge of making the arrangements 
and overseeing the conduct of the vote. Each candidate was allowed to 
send two observers to every polling station to monitor what was taking 
place. Media coverage of the competing campaigns was mostly fair and 
equal.77 And, while Abdel Aziz’s eventual victory was both predictable 
and handsome, the size of his winning margin was not an affront to cred-
ibility.78 The country’s Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel, 
CCo) duly declared him the winner and the result was ‘recognized by the 
international community’.79
The FNDD and other opposition groups rejected the outcome, however, 
on the grounds that the election was flawed. The Transitional Government 
and CENI had been given just twenty-one days in which to prepare, not 
nearly enough time to do everything that was needed to ensure a free and 
fair vote. Most credible international election monitors had declined to 
participate, arguing that conditions prevented them from carrying out 
a ‘complete and effective observation mission’.80 The Constitutional 
Council had acted with suspicious haste, declaring the winner just forty-
eight hours after the polls had closed, far earlier than it had to and before 
the Electoral Commission’s final report into the conduct of the ballot had 
been published. The chairman of the CENI, Sidi Ahmed Ould Deye, had 
sufficient doubts about the ‘reliability’ of the result to resign from his 
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post.81 And the constitutional ordinance barring members of the armed 
forces and CMJD from standing for election had simply been ignored.82
But the opposition’s biggest grievance was about the broader context 
in which the vote had been held, for it had not been staged in accordance 
with established and accepted constitutional practice as part of a long-
standing and culturally embedded political routine. On the contrary, it 
had taken place because a cabal of usurpers had demanded that it did. 
After overthrowing the legally elected president, they wanted the chance 
to acquire retrospective public approval, clearly not because they valued 
and respected the democratic will of the people but because they needed 
to normalise and legitimise what they had done. The election, then, was 
never intended to be an open competition. No amount of promises and 
concessions was going to alter the almost certain outcome. Its function, 
instead, was as an electoral coronation, to give Abel Aziz a mandate after 
the fact. Not only was the staging of the 2009 election an affront to the 
very principles it was supposed to embody and implement but its inevita-
ble conclusion marked the final triumph of the 2008 coup d’état. In con-
ception, design and conduct, therefore, it was a profoundly competitive 
authoritarian exercise.
So, too, were the 2013 parliamentary and 2014 presidential elections, 
in part because many of the issues and antagonisms which had defined 
both the content and conduct of the previous ballot also dominated these 
later votes. Indeed, ten of the largest and most popular parties –  belonging 
to the anti-regime Coordination of Democratic Opposition coalition – 
boycotted the 2013 election in protest at the government’s preparations 
for it.83 The only COD member to participate was the Tawassoul which 
was beaten into a distant second by Abdel Aziz’s Union for the Republic. 
Conveniently, the UR secured exactly enough seats (seventy-four out of 
147) to form a majority while the Tawassoul gained only sixteen, prompt-
ing its leader,84 Jemil Ould Mansour, to complain to the CENI about 
‘ballot stuffing in some places and the resumption of the vote after the 
count in others’.85
The 2014 presidential election was also boycotted by the COD – 
 including the Tawassoul this time – leading to a turnout rate of just 56 
per cent.86 Further serious doubts about the credibility of the process 
were stirred by the eventual result, as Abdel Aziz secured victory with 
82 per cent of the vote, a triumph on a comparable scale to those of Ben 
Ali. Furthermore, his nearest challenger, Biram Ould Dah Ould Abeid, 
standing for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (Initiative 
pour la Resurgence du Mouvement Abolitioniste, IRMA), was able to 
muster only 9 per cent. Despite his complaining to the CENI, Western 
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governments quickly recognised the outcome and congratulated ‘the 
people of Mauritania on the successful completion of peaceful and orderly 
presidential election’. Tellingly, they did not praise the regime for the 
freeness and fairness of the ballot.87
The recurrence of many of the same allegations and arguments across 
these elections highlights just how much less affected by the Arab Spring 
Mauritania has been than its northern neighbours. While protests were 
staged in many of the country’s larger urban centres throughout 2011 
and early 2012, they were not as numerous or as large as those organised 
elsewhere in the region. And, even though a higher proportion of these 
rallies was more overtly political (rather than economic) than those held 
in Algeria and Morocco, the casus belli was often an older, more enduring 
grievance linked to the 2008 coup d’état. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given 
that the 2009 election – arguably the final act in the coup – took place 
just eighteen months earlier, the country’s Arab Spring protests were 
profoundly shaped and coloured by what had gone on before. Certainly, 
locally, they were both seen and presented as a continuation of this earlier 
unrest.
Partly as a result, the regime has remained alive to its origins, to how 
it initially acquired power. In addition to respecting some of the political 
reforms introduced by the CMJD and Abdallahi, therefore, it has preserved 
the country’s generally permissive media environment. In this, Mauritania 
is far more liberal than its northern neighbours. In the Reporters Without 
Borders’ 2015 Press Freedom Index, it was ranked 55th (out of 180 coun-
tries), well ahead of Algeria (119th), Tunisia (126th), Morocco (130th), 
Libya (154th) and Egypt (158th).88 And, since taking power, the regime 
has broadly strengthened the media reforms made by its predecessors. It 
does not interfere in the workings of the High Authority for the Press and 
Broadcasting (Haute Autorité de la Presse et de l’Audiovisuel, HAPA), 
the independent body established by Abdallahi in October 2006 to 
oversee the media. Nor does it seek to control or curb the activities of the 
Mauritanian Journalists’ Union (Syndicat des Journalistes Mauritaniens, 
SJM). In 2011, it ‘abolished prison sentences for slander and defamation, 
including for speech about heads of state’. And, in late 2011, it approved 
the launch of several new, independent television and radio stations, 
thereby bringing its fifty-one-year monopoly over the country’s broadcast 
media to an end.89
Nevertheless the regime still actively restricts both freedom of speech 
and the media. And, perhaps more worryingly, over the past couple of 
years it has contemplated passing new legislation which, if introduced, 
would greatly undermine existing liberties. Many of the abuses which are 
Democratisation in the Maghreb
196
perpetrated presently are (over-) reactions to something said or written 
about one of Mauritania’s sensitive topics – Islam, the military, high-
level corruption and slavery. While these issues are not quite as taboo as 
the monarchy, Islam and the Western Sahara are in Morocco – not least 
because they are not proscribed to the same extent either in law or by 
culture – the authorities still tend to treat harshly those deemed to have 
said something offensive.
Indeed, in March 2014, six journalists were detained by the security ser-
vices for covering a press conference held by the banned Islamist group, 
Friends of the Prophet (Ahbab Errassoul). Then, in December 2014, a 
journalist at the Al-Layl newspaper, Abeh Ould Mohammed Lafdal, was 
arrested by police and detained without charge for several days following 
an argument he had with President Abdel Aziz. And, also in December 
2014, Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mohamed Ould Mkhaitir was sentenced 
to death for apostasy for arguing in a blog post that local interpretations 
of Islam helped legitimise and entrench the country’s rigid caste system. 
Such cases only encourage journalists to keep practising self-censorship.90
And what protections the law currently provides may soon be legally 
pared back if the government passes the cybercrime bill it has been prepar-
ing with intermittent urgency since early 2013. If promulgated, it ‘would 
establish jail time and heavy fines for disseminating certain types of politi-
cally sensitive content over the internet’, ‘bring encryption technology 
under heavy state regulation’ and, most notably, ‘nullify previous laws 
extending protections to journalists using digital technologies’.91
Conclusions
Mauritania’s political development over the past decade tests all aspects of 
Levitsky and Way’s model. Its earlier turn towards democracy (2005–8) 
seems to provide a textbook demonstration of how Western pressure can 
affect political change. So great was the country’s dependence on interna-
tional aid and such was the West’s displeasure at President Taya’s defen-
estration, that the HCE felt compelled, in a last-ditch attempt to regain 
the trust of the donors whose support was so essential, to introduce a raft 
of political reforms. This programme culminated in the 2008 presidential 
election, still the freest and fairest vote ever held in the country, and the 
first of its kind staged by an Arab League member. Western pressure, care-
fully targeted and judiciously applied, drove an illegitimate and usurping 
regime to democratise.
Yet the new order was short-lived and its demise posed difficult ques-
tions for Levitsky and Way even though, in the first instance, its fate 
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confirmed their most basic premise: that not all political transitions result 
in democracy. The HCE’s armed intercession brought an abrupt halt to 
the country’s liberalising march. President Abdallahi was overthrown 
and barred from standing in the 2009 election which, while conducted in 
accordance with many of the reforms he and the CMJD had introduced, 
was not as free and fair as before. And, inevitably, Abdel Aziz’s victory 
cast huge doubt on the West’s intent. Its complaints about the HCE’s 
intervention did not prevent it from recognising and collaborating with the 
new regime. It appeared to have lost both the will and the way to sustain 
the democracy it had helped bring about.
Yet, in one crucial respect, the West’s behaviour was entirely consist-
ent. Mauritania’s democratic turn did not occur because of Western inten-
tions, but despite them. Democratisation was a happy, yet unexpected 
and unsolicited, outcome for Washington and Brussels. Abdel Aziz’s 
ascension simply pulled back the curtain, therefore, on the West’s true 
motivations and objectives. And, even now, despite the Arab Spring and 
their promises better to support what liberalising ambitions the region’s 
inhabitants harbour, Western governments do not crave democracy for 
Mauritania above all else. Their most fervent desire remains, as always, 
security and stability, to the extent that they are prepared to support Abdel 
Aziz because he is the incumbent and sensitive to their fears for and in the 
region.
Both the West’s seeming erraticism and privileging of strategic con-
siderations are well explained by Levitsky and Way’s model. The United 
States and European Union have only medium links to Mauritania. This 
means that their investment in democracy there is entirely inconsist-
ent. So, even though their leverage over Nouakchott is medium and the 
regime’s ability to withstand their influence reduced, they have exerted 
uneven democratising pressure. The regime has medium organisational 
power. While the security apparatus is well funded, it is factionalised and, 
therefore, lacks cohesion. And, despite the ruling UR’s dominance of the 
National Assembly, it was established only recently as a vehicle for Abdel 
Aziz and, as such, lacks deep roots in large parts of the country.
The regime’s susceptibility to the West’s authority, even if irregularly 
wielded, provides an intriguing corollary to Levitsky and Way’s model 
because its vulnerability is largely and deliberately self-induced as a 
result of the Black Knight patronage it once accepted from Libya, Syria 
and, above all, Iraq. By aligning with Baghdad, President Taya not only 
made an opponent of the West but developed a dependence on a country 
whose ability to provide patronage was irreparably curtailed. When this 
happened, Taya’s response was completely to reposition Mauritania and 
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actively seek Western approval and support. He therefore acquiesced to 
many of the West’s core demands. He liberalised the country’s politics 
but this amounted to little more than holding regular, but uncompetitive, 
elections and, far more significantly, established diplomatic relations with 
Israel, a decision that is still widely resented at home. Yet, despite such 
bitter opposition, this compromise, arguably more than any other, helped 
shift Mauritania to where Taya wanted it to be: firmly in the West’s politi-
cal orbit.
And, in making this journey, the country has conformed to another 
of Levitsky and Way’s foundational observations: that, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War, ‘the primary sources of external assistance were 
. . . located almost exclusively in the West’, driving ‘many autocrats [to] 
adopt formal democratic institutions in an effort to “position their countries 
favorably in the international contest for scarce development resources” ’.92 
Mauritania’s initial shift to competitive authoritarianism, therefore, formed 
part of the main wave of transitions identified by Levitsky and Way and 
examined in their book. And, though its shift was triggered by Iraq’s 
demise rather than that of the Soviet Union,93 the principal causes of its 
transformation are otherwise largely the same as those captured in their 
model. In more ways than one Mauritania is a near textbook case study.
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The past few years have been a period of unprecedented political upheaval 
for the Maghreb. While each country had, of course, experienced dra-
matic moments before – Ben Ali’s ousting of Bourguiba, Algeria’s Black 
October riots, the Casablanca bombings and Mauritania’s 2005 and 2008 
coups d’état to name but some – nothing of the breadth, depth or duration 
of the Arab Spring, a protest that began in a provincial city in one of North 
Africa’s quieter corners and quickly engulfed the entire region. Presidents 
of decades’ standing – latter-day imperators – were swept from office on 
waves of public discontent while their counterparts elsewhere nervously 
and hurriedly tried to calm the mob.
In several places, these protests are still being played out: in the law 
courts of Egypt; on the bloody battlefields of Libya; and in the leaking tubs 
carrying migrants to Europe. And, even where the winds of change seem to 
have died down, the political and social landscape is different from before, 
sometimes markedly so. Algeria has dispensed with its nineteen-year-long 
state of emergency. King Mohammed VI is now obliged – constitution-
ally, at least – to consult his prime minister more frequently and widely. 
Mauritania has a new youth movement. Tunisia has become a democracy.
And herein lies one of the defining paradoxes of the Arab Spring; its 
ubiquity and singularity. Nearly all of the region’s countries have been 
directly affected, have experienced some domestic manifestation of this 
transnational phenomenon. Anti-government rallies were staged every-
where throughout early 2011. Umbrella bodies mushroomed better to 
co-ordinate, direct and motivate protestors. Public squares were occupied, 
government buildings targeted, symbols of the regime attacked, yet, 
despite making similar demands in largely the same ways over much the 
same period, the outcomes of these protests varied hugely. These transna-
tional forces were given local faces. Domestic factors and concerns helped 
generate unique results.
Regional specialists were repeatedly confounded – initially at least – 
by this interplay of generalities and specificities. They compounded their 
collective failure to anticipate the start of the Arab Spring first by being 
too conservative and then too ambitious. They misdiagnosed what would 
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become of Ben Ali’s regime and the speed of its collapse. They then 
overcompensated and predicted sweeping changes everywhere all at once: 
Algeria was to be next, Bouteflika’s days were definitely numbered. And, 
while the tide of change certainly swept through the streets of Algiers, the 
regime survived along with those in Rabat and Nouakchott.
An important aim of this book, therefore, has been to chart and explain 
these discrepancies: why Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania have 
reached different political outcomes. It has done so by contextualising 
each country’s experiences both temporally and regionally. Their indi-
vidual political development has been examined over the past decade 
and set alongside those of their three near neighbours. The examination 
and comparison have been guided and structured according to Levitsky 
and Way’s model. Nevertheless, the book is not primarily about the Arab 
Spring protests: why they began; how they developed as they did; and 
with what consequences. It is not a taxonomy of who did what and when. 
Rather, the unrest represents a vital moment in the recent political lives of 
these countries, a crucial turn in the development of the book’s true focus 
on modern Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.
Formulated in response to events from a different period, Levitsky and 
Way’s model both anticipates these variations and offers a framework for 
explaining them. One of their foundational assumptions – that political, 
even liberalising, transitions do not always lead to democracy – has cer-
tainly been borne out. Of the four case studies examined here, only Tunisia 
has achieved this transformation. The other three have all remained 
largely as they were: ‘civilian regimes in which formal democratic institu-
tions exist and are widely viewed as the means of gaining power, but in 
which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advan-
tage vis-à-vis their opponents’;1 that is to say, they are still competitive 
authoritarian.
Levitsky and Way’s model places more emphasis than most on the 
United States and European Union as democratising forces. In particu-
lar, it assesses both their links to, and leverage over, regimes. Linkage is 
measured across six categories of connection – economic, intergovern-
mental, technocratic, social, information and civil society. Leverage is 
determined by the amount of democratising pressure the United States 
and the European Union can bring to bear balanced against the regime’s 
ability to resist their influence. If these links are numerous and good, and 
Western leverage high, then democratisation is more likely, no matter how 
much organisational power the regime has. But, if linkage and leverage 
are weaker, then the regime’s coercive, political and economic capabilities 
play a more decisive role.
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The United States and European Union had high linkage to, and high 
leverage over, Ben Ali’s regime. Nevertheless, they did not put as much 
democratising pressure on Tunis as they could have done. Their failure 
to do so was born of reluctance and the inability and unwillingness of 
Western governments and different parts of the European Union to co-
ordinate their leverage better. Ben Ali’s regime fell, and the country made 
the transition to democracy, because of the weakness of its organisational 
power caused by an insuperable division between the armed and security 
forces, and the RCD’s brittle cohesion owing to a lack of non-material ties.
The United States and European Union have medium linkage to, and 
low leverage over, Bouteflika’s regime. Some connections (technocratic, 
social, information and civil society) are stronger than others (economic 
and intergovernmental). For reasons rooted in history, Algiers remains far 
more wary about joining Western policy frameworks and agreeing trea-
ties with Washington and Brussels than Tunis and Rabat do for fear of 
diminishing its hard-won sovereignty and freedom of manoeuvre. And, 
as a major oil producer with a large economy, it is well equipped to resist 
whatever democratising pressure the US and EU might want to put on 
it. In fact, they are disinclined to press Algiers to democratise for fear of 
undermining its ability to counter Islamist terror groups in the region or 
impair its oil and gas provision. Algiers also has strong organisational 
power based on its large, well-funded and battle-hardened security appa-
ratus which is led by men who have extensive experience of winning and 
retaining power by force of arms.
The United States and European Union have high linkage to, and low 
leverage over, the Moroccan regime. Rabat is the West’s closest ally in 
the region and has eagerly joined all the policy frameworks that it can 
at the earliest opportunity. Its large economy, though, means that it is 
well placed to withstand whatever democratising pressure the US and 
EU might wish to put on it. It also has high organisational power based 
on an effective and cohesive security apparatus. But, as with Tunis and 
Algiers, Washington and Brussels are disinclined to try to compel Rabat 
to democratise for fear of undermining the regime and eroding its ability 
to act as a bulwark against Islamist extremism and terrorism in the region. 
Furthermore, and again as before, this pressure is further compromised by 
the failure of Western governments and different parts of the European 
Union to co-ordinate their efforts better.
The United States and European Union have medium links to, and 
medium leverage over, Abdel Aziz’s regime. Of the four case studies 
examined here, Mauritania has the fewest ties to the United States and 
Europe. It belongs to only one EU policy framework (the UfM) and has 
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no trade agreements with the United States. And, uniquely, most members 
of its diaspora do not live in Europe but in other African countries. It is 
neither a major nor an intermediate oil producer, does not possess nuclear 
weapons, has a small economy and no longer has the backing of a Black 
Knight patron. It also has only medium organisational power as both its 
security apparatus and ruling party lack scope and cohesion. Nevertheless, 
its medium links to the West mean that Washington and Brussels, 
Paris and Madrid do not put consistent democratising pressure on it. 
Furthermore, and as with Tunis, Algiers and Rabat, they remain reluctant 
to press it harder through fear that they will weaken its ability to combat 
Islamist terrorism and deal with illegal migration.
Levitsky and Way’s model, therefore, has been used to structure the 
analysis of each case study and facilitate their comparison. This is the first 
time the model has been applied to these countries. Its application has pro-
vided fresh insight into why they each developed in the ways that they did 
– including their respective experiences of the Arab Spring – and how they 
are similar to, and differ from, their neighbours. The case studies have, in 
turn, tested and extended some of Levitsky and Way’s ideas, most notably 
about history and geography, unelected executives, ruling parties, the rela-
tionship between high- and low-intensity coercion and the  cohesion and 
scope of armed and security forces, and Western intent.
Algeria shows us that history and geography are not neutral enablers 
of stronger links between a country and the West. Sometimes, in fact, 
shared experiences, facilitated in Algeria’s case by geographic proximity, 
can have the reverse effect and deter the forging of certain types of con-
nection. Algeria’s wariness about joining some of the European Union’s 
policy frameworks, most notably the UfM, is directly informed by its 
extended colonisation by France and the high price it had to pay to secure 
its independence. Algiers continues to guard very jealously its hard-won 
sovereignty and freedom of manoeuvre. This lesson also reinforces the 
value of comparative analysis because Algeria’s weaker intergovernmen-
tal links become more apparent when contrasted with those of Tunisia and 
Morocco.
Morocco and Algeria also demonstrate that Levitsky and Way’s 
model can be applied to regimes in which unelected executives and 
tutelary authorities wield significant political power. While neither King 
Mohammed nor the Algerian armed forces have to submit to the vote 
to renew their mandates, their authority and positions in their respec-
tive political systems are still profoundly affected by elections and their 
outcomes. Who wins and on what platform have huge implications for 
their roles and the extent of their influence. They, like all competitive 
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authoritarian regimes, need a degree of democracy – achieved mainly 
through the staging of regular multiparty elections – to satisfy Western 
opinion and assuage domestic opposition. Yet these ballots are rarely free 
and fair, and the political playing field remains heavily tilted in favour of 
pro-regime parties and candidates.
The Moroccan and Algerian regimes have also forged different working 
relationships with their respective ruling parties. Unlike either Abdel Aziz 
or, in particular, Ben Ali, who more closely conform to Levitsky and 
Way’s ideal arrangement, King Mohammed and Bouteflika do not rely on 
one group that they have privileged and elevated above all others. Instead, 
they court and favour several, both alternately and simultaneously. The 
Istiqlal and the PJD, the RND and the FLN must compete with one 
another and others for posts, power and prestige. That these two regimes, 
of the four examined, should take this approach suggests an interesting 
correlation between the presence of an unelected executive or tutelary 
authority and the ability of those in power to dispense with a more conven-
tional ruling party. Seemingly, because they are less directly dependent on 
elections – in that neither the king nor the armed forces must submit to the 
vote themselves – they can afford not to create or build up organisations 
that can subsequently limit their actions. They are able to avoid Ben Ali’s 
symbiosis with the RCD whereby the party relied on him but he, in turn, 
depended on it.
This observation is buttressed by the lesser gradations between these 
four case studies. King Mohammed is arguably the most able to dominate 
his country’s political parties because he is the least dependent on elec-
tions. Bouteflika, with the backing of the military, can afford to play off 
the RND and FLN against each other to a greater extent than Abdel Aziz 
who, in turn, does not need to elevate the UR to the same position as the 
RCD because he has the support of parts of the Mauritanian armed forces. 
Again, comparative analysis is crucial to highlighting these differences, 
to exposing the subtle contrasts between the various case studies and sug-
gesting what they might mean for Levitsky and Way’s model.
The book also deliberately inverts another of Levitsky and Way’s 
observations better to appraise and demonstrate organisational power. 
They argue that ‘scope is particularly important for low-intensity coer-
cion’ and that ‘cohesion is critical to the success of high-intensity coer-
cion’,2 that is, that a regime’s armed and security forces can conduct 
certain types of operation only if they have good reach and are unified. 
The book reasons that, on this basis, the reverse can also be demonstrated, 
that a security apparatus’s capacity to undertake low- and high-intensity 
actions can be used to determine its scope and cohesion. This logical 
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innovation offers another means of evaluating a regime’s coercive capa-
bility and organisational power, and forms part of the book’s assessment 
of each of its case studies.
Finally, the book confirms the great importance of one of Levitsky 
and Way’s caveats: that ‘where Western powers have countervailing eco-
nomic or strategic interests at stake, autocratic governments often possess 
the bargaining power to ward off external demands for democracy by 
casting themselves – and regime stability – as the best means of protecting 
those interests’.3 The same can also be said of competitive authoritarian 
regimes. A common feature of all the case studies examined here is the 
extent to which the West has avoided putting as much democratising pres-
sure on them as it could for fear of impairing their ability to pursue some 
strategic line deemed essential by the United States, European Union and 
European governments. This vital qualification not only helps preserve the 
analytical rigour of Levitsky and Way’s model but also explain why Ben 
Ali’s Tunisia was, and Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania have remained, 
competitive authoritarian.
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